

# Fast Facts



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## Families

### FAMILY COMING TO THE FORE

**R**ecent attention to issues as diverse as gang warfare in the Western Cape and the living conditions of mineworkers underlines the relevance of the Institute's research on families.

**T**here is increasing recognition in South Africa that families matter, in part as a result of a concerted effort by the Institute to put this issue on the map. Our research over the last two years generated unprecedented attention in the Media.

One of the outcomes has been the release last year of the *Green Paper on Families*, which has since been drafted into a white paper in an overall attempt to make family a higher priority in government policy.

President Jacob Zuma recently referred to Institute research as he highlighted the importance of the family as a social institution. He cited the prevalence of absent fatherhood, orphanhood, and child-headed households, and called for the strengthening of families.

This issue of *Fast Facts* includes the latest available statistics on families in South Africa. Orphans, child-headed households, single parenthood, absent fatherhood, and teenage pregnancy are among the aspects on which data is provided (pages 2-7). Government policy on families is assessed on pages 8-10.

As research on the issue published last year by the Institute argued (*Fast Facts* April and May 2011), the breakdown of families has links to social problems such as violence, teenage pregnancy, and poor educational outcomes. Increasingly questions are being asked about why South Africa is such a violent society, affected by extreme forms of violence ranging from gang warfare to the rape of grandmothers. The breakdown of families, and in particular the absence of men in their children's lives, ought to be considered as a piece of this depressing puzzle.

Recent attention to the living conditions of mineworkers in the aftermath of the Marikana massacre suggests there are still many questions about the dynamics of family life in modern-day South Africa that remain unanswered. Many of the men killed in the massacre supported families living apart from them in the rural Eastern Cape and Lesotho.

To what extent does this splitting up of families continue because of the norms set in place when such a practice was enforced as part of apartheid policies? Or perhaps problems such as poor housing and crime put men off bringing their families to live with them where they work. The fact is that without further research we do not know. What is becoming clear, however, is the importance of a continuing focus on the family. — **Lucy Holborn**

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## The South African family in numbers

**A**s the tables on the next four pages show, family life in South Africa is characterised by a decline in marriage, an increase in the number of single-parent households, a significant increase in the number of children growing up without a father regardless of whether he is living or deceased, and a marked increase in orphaned children. Research suggests that one outcome of some of these trends is more unwanted and therefore unplanned teenage pregnancies, which in turn means more children will be born into unstable families.

**R**egistered marriages, which include both civil and customary marriages, declined in South Africa by 8% between 2003 and 2010. Civil marriages alone declined by just over 4%, while customary marriages declined by 42% (Table 1). Children born to unmarried parents are statistically more likely to end up living in single-parent households than those born to married parents. Single-parent households in turn are more likely to be affected by poverty and unemployment.

Children, who are defined as individuals under the age of 18, comprise approximately 40% of South Africa's population. This amounts to just over 18.5 million children (Table 2).

Some 0.5% of all children in South Africa live in households headed by children. The number of children living in such households decreased by 29% between 2002 and 2010, from 118 000 to just over 92 000. Mpumalanga and the Eastern Cape have the highest proportions of children living in child-headed households, at 0.8% each, followed by KwaZulu-Natal, at 0.6% (Table 3). This can be attributed to a high prevalence of HIV/AIDS and net out-migration patterns.

Just under 1.5 million children live with their grandparents and great aunts or uncles in what are known as 'skip-generation' households. Some 8% of all South African children live in such households (Table 10).

There were just over 3.5 million orphans in 2010, with 636 000 (4% of children) being maternal, 2.1 million (12%) being paternal, and 800 000 (4%) being double orphans (Table 4).

Only 34% of South African children live with both their parents, compared to 39% who live with their mother only, 3% who live with their father only, and 24% — almost a quarter — who live with neither of their parents. Some 81% of Indian children live with both their parents, followed by 78% of white children, and 51% of coloured children. Only 28% of African children live with both their parents. (Table 8).

Some 13% of all African children are paternal orphans, as opposed to 6% of coloured, 3% of Indian, and 2% of white children. Some 4% of African children are maternal orphans, and 5% are double orphans (Table 6). The higher proportion of paternal orphans can be attributed to higher mortality rates among men. In addition, children with unknown paternal identities are recorded as paternal orphans because the vital status of their fathers is not known.

In 2010 some 47% of children had absent but living fathers. Some 16% had deceased fathers, while 37% had a present father. Between 1996 and 2010 the proportion of children with absent fathers increased by 14%, while the proportion with deceased fathers increased by 75%. The proportion of children whose fathers were present decreased by 26% (Table 11).

Research published by the Institute in 2011 (*Fast Facts*, April and May 2011) has shown that young girls who grow up without fathers are more likely to experience lower self-esteem, higher levels of risky sexual behaviour, and more difficulties in romantic relationships. They are also more likely to fall pregnant early, bear children outside of marriage, marry early, or get divorced.

The teenage fertility rate in South Africa is on the decline, dropping from 81 births per 1 000 women aged between 15 and 19 in 1997 to 54 in 2010 (Table 13). However, teenage pregnancy remains a problem. The proportion of sexually active 15-19 year olds who had ever been pregnant increased by 28% between 2002 and 2008, from 19% to 24%. The Northern Cape had the most significant increase, 160%, followed by the Eastern Cape with 147%. Only two provinces experienced decreasing teenage pregnancy, namely Mpumalanga with a 10% decrease, and Limpopo with a 4% decrease (Table 12).

These figures, updated from the last research the Institute conducted on families (*Fast Facts*, April and May 2011) point to four main problems facing South African families — the decline of marriage on the one hand and, on the other, increases in orphanhood, absent fathers, and teenage pregnancy. In this issue of *Fast Facts* we look at legislation and policy aimed at curbing these problems, which undermine family life.

— *Lerato Moloi*

# Families

## MARRIAGE REGISTRATIONS<sup>a</sup>, 2003-10

Year	Civil marriages <sup>b</sup>	Customary marriages <sup>c</sup>	Total
2003	178 689	17 283	195 972
2004	176 521	20 301	196 822
2005	180 657	19 252	199 909
2006	184 860	14 039	198 899
2007	183 030	20 259	203 289
2008	186 522	16 003	202 525
2009	171 989	13 506	185 495
2010	170 826	9 996	180 822
<b>2003-10</b>	<b>-4.4%</b>	<b>-42.2%</b>	<b>-7.7%</b>

Source: Stats SA, *Marriages and divorces 2010*, Statistical release P0307, 12 December 2011, Table 1 p17, table 6 p24

- a Refers to all marriages of citizens and permanent residents that are recorded in the civil registration systems of the Department of Home Affairs (DHA).
- b Civil marriages are administered through the Marriage Act of 1961. They include marriages solemnised by lay licensed marriage officers and by priests or religious persons.
- c According to the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act of 1998, customary marriages are marriages that are negotiated, celebrated, or concluded according to any of the systems of indigenous African customary law which exist in South Africa. To be included in the data, customary marriages must have been registered at the Department of Home Affairs. The Act does not prohibit a man already in a customary marriage from entering into a civil marriage or another customary marriage. However, data is not collected on the marital status of men at the time they register new customary marriages, so no official data on the number of polygamous marriages in South Africa currently exists.

## CHILDREN<sup>a</sup> BY PROVINCE, 2010

Province	Number of children	Proportion	Total population	Proportion of population that are children
Eastern Cape	2 684 000	14.5%	6 743 800	39.8%
Free State	1 071 000	5.7%	2 824 500	37.9%
Gauteng	3 310 000	17.4%	11 191 700	29.6%
KwaZulu-Natal	4 267 000	23.0%	10 645 400	40.1%
Limpopo	2 258 000	12.4%	5 439 600	41.5%
Mpumalanga	1 460 000	7.9%	3 617 600	40.4%
North West	1 276 000	6.9%	3 200 900	39.9%
Northern Cape	430 000	2.3%	1 103 900	39.0%
Western Cape	1 771 000	9.5%	5 223 900	33.9%
<b>South Africa</b>	<b>18 527 000</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>49 991 300</b>	<b>37.1%</b>

Source: Stats SA, *Social profile of vulnerable groups in South Africa, 2002-2010*, Report No 03-19-00, 15 December 2011, Table 2.1, p5;

*Mid-year population estimates 2010*, Statistical release P0302, 27 July 2010, Table 2, p4

- a Children are defined as individuals under the age of 18 and comprise about 40% of the country's total population. Some provinces have higher proportions of their population that are children. This may be attributed to generally higher fertility rates in rural areas, and migration patterns where some parents leave their homes to seek work in areas where there are better job opportunities.

## CHILD-HEADED HOUSEHOLDS<sup>a</sup> BY PROVINCE, 2002-10

Province	2002		2007		2010		Change: 2002-10	
	Number	Proportion <sup>b</sup>	Number	Proportion <sup>b</sup>	Number	Proportion <sup>b</sup>	Number	Proportion
Eastern Cape	46 000	1.6%	37 000	1.2%	21 472	0.8%	-24 528	-50.0%
Free State	6 000	0.7%	8 000	0.7%	4 284	0.4%	-1 716	-42.9%
Gauteng	3 000	0.1%	6 000	0.2%	3 310	0.1%	310	0.0%
KwaZulu-Natal	18 000	0.5%	24 000	0.6%	25 602	0.6%	7 602	20.0%
Limpopo	32 000	1.3%	57 000	2.3%	27 096	1.2%	-4 904	-7.7%
Mpumalanga	8 000	0.6%	9 000	0.6%	11 680	0.8%	3 680	33.3%
North West	5 000	0.3%	5 000	0.4%	1 276	0.1%	-3 724	-66.7%
Northern Cape	0 <sup>c</sup>	0.2%	1 000	0.3%	1 290	0.3%	1 290	-
Western Cape	0 <sup>c</sup>	0.0% <sup>c</sup>	2 000	0.1%	0 <sup>c</sup>	0.0%	0 <sup>c</sup>	0.0%
<b>South Africa</b>	<b>118 000</b>	<b>0.7%</b>	<b>148 000</b>	<b>0.8%</b>	<b>92 365</b>	<b>0.5%</b>	<b>-25 635</b>	<b>-28.6%</b>

Source: University of Cape Town (UCT) Children's Institute, *South African Child Gauge 2010/2011*, 16 August 2011, p83; Stats SA, *Social profile of vulnerable groups in South Africa, 2002-2010*, Report No 03-19-00, 15 December 2011, Table 2.1, p5, Table 2.5, p8

- a Oldest resident is younger than 18 years.
- b The proportion of children in each province living in child-headed households.
- c The number or proportion of child-headed households is so small that it becomes nought when rounded off.
- In 2010 the Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, and Mpumalanga had the highest proportions of child-headed households. This can be attributed to the scourge of HIV/AIDS, and net out-migration that can be found in these provinces.

## FAMILIES

### ORPHANS<sup>a</sup> BY PROVINCE, 2010

<i>Province</i>	<i>Maternal orphans<sup>b</sup></i>		<i>Paternal orphans<sup>c</sup></i>		<i>Double orphans<sup>d</sup></i>	
	<i>Number</i>	<i>Proportion</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Proportion</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Proportion</i>
Eastern Cape	113 305	4.2%	376 805	14.0%	160 735	6.0%
Free State	40 599	3.8%	120 756	11.3%	66 624	6.2%
Gauteng	68 376	2.1%	296 296	9.0%	84 656	2.6%
KwaZulu-Natal	219 648	5.1%	642 048	15.0%	274 560	6.4%
Limpopo	48 246	2.1%	265 353	11.8%	61 404	2.7%
Mpumalanga	64 800	4.4%	158 400	10.8%	72 000	4.9%
North West	41 310	3.2%	111 780	8.8%	51 030	4.0%
Northern Cape	16 188	3.8%	40 896	9.5%	14 484	3.4%
Western Cape	29 801	1.7%	110 439	6.2%	19 283	1.1%
<b>South Africa</b>	<b>636 370</b>	<b>3.4%</b>	<b>2 127 294</b>	<b>11.5%</b>	<b>800 008</b>	<b>4.3%</b>

Source: Stats SA, *Social profile of vulnerable groups in South Africa, 2002-2010*, Report No 03-19-00, 15 December 2011, Table 2.2, p6; ASSA, *ASSA 2008 AIDS and Demographics Model*, March 2011

- a The proportion of all children in each province who are orphans. For example, 4.2% of all children in the Eastern Cape are maternal orphans.
- b Children who have lost their mother only.
- c Children who have lost their father only. The high number of paternal orphans can be attributed to higher mortality rates among men. In 2008 some 86% of all those who died as a result of violence were men, as compared to 14% who were women. In addition, children who have unknown paternal identities are recorded as paternal orphans.
- d Children who have lost both their parents.

### ORPHANS, 2010-25<sup>a</sup>

<i>Year</i>	<i>Maternal orphans</i>	<i>Paternal orphans</i>	<i>Double orphans</i>
2010	1 668 901	3 112 125	565 420
2011	1 712 677	3 135 067	599 874
2012	1 742 924	3 138 686	626 053
2013	1 763 010	3 127 568	645 140
2014	1 774 794	3 104 408	657 766
2015	1 779 248	3 070 880	664 359
2020	1 723 864	2 858 591	626 914
2025	1 612 004	2 656 048	553 319
<b>Change: 2010-2025</b>	<b>-0.03%</b>	<b>-0.15%</b>	<b>-0.02%</b>

Source: ASSA, *ASSA 2008 AIDS and Demographics Model*, March 2011

- a Projections.

## FAMILIES

### ORPHANS<sup>a</sup> BY RACE, 2010

Race	Maternal orphans <sup>b</sup>		Paternal orphans <sup>c</sup>		Double orphans <sup>d</sup>	
	Number	Proportion	Number	Proportion	Number	Proportion
African	600 171	3.9%	2 000 570	13.0%	784 839	5.1%
Coloured	36 675	2.5%	90 954	6.2%	13 203	0.9%
Indian	2 136	0.6%	9 612	2.7%	3 204	0.9%
White	1 942	0.2%	21 362	2.2%	971	0.1%
<b>Total</b>	<b>636 370</b>	<b>3.5%</b>	<b>2 127 294</b>	<b>11.7%</b>	<b>800 008</b>	<b>4.4%</b>

Source: Stats SA, *Social profile of vulnerable groups in South Africa, 2002-2010*, Report No 03-19-00, 15 December 2011, Table 2.2, p6


a The proportion of all children in each race group who are orphans. For example, 3.9% of all African children are maternal orphans, 13% are paternal orphans, and 5.1% are double orphans.

b Children who have lost their mother only.

c Children who have lost their father only. The high number of paternal orphans can be attributed to higher mortality rates among men. In addition, children with unknown paternal identities are recorded as paternal orphans.

d Children who have lost both their parents.

### PROPORTION OF CHILDREN WHO ARE ORPHANS BY RACE, 2010




## FAMILIES

### CHILDREN LIVING WITH/WITHOUT THEIR PARENTS BY RACE, 2010

<i>Race</i>	<i>Mother only</i>	<i>Father only</i>	<i>Both parents</i>	<i>Neither</i>	<i>Total<sup>a</sup></i>
African	41.9%	3.3%	28.0%	26.7%	100.0%
Coloured	34.0%	3.4%	50.8%	11.8%	100.0%
Indian	11.2%	2.1%	80.9%	5.8%	100.0%
White	16.1%	3.3%	77.5%	3.1%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>39.3%</b>	<b>3.3%</b>	<b>33.5%</b>	<b>23.9%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

Source: Stats SA, *Social profile of vulnerable groups in South Africa, 2002-2010*, Report No 03-19-00, 15 December 2011, Table 2.4, p7  
 a Totals should add up horizontally but may not, owing to rounding.

### CHILDREN LIVING WITHOUT THEIR PARENTS BY RACE, 2010



### CHILDREN LIVING IN SKIP GENERATION<sup>a</sup> HOUSEHOLDS BY RACE, 2010

<i>Race</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Proportion</i>
African	1 335 426	8.5%
Coloured	48 911	3.3%
Indian	14 433	4.1%
White	12 765	1.3%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1 408 052</b>	<b>7.6%</b>

Source: Stats SA, *Social profile of vulnerable groups in South Africa, 2002-2010*, Report No 03-19-00, 15 December 2011, Figure 2.1, p5, Figure 2.5, p11

a Skip generation households are those which have two or more non-consecutive generations living in a household. In other words, these figures indicate the number and proportion of children living with their grandparents and great aunts/uncles, without their parents.

## FAMILIES

### CHILDREN<sup>a</sup> WITH/WITHOUT FATHERS BY RACE, 1996-2010

<i>Race</i>	<i>Presence of father</i>	<i>1996<sup>b</sup></i>	<i>2009<sup>c</sup></i>	<i>2010<sup>c</sup></i>	<i>Change: 2009-10</i>
African	Deceased father	10.0%	18.4%	18.1%	-1.6%
	Absent (living) father	45.5%	51.5%	50.6%	-1.7%
	Father present	44.5%	30.1%	31.3%	4.0%
Coloured	Deceased father	7.3%	6.1%	7.1%	16.4%
	Absent (living) father	34.3%	40.8%	38.7%	-5.1%
	Father present	58.4%	53.1%	54.2%	2.1%
Indian	Deceased father	4.8%	2.4%	3.6%	50.0%
	Absent (living) father	16.6%	12.2%	13.4%	9.8%
	Father present	78.6%	85.4%	83.0%	2.8%
White	Deceased father	3.4%	1.7%	2.3%	35.3%
	Absent (living) father	12.8%	15.0%	16.9%	12.7%
	Father present	83.8%	83.3%	80.8%	3.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>Deceased father</b>	<b>9.2%</b>	<b>16.1%</b>	<b>16.1%</b>	<b>0.0%</b>
	<b>Absent (living) father</b>	<b>41.6%</b>	<b>48.0%</b>	<b>47.4%</b>	<b>1.3%</b>
	<b>Father present</b>	<b>49.2%</b>	<b>35.9%</b>	<b>36.5%</b>	<b>1.7%</b>

Source: SAIRR, *South Africa Survey 2009/2010*, 2010, p64; Stats SA, *Social profile of vulnerable groups in South Africa, 2002-2010*, Report No 03-19-00, 15 December 2011, Table 2.2, p6; Table 2.4, p7

a For the 1996 and 2002 data children refers to persons aged 0-15. For the 2009 and 2010 data children refers to persons aged 0-17. For this reason, this data is not strictly comparable to the 1996 data.

b Stats SA, October Household Survey data.

c Stats SA, General Household Survey data.

### TEENAGE<sup>a</sup> PREGNANCY BY PROVINCE, 2002 AND 2008

<i>Province</i>	<i>2002</i>	<i>2008</i>	<i>Change</i>
Eastern Cape	12.5%	30.9%	147.2%
Free State	15.9%	20.3%	27.7%
Gauteng	13.3%	19.4%	45.9%
KwaZulu-Natal	21.8%	25.8%	18.3%
Limpopo	29.8%	28.6%	-4.0%
Mpumalanga	27.1%	24.5%	-9.6%
North West	17.1%	17.9%	4.7%
Northern Cape	9.3%	24.2%	160.2%
Western Cape	12.0%	15.3%	27.5%
<b>South Africa</b>	<b>19.1%</b>	<b>24.4%</b>	<b>27.7%</b>

Source: Health Systems Trust, www.hst.org.za, accessed on 28 January 2011

a This refers to the proportion of sexually active 15-19 year olds in each province who had ever been pregnant. The data presented here was originally from the Medical Research Council's National Youth Risk Behaviour Surveys.

### TEENAGE FERTILITY RATE<sup>a</sup>, 1997-2010

<i>Year</i>	<i>Births per 1000 women aged 15-19</i>
1997	81
2000	75
2002	71
2005	64
2008	57
2009	56
2010	54

Source: The World Bank, *World Development Indicators 2012*, April 2012

a The teenage fertility rate refers to the number of births per 1 000 women aged 15-19.

## Eighteen years of democracy, yet South Africa's family policy still an infant

**P**rior to 1994, family life in South Africa was undermined by apartheid policies. Since then a *White Paper for Social Welfare* of 1997, a *National Family Policy* of 2005, and a *White Paper for Families* of 2012 have been published. But some 18 years after the advent of democracy, South African families, although faring better materially, are still plagued by orphanhood, teenage pregnancy, absent fatherhood, and low rates of marriage. This may be attributed, among other things, to the lack of promotion of individual responsibility in family policy, and the conduct of people in positions of power in the way they deal with their own families.

**T**he Department of Social Development (DSD) refers to family policy as the principles governing actions directed towards achieving the promotion of family life and family strengthening in South Africa. Such actions include the provision of welfare, minimum standards of income, and some measure of progressive redistribution of resources, in such a way as to shape the development of families. A family is defined as a societal group that is not restricted to a particular physical residence but is related by blood, adoption, foster care or the ties of marriage, including civil marriages, customary marriages, religious marriages, and domestic partnerships.

### Family policy before 1994

**P**rior to the first democratic election in 1994, family policy was informed by the political dispensation of the time, where there was a governing group which promoted the Western concept of family life, and a subordinate group which was supposed to absorb it. There were also policies and legislation put into place which favoured the family life of the governing group and disadvantaged that of the other. Among such mechanisms were the Black Administration Act of 1927, which did not recognise indigenous marriage laws and led to the gradual replacement of customary marriages — those that were negotiated, celebrated, or concluded according to any of the systems of indigenous customary law that existed in South Africa — by common-law marriages, which were administered through the Marriage Act of 1961.

In addition, there was an underlying policy towards Africans which ensured that they were welcome in 'white areas' only for as long as they were needed to cater for the needs of white people. One result of this policy was a migrant labour system in which African men had to travel from their places of residence in the homelands into cities and towns to seek work but were seldom allowed to bring their families with them if they wanted to do so. As a result, families were often forced to stay behind in the homeland areas. Housing shortages in the cities, and restrictions on the construction of African housing there, made family life even more difficult.

### Family policy after 1994

**T**he Constitution of 1996 was the first to mention the importance of family as a socio-economic right. Section 28 provides that, 'Every child has the right to family care or parental care, or to appropriate alternative care when removed from the family environment.'

### The *White Paper for Social Welfare* of 1997

**T**he first piece of policy which sought to correct the injustices of the previous regime in terms of equal social welfare for all population groups, and to guide the implementation of pro-family policies and services in the country, was the *White Paper for Social Welfare* of 1997. Families are dealt



with in the first section of the eighth chapter of this document.

The chapter first deals with how South African families, particularly African families, have been affected by the social, economic, and political policies of the past and the inequitable distribution of resources. Migration patterns, the growing subculture of violence, growing divorce and desertion rates, a lack of housing, and increasing economic stress and poverty are mentioned as having played a role in redefining household structures. Some of the issues which are listed as having great social and economic impact on family in 1997 and the years leading up to it include:

- alcohol and drug abuse,
- communication and relationship problems, including family violence,
- marital conflict as a result of a lack of preparation for marriage, remarriage and family life,
- parenting problems,
- a lack of family and community support networks,
- adverse conditions in communities, such as a lack of services and amenities, and
- vulnerable children, including those that are disabled, abused and neglected, those with divorced/divorcing parents, and those with chronic diseases and nutrition problems, among other things.

The white paper proposed interventions in the form of family and child welfare services to deal with some of the causes of family breakdown in South Africa. The aim of these services was to preserve and strengthen families to help them provide a suitable environment for the physical, emotional, and social development of all their members. Families with vulnerable members and those who are poor and whose involvement in rearing and caring for their members would be at ‘an unacceptable cost to themselves’ were a particular focus of the proposed interventions.

Programmes listed as a national priority in promoting family life included life skills education, marriage preparation, promotion of family life in the business sector, the creation of a network of trained community members to facilitate and strengthen networking between families and within the community, and the establishment of an inter-sectoral task group to make recommendations about future social programmes.

In dealing with vulnerable children, there was a focus on programmes for preschool and schoolgoing children, adoption, foster care, and residential care, including the establishment of a national early childhood development strategy and awareness campaigns to promote adoption as a child protection service.

This policy framework, although a welcome first step to dealing with the issues that South African families faced at the time, had a strong focus on children and did not pay attention to the family as a unit made up also of other members who may also need interventions and programmes of assistance.

### **The National Family Policy of 2005**

**I**n 2004 the Child, Youth, and Family Development Research Programme of the Human Sciences Research Council published a paper that described the structure and the needs of South African families. In addition, the paper outlined some recommendations for the development of a specific national policy framework for families that was not created against the backdrop of unequal social welfare services inherited from the apartheid past. The paper also called for more attention to be paid to the broader needs of the family such as housing, employment, and support structures for family well-being. This research culminated in a *National Family Policy* of 2005. However, the new policy did not differ much from the previous one. Its guiding principles were, in short, to treat families as the core of society, to protect and support families through effective and efficient service delivery, to create an enabling environment that would gear families towards self-reliance, and to promote inter-sectoral collaboration among stakeholders in the provision of services.

Some of the main recommendations stated that South African family policy needed to include:

- a set of “enabling economic policies” that would ensure that, among other things, employment, housing, and loan policies are supportive of family life,

- a set of family law policies that would affect adoption, inheritance, responsibility for child maintenance, and the like,
- a set of services to support family policy implementation, and
- a set of societal conditions conducive to family support.

### **The White Paper on Families of 2012**

In 2011 the *Green Paper on Families*, drawing from the *National Family Policy*, was published by the DSD and, after public consultations across all nine provinces, drafted into the *White Paper on Families* earlier in 2012. The purpose of the draft white paper is to promote and strengthen families in South Africa by treating them as a key development imperative and by calling for a new approach towards them. The aim is for all government departments to take into account family issues when creating and implementing policy so that family well-being can be fostered on a national scale. The draft white paper has three key strategies, namely promotion of healthy family life, family strengthening, and family preservation, each with recommended strategy actions. This policy framework has been promoted as being different from previous ones because it takes into account that individual family members do not function in a vacuum, so that the family needs to be treated as one organism.

### **Gaps in and challenges to family policy**

A glaring omission in South Africa’s family policy to date is the promotion of individual responsibility of parents to ensure the well-being and stability of their own families. Section 28 of the Constitution thus mentions parental care as a socio-economic right, but there is no mention of parental responsibilities. Promotion of these responsibilities could go a long way in ensuring that young boys and girls wait until they are ready to have children, fathers take responsibility for their children, both financially and otherwise, and people foster stable relationships that are conducive to the upliftment of family life, among many other things.

Another problem that cannot be bypassed, even with strong family policy and legislation, is how our leaders conduct themselves with regard to their family life. In an era when 58 000 school girls fall pregnant in one year, it does nothing for the well-being of families and the attitudes and perceptions of those he influences when the president of the country says, as Jacob Zuma did in an interview August 2012, “It is not right to be single...” and “kids are important to a woman because they actually give extra training to a woman to be a mother”, without discussing the benefits of being part of a stable, fulfilling relationship and the importance of family planning. When ministers appear on the front pages of tabloid newspapers being accused of fathering illegitimate children and having extra-marital affairs, it undermines efforts on the part of some government departments and other organisations to challenge patriarchal norms and irresponsible sexual behaviour.

The draft white paper, its shortcomings as well as its positive traits, is dealt with later in this issue of *Fast Facts* (see pp11-12) in a written submission made by the Institute to the DSD on how the final white paper can be strengthened.

— **Lerato Moloji**

### **THANKS**

Previous research done by the Institute on families goes as far back as the November 2007 issue of *Fast Facts* where an article was featured suggesting the importance of the family as an institution which transmits positive values. The July 2009 issue of *Fast Facts* provided statistics suggesting that the absence of family life may be one of the biggest risks facing South Africa. The April and May 2011 issues of *Fast Facts* described the situation and structure of South African families, and looked at the issues the youth faces in relation to social breakdown in families. This issue of *Fast Facts* looks at South African family policy and, in particular, the *White Paper on Families* of 2012. The statistics originally published in 2009 are updated to determine how they have been affected over time. We would like to extend our thanks to the Anglo American Chairman’s Fund who sponsored this latest research.

## Individual responsibilities missing from white paper on families

**I**n July 2012 the Department of Social Development published a draft white paper on families. The following is an edited version of a submission by the Institute on the document.

*The White Paper on Families in South Africa*, released by the Department of Social Development (DSD) in July 2012, makes an important first step in acknowledging the problem of family breakdown in South Africa, its causes and some of its effects. However, the document lacks specific proposals that can be implemented by various government departments to address the problems identified. Moreover, it fails to acknowledge the role individual responsibility, norms, and attitudes can play in building more stable families, albeit with assistance and incentives from the Government.

### Promotion of healthy family life

The white paper recommends three key strategies to promote functioning families.

Under the first key strategy (promotion of healthy family life) it is recommended that the Government ‘foster stable sexual unions and partnerships’. Through this recommendation, the white paper is acknowledging the fact that families built around stable sexual relationships are likely to be the strongest, and there is indeed a lot of research to suggest that children brought up with both of their biological parents in the household fare better than those with absent parents, particularly absent fathers. The white paper suggests that the DSD’s *Manual for Marriage Preparation and Marriage Enrichment* is one of the main resources that can be used to implement this strategy. On the one hand, the strategy does not explicitly cite marriage as the most stable form of sexual union, but on the other hand, marriage counselling is the only proposed action to foster stable sexual unions.

Firstly, therefore, it is not clear whether the department aims to promote marriage or not. This suggests that more research needs to be conducted on whether marriage is the most stable form of relationship, and whether children growing up with married parents fare better. Secondly, it seems that other means of promoting stable relationships have not been considered. These could include family planning programmes where people are encouraged to wait to have children until they are in a stable relationship. It also overlooks the practical fact that the most vulnerable or unstable couples may be the least likely to seek marriage guidance.

A significant cause of children growing up in single-parent families is the death of a parent. This is not acknowledged as one of the barriers to the ‘promotion of healthy family life’ or as a cause of unstable families. HIV/AIDS, maternal mortality, and death as a result of violence all need to be considered as causes of ‘broken’ families.

Key Strategy 1 also recommends encouraging fathers’ involvement in their children’s upbringing. Given that almost half of all children have absent but living fathers (compared to only 3% living in single-father households), it is right that the involvement of fathers is emphasised. Again, however, there could be more practical suggestions in the white paper as to how this could be done. Better enforcing maintenance payments by absent fathers, and ensuring that fathers are treated equally by the courts in custody decisions (which the law provides for but which anecdotal evidence suggests does not always happen), are two examples.

In this section of the white paper, there is also no mention of unemployment. Unemployment is likely to be playing a major role in the absence of fathers from families, either because they have migrated to other areas in search of scarce jobs, or because a lack of income puts men off taking responsibility for the children they father. A shortage of housing in cities and high crime levels in urban areas may also cause men to leave their families behind in rural areas.

In general, not enough is known about why fathers are absent in the first place. There are a number of possible reasons, including labour migration, the high mortality rate of young men, male attitudes to women (including the prevalence of rape), and attitudes towards having multiple partners. The white paper could include proposals for more research to be done (most usefully a nationally representative field survey), as interventions may be ineffective if it is not understood what the prevailing causes of absent fatherhood are in the first place.

### Family strengthening

Furthermore, in Key Strategy 2 (family strengthening), one of the recommended actions is to ensure the income and basic social security of families. The recommendation mentions ‘social protection schemes’, ‘universal pensions’, ‘social- and micro-insurance schemes’. However, it does not mention employment, which is the best way of ensuring an income. The emphasis of the white paper should not be to encourage more dependency by families on minimum incomes in the form of social grants. Families and communities will be better off, both financially and socially, if more people are working.

Key Strategy 2 also recommends the provision of adequate primary healthcare, saying that all family members should ‘have access to adequate and affordable healthcare and nutrition services’. While this is an important goal, specifics on how the healthcare system can strengthen families are missing. One particularly important role the healthcare system can play is in providing broader family planning services to women and families. This does not only include making contraceptives more widely available, but also offering advice on when to start a family. The department of health could use public information campaigns to stress the financial and emotional responsibility of having children and to encourage the concept of planned parenthood. This can play a role in reducing the number of unwanted pregnancies and the number of families that are put under financial and emotional strain because of unplanned pregnancy.

### Implementation

The white paper lists most government departments and the role they can play in implementing the Government’s policy on families. Once again, however, the roles envisaged for the various departments are not fleshed out with concrete actions that they can undertake to support and strengthen families.

The Department of Basic Education has an important role to play in addressing the prevalence of broken families in the country. Missing from the white paper is any sense that the breakdown of families demonstrated by the data on orphans, absent fathers, and single parents, is part of a cycle that needs to be broken. Both international and local research suggests that children growing up in unstable families are more likely to grow up to have unstable relationships themselves. Schools can play a role in breaking this cycle, by not only teaching children the basic facts about contraception and sexually transmitted diseases, but also by teaching them about relationships and the emotional and financial responsibilities of having children. For children growing up in functioning families, this would be done by their parents, but in the absence of stable families, guidance provided at school may be one of the best means of reducing teenage pregnancy and, in the longer term, the prevalence of unstable families.

### Conclusion

Apart from lacking enough practical proposals on how to address family breakdown, the white paper fails to deal with some of the most difficult but pertinent issues around family breakdown. Most particularly, it does not sufficiently deal with the role of attitudes, norms, and individual behaviour. Male attitudes towards women are not dealt with, despite the high incidence of sexual violence in the country — 181 incidents every day, according to official police statistics. While these are difficult things for any government to change, the white paper can still acknowledge that they may be playing a role in the pattern of family breakdown in South Africa and, at the very least, propose that comprehensive research be conducted to establish the degree to which attitudes of promiscuity and male chauvinism, among others, are a factor in this cycle.

For instance, not enough is known about the extent to which women, particularly the most vulnerable from poorer and less-educated backgrounds, are empowered to refuse sex with their partners or to require their partners to use contraception.

In general, there is not enough emphasis on the concept of individual responsibility. Bringing a child into the world brings with it serious financial and emotional burdens for at least 18 years. Much of that burden is currently borne by single mothers, grandparents, and in the worst cases, the State. The white paper needs to emphasise that having a child is something individuals should do in a planned way, within a stable relationship, aware of and willing to take on all of those responsibilities.

— **Lucy Holborn**

### PUTTING FAMILY POLICY ON THE MAP

*The Green Paper on Families: Promoting Family Life and Strengthening Families in South Africa* was approved by the Cabinet at the end of 2011 and released for public consultation. It cited research conducted by the Institute in 2009 on the prevalence of broken families. Since the release of the green paper, *The White Paper on Families in South Africa* has been drafted by the Department of Social Development (DSD). After publishing more comprehensive research on families in April 2011, the Institute is now part of a task team working with the DSD to finalise the draft white paper. This is an edited version of a written submission made by the Institute on that white paper.

<b>LABOUR LOG</b>			
<b>Labour participation rate 2Q 2012 (supply)</b>	54.5%	2Q 2011: 54.5%	Stats SA/QLFS
<b>Labour absorption rate 2Q 2012 (demand)</b>	40.9%	2Q 2011: 40.5%	Stats SA/QLFS
<b>Public sector employment 2011</b>	up 4.6%	compared to 2010	SARB
<b>Private sector employment 2011</b>	up 1.4%	compared to 2010	SARB
<b>Employment change (annualised) (Jul 2012)</b>	0.2%	since Jun 2012	Adcorp
— formal sector	-0.6%	since Jun 2012	Adcorp
— informal sector	2.0%	since Jun 2012	Adcorp
— permanent	-0.7%	since Jun 2012	Adcorp
— temporary	-0.3%	since Jun 2012	Adcorp
<b>Total employment 2Q 2012</b>	13 447 000	2Q 2011: 13 125 000	Stats SA/QLFS
<b>Change in total employment</b>	322 000	2Q 2012 vs 2Q 2011	Stats SA/QLFS
— agriculture	40 000	2Q 2012 vs 2Q 2011	Stats SA/QLFS
— mining	75 000	2Q 2012 vs 2Q 2011	Stats SA/QLFS
— manufacturing	-57 000	2Q 2012 vs 2Q 2011	Stats SA/QLFS
— utilities	5 000	2Q 2012 vs 2Q 2011	Stats SA/QLFS
— construction	-31 000	2Q 2012 vs 2Q 2011	Stats SA/QLFS
— trade	22 000	2Q 2012 vs 2Q 2011	Stats SA/QLFS
— transport	14 000	2Q 2012 vs 2Q 2011	Stats SA/QLFS
— finance	33 000	2Q 2012 vs 2Q 2011	Stats SA/QLFS
— community and social services	181 000	2Q 2012 vs 2Q 2011	Stats SA/QLFS
— private households	36 000	2Q 2012 vs 2Q 2011	Stats SA/QLFS
<b>Employees in non-farm enterprises registered for income tax</b>	up 1.1%	Mar 2012 vs Mar 2011	Stats SA/QES
<b>Number of such employees</b>	up 95 000	to 8 384 000	Stats SA/QES
<b>Net employment (hiring intentions) outlook 3Q 2012</b>	+4%	3Q 2011: -1%	Manpower
<b>Unemployment rate 2Q 2012 (official)</b>	24.9%	2Q 2011: 25.7%	Number: 4.5 million
<b>Unemployment rate 2Q 2012 (expanded including discouraged)</b>	36.2%	2Q 2011: 36.9%	Number: 7.6 million
<b>Nominal wages per worker 2011</b>	up 7.1%	compared to 2010	SARB
<b>Real wages per worker 2011</b>	down 0.3%	compared to 2010	SARB
<b>Nominal remuneration/worker public 2011</b>	up 6.7%	compared to 2010	SARB
<b>Nominal remuneration/worker private 2011</b>	up 7.0%	compared to 2010	SARB
<b>Real remuneration/worker public 2011</b>	down 0.7%	compared to 2010	SARB
<b>Real remuneration/worker private 2011</b>	down 0.4%	compared to 2010	SARB
<b>Labour productivity 2011</b>	up 0.9%	compared to 2010	SARB
<b>Nominal unit labour costs 2011</b>	up 6.2%	compared to 2010	SARB
<b>Compensation of employees to GDP (at factor cost) 1Q 2012</b>	49.5%	1Q 2011: 50.4%	SARB
<b>Average monthly earnings (Feb 2012)</b>	R13 080	Feb 2011: R12 262	Stats SA/QES
<b>Average wage settlements (this year to Jun)</b>	7.7%	Jan-Jun 2011: 7.5%	Andrew Levy
<b>Number of strike mandays (this year to Jun)</b>	750 000	Jan-Jun 2011: 400 000	Andrew Levy

<b>INVESTMENT INDEX</b>		
<b>Real gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) 2Q 2012</b>	R99bn	up 5.5% compared to 2Q 2011
<b>GFCF ÷ GDP 2Q 2012 (annualised, adjusted)</b>	22.1%	2Q 2011: 21.2% (Target 25%)
<b>Gross domestic saving ÷ GDP 2Q 2012</b>	14.1%	2Q 2011: 16.6%
<b>Real GFCF by public authorities</b>	up 9.0%	2Q 2012 vs 2Q 2011
<b>by public corporations</b>	up 10.7%	2Q 2012 vs 2Q 2011
<b>by private business</b>	up 3.0%	2Q 2012 vs 2Q 2011
<b>Real GFCF in mining and quarrying</b>	up 5.0%	2Q 2012 vs 2Q 2011
<b>in manufacturing</b>	up 4.1%	2Q 2012 vs 2Q 2011
<b>in electricity, gas and water</b>	up 12.1%	2Q 2012 vs 2Q 2011
<b>in transport and communication</b>	up 8.5%	2Q 2012 vs 2Q 2011
<b>in finance etc</b>	up 1.9%	2Q 2012 vs 2Q 2011
<b>in community, social and personal services</b>	up 3.2%	2Q 2012 vs 2Q 2011
<b>Real GFCF in residential buildings</b>	up 1.5%	2Q 2012 vs 2Q 2011
<b>in non-residential buildings</b>	up 1.4%	2Q 2012 vs 2Q 2011
<b>in construction works</b>	up 3.9%	2Q 2012 vs 2Q 2011
<b>in transport equipment</b>	up 12.4%	2Q 2012 vs 2Q 2011
<b>in machinery and equipment</b>	up 5.2%	2Q 2012 vs 2Q 2011
<b>Foreign investment into SA 2Q 2012</b>		
<b>direct (FDI)</b>	R5.7bn	2Q 2011: R15.4bn
<b>portfolio</b>	R22.7bn	2Q 2011: R32.1bn
<b>other</b>	R17.3bn	2Q 2011: R13.9bn
<b>SA investment abroad 2Q 2012</b>		
<b>direct</b>	-R4.6bn	2Q 2011: -R1.6bn
<b>portfolio</b>	-R5.5bn	2Q 2011: -R10.5bn
<b>other</b>	-R11.5bn	2Q 2011: -R17.0bn
<b>Balance on financial account 2Q 2012</b>	R24.0bn	2Q 2011: R35.4bn
<b>Equities net purchases/sales by foreigners (this year to Aug)</b>	-R2.9bn	Jan-Aug 2011: -R9.4bn
<b>Bonds net purchases/sales by foreigners (this year to Aug)</b>	R66.2bn	Jan-Aug 2011: R53.7bn

<b>SOCIO-ECONOMIC SCOREBOARD</b>			
<b>Total population 2012</b>	51.14m	2011: 50.59m	SAIRR/Stats SA
<b>GDP per head 2Q 2012 (annualised, adjusted)</b>	R61 505	current prices	SAIRR/SARB
<b>Real growth in GDP per head 2011</b>	2.1%	2010: 1.9%	SARB
<b>Household saving to disposable income 2Q 2012</b>	0.0%	2Q 2011: -0.1%	SARB
<b>Household debt to disposable income 2Q 2012</b>	76.3%	2Q 2011: 76.3%	SARB
<b>Household debt-service cost to disposable income 2Q 2012</b>	6.9%	2Q 2011: 6.9%	SARB

## HOUSING HIGHLIGHTS

<b>House Price Index (nominal) (medium size)(Jul)</b>	up 2.2%	compared to Jul 2011	Absa
<b>House Price Index (real) (Jun)</b>	down 3.3%	compared to Jun 2011	Absa
<b>Mortgage advances (Jul)</b>	up 1.9%	compared to Jul 2011	SARB
<b>Houses built smaller than 81m<sup>2</sup> (this year to Jun)</b>	down 1.4%	on same period last year	Stats SA
<b>Houses built/being built (government subsidy)<sup>a</sup></b>	3 219 236	Apr 1994–Mar 2011 (up 6.1% from Mar 2010)	
<b>Government housing delivery (Apr 2010-Mar 2011)<sup>a</sup></b>	185 425	down 18% on same period previous year	
<b>House price trends (nominal) (average) 2Q 2012</b>			
— Affordable houses (40–79m <sup>2</sup> /priced at under R500 000)	up 6.6%	compared to 2Q 2011	Absa
— Small houses (80–140m <sup>2</sup> /R677 772) (average price)	down 9.9%	compared to 2Q 2011	Absa
— Medium houses (141–220m <sup>2</sup> /R994 098)	up 1.1%	compared to 2Q 2011	Absa
— Large houses (221–400m <sup>2</sup> /R1 476 542)	up 0.1%	compared to 2Q 2011	Absa
— All houses (80–400m <sup>2</sup> /R1 027 073)	down 2.8%	compared to 2Q 2011	Absa
— Luxury housing (costing more than R3.6m)	up 3.0%	compared to 2Q 2011	Absa
— Greater Johannesburg (80–400m <sup>2</sup> /R1 097 754)	down 5.3%	compared to 2Q 2011	Absa
— Cape Town metro (80–400m <sup>2</sup> /R1 243 008)	up 7.4%	compared to 2Q 2011	Absa
— Durban metro (80–400m <sup>2</sup> /R976 377)	down 3.2%	compared to 2Q 2011	Absa
— PE/Uitenhage metro (80–400m <sup>2</sup> /862 510)	down 3.9%	compared to 2Q 2011	Absa
<b>Cost of building a new house (average)</b>	up 4.3%	compared to 2Q 2011	Absa
a Department of Human Settlements.			

## INFLATION INDEX

<b>Headline inflation rate (Jun 2012 vs Jun 2011)</b>	4.9%	same period previous year: 5.3%
— Housing and utilities (22.56%)*	5.7%	6.9%
— Transport (18.80%)*	4.6%	5.3%
— Food and non-alcoholic beverages (15.68%)*	5.3%	7.4%
— Insurance and other services (13.56%)*	5.1%	4.4%
— Household contents and services (5.86%)*	2.6%	1.7%
— Alcohol and tobacco (5.58%)*	7.2%	6.0%
— Recreation and culture (4.19%)*	0.9%	0.5%
— Clothing and footwear (4.11%)*	3.6%	2.2%
— Communication (3.22%)*	-1.0%	-1.1%
— Restaurants and hotels (2.78%)*	6.1%	5.4%
— Education (2.19%)*	9.0%	8.6%
— Health (1.47%)*	5.2%	5.2%
<b>Rise in administered (non-market) prices</b>	7.5%	11.7%
<b>Inflation without administered prices</b>	4.4%	4.2%
<b>CPI for primary urban areas (larger cities/towns)</b>	4.8%	5.2%
<b>CPI for secondary urban areas (smaller towns)</b>	5.2%	5.8%
<b>CPI for rural areas</b>	5.5%	5.8%
<b>Producer price rise (PPI)</b>	5.4%	8.9%
<b>Imported producer inflation</b>	6.6%	10.2%
* Weighting		

<b>BUSINESS BAROMETER</b>			
Leading business indicator (Jun)	down 4.3%	on same period last year	SARB
Use of manufacturing production capacity (May)	81.4%	May 2011: 81.1%	Stats SA
Manufacturing production (volume) (this year to Jul)	up 2.1%	on same period last year	Stats SA
Total vehicles sold (this year to Aug): 411 804	up 11.3%	on same period last year	NAAMSA
Vehicles exported (this year to Aug): 178 067	down 2.2%	on same period last year	NAAMSA
Tractors sold (this year to Aug): 5 367	up 21.6%	on same period last year	SAAMA
Electricity consumed (this year to Jul)	down 2.6%	on same period last year	Stats SA
Total building plans passed (value) (this year to Jun)	down 1.7%	on same period last year	Stats SA
Total buildings completed (value) (this year to Jun)	down 2.2%	on same period last year	Stats SA
All building costs (average) 3Q 2012	up 12.7%	on same period last year	BER
Cement sales (tonnes) 1Q 2012	up 22.0%	on same period last year	CCI
Mining production (volume) (this year to Jun)	down 5.3%	on same period last year	Stats SA
Retail sales (value) (this year to Jun)	up 5.6%	on same period last year	Stats SA
Wholesales (value) (this year to Jun)	up 8.6%	on same period last year	Stats SA
Current adspend (this year to Jun): R14.2bn	up 9.6%	on same period last year	A C Nielsen
Number of liquidations (this year to Jul): 1 615	down 12.4%	on same period last year	Stats SA
Judgements for debt (this year to Jun): 221 897	down 16.4%	on same period last year	Stats SA
Tourism accommodation occupancy rate (Jun)	43.1%	Jun 2011: 39.4%	Stats SA
Overseas tourists (this year to May): 1 008 013	up 18.0%	on same period last year	Stats SA
<b>BETTER: 12</b>			<b>WORSE: 7</b>

<b>CONFIDENCE COUNT</b>			
RMB/BER business confidence index 3Q 2012	up 6 points	to 47 since 2Q 2012	(scale 0–100)
Sacci business confidence index (Aug)	up 4.1 points	to 95.0 since Jul 2012	(2010 = 100)
BER/DTI manufacturing confidence index 3Q 2012	up 4 points	to 33 since 2Q 2012	(scale 0–100)
FNB/BER building confidence index 3Q 2012	down 1 point	to 26 since 2Q 2012	(scale 0–100)
BER building contractors confidence index 3Q 2012	up 2 points	to 26 since 2Q 2012	(scale 0–100)
FNB/BER civil construction index 2Q 2012	up 4 points	to 38 since 1Q 2012	(scale 0–100)
Consumer financial vulnerability index 2Q 2012	down 10.3 points	to 48.6 since 1Q 2012	(scale 0–100) FinMark/BMR
Ernst&Young/BER financial services index 2Q 2012	down 8 points	to 74 since 1Q 2012	(scale 0–100)
E&Y/BER consumer confidence index 2Q 2012	down 8 points	to -3 since 1Q 2012	(scale minus 100–100)
— black consumer confidence index 2Q 2012	down 9 points	to 3 since 1Q 2012	(scale minus 100–100)
— white consumer confidence index 2Q 2012	down 7 points	to -12 since 1Q 2012	(scale minus 100–100)
— high-income household confidence index 2Q 2012	down 7 points	to 1 since 1Q 2012	(scale minus 100–100)
— low-income household confidence index 2Q 2012	down 14 points	to -14 since 1Q 2012	(scale minus 100–100)
Kagiso purchasing managers index (PMI) (Aug)	down 0.8 points	to 50.2 since Jul 2012	(2000 = 100) BER
Sacci trade activity index (TAI) (Aug)	up 5 points	to 50 since Jul 2012	(scale 0–100)
Sacci trade expectations index (TEI) (Aug)	no change	from 54 since Jul 2012	(scale 0–100)
FNB/TBCSA tourism business index (TBI) 2Q 2012	down 13.7 points	to 88.2 since 1Q 2012	(scale 0–100)
Vehicle sales confidence indicator 2Q 2012	down 0.4 points	to 6.0 since 1Q 2012	(scale 1–10) WesBank
Agricultural business confidence index 2Q 2012	down 3.1 points	to 59.64 since 2Q 2012	(2001 = 50) ABC/IDC
<b>BETTER: 6</b>	<b>UNCHANGED: 1</b>		<b>WORSE: 12</b>



ECONOMIC BAROMETER						
GDP 2Q 2012 (basic prices)		R721bn				
GDP growth at market prices 2Q 2012 (ann, adj)		3.2%	2Q 2011: 1.0%			
GDP growth at market prices (2Q 2012 vs 2Q 2011)		3.0%	2Q 2011: 3.3%			
Agriculture (4.4% of GDP)	3.5%	Trade etc (14.5%)	4.2%			
Mining (9.2%)	-1.8%	Transport and communication (8.1%)	2.6%			
Manufacturing (12.6%)	2.4%	Finance etc (20.2%)	3.8%			
Electricity and water (3.1%)	-1.4%	Community services (7.0%)	2.2%			
Construction (5.2%)	2.8%	Government (15.8%)	3.2%			
Gov consumption expenditure growth 2Q 2012 (ann, adj)		4.1%	2Q 2011: -0.4%			
Gov capital expenditure growth 2Q 2012 (ann, adj)		15.7%	2Q 2011: 1.7%			
Public sector expenditure to GDP 2Q 2012 (ann, adj)		29.8%	2Q 2011: 28.1%			
Exports (this year to Jul)		R412bn	up 8% on same period in 2011			
Imports (this year to Jul)		R469bn	up 21% on same period in 2011			
Trade balance (this year to Jul)		-R57bn	Jan-Jul 2011: -R7bn			
Gold and forex reserves (Aug)		R421bn	Aug 2011: R362bn			
Reserves/imports (Jul)		5.6 to 1	Jul 2011: 5.6 to 1			
Current account deficit 2Q 2012		R52bn	2Q 2011: R21bn			
— as proportion of GDP		6.4%	2Q 2011: 3.0%			
Capital account surplus 2Q 2012		R48bn	2Q 2011: R23bn			
Gold price per ounce (average) (Jul)		\$1 593	Jul 2011: \$1 571	(Increase: 1%)		
Gold price per ounce (average) (Jul)		R13 149	Jul 2011: R10 679	(Increase: 23%)		
Platinum price per ounce (average) (Jul)		\$1 424	Jul 2011: \$1 758	(Decrease: 19%)		
Platinum price per ounce (average) (Jul)		R11 740	Jul 2011: R11 944	(Decrease: 2%)		
Crude oil price (brent/barrel) (Jul)		\$103	Jul 2011: \$116	(Decrease: 11%)		
Petrol (premium pump price per litre Gauteng) (Sep)		R11.97	Sep 2011: R10.18	(Increase: 18%)		
Growth in money supply (M3) (Jul)		8.3%	Jul 2011: 5.6%			
Change in private sector credit extension (Jul)		8.3%	Jul 2011: 5.7%			
Prime overdraft rate (average) 18/9/12		8.5%	year ago: 9.0%			
Real prime overdraft rate (average) (Jul)		3.4%	Jul 2011: 3.6%	(based on headline inflation)		
Repo rate (average) 18/9/12		5.0%	year ago: 5.5%			
€R 0.0930	£R 0.8022	\$R 0.1198	¥R 9.280	€\$ 0.7755	¥/\$ 77.44	at 14/9/12
R/€10.7589	R/£ 13.430	R/\$ 8.3442	R/¥ 0.1078	\$/€1.2894	\$/¥ 0.0129	at 14/9/12
Rand vs euro last 12/24/36 months		-6%/-16%/-0.2%		(Lowest: R/€14.65 Highest: R/€1.80)		
Rand vs dollar last 12/24/36 months		-11%/-16%/-13%		(Lowest: R/\$ 13.00 Highest: R/\$ 0.67)		
Rand vs pound last 12/24/36 months		-15%/-20%/-11%				
Rand vs yen last 12/24/36 months		-8%/-21%/-23%				
Rand vs basket last 12/24/36 months		-8%/-15%/-10%				

LATEST FORECASTS		
	Current <sup>a</sup>	
GDP growth 2013	3.6%	Absa; Investec
	3.0%	Nedbank
Headline inflation rate (CPI) 2013 (average)	5.6%	Absa
	5.1%	Nedbank
Expected CPI (business) 2013 (average) (trade unions)	6.3%	BER
	6.5%	BER
Producer price inflation 2013 (average)	6.2%	Reuters Econometer
	4.8%	BER
Imported producer inflation 2013 (average)	-1.9%	Absa
Gross fixed capital formation 2013	up 7.1%	Investec
	up 4.4%	Nedbank
Final consumption expenditure by households 2013	up 4.5%	Investec
	up 3.5%	Absa
Government consumption expenditure 2013	up 4.3%	BER
	up 4.0%	Absa
Gross domestic expenditure 2013	up 5.1%	Investec
	up 4.3%	Absa
Exports 2013	up 5.3%	Standard Bank
	up 3.5%	Investec; Nedbank
Imports 2013	up 8.6%	Investec
	up 7.4%	Standard Bank
Current account deficit Rbn	R216bn	Investec
	R160bn	BER
— as proportion of GDP 2013	6.1%	Investec
	5.0%	Reuters Econometer
Capital account surplus 2013	R190bn	Nedbank
Prime overdraft rate 2013 (year end)	9.0%	Investec; Nedbank
	8.5%	BER; Standard Bank
R/€ exchange rate 2013 (average)	10.82	Nedbank
	9.85	BER
R/\$ exchange rate 2013 (average)	8.73	Nedbank
	7.74	BER
Gold price per ounce 2013 (average)	\$1 850	Standard Bank
	\$1 584	BER
Nominal wage rise 2013	8.2%	BER
Increase in total employment (including informal)	1.9%	BER
Unemployment rate 2013	23.3%	BER
<i>Sources:</i> Absa; Beeld Consensus; Bureau for Economic Research (BER); IMF; Investec; Nedbank; Reuters Econometer; Standard Bank		

*These forecasts contain the highest and lowest estimates available to us.*

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