

LESSONS FROM LOCAL CRIME PREVENTION

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Dr Richard Griggs



OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATION FOR SOUTH AFRICA

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ACRONYMS

CBOs	Community-based Organisations	ISS	Institute for Security Studies
CJI	Criminal Justice Initiative	KZN	KwaZulu-Natal
CJP	Crime and Justice Programme	Madam	Multi-Agency Delivery Mechanism
CPA	Centre for Peace Action	MRC	Medical Research Council
CPF	Community Policing Forum	NCPS	National Crime Prevention Strategy
CPM	Crime Prevention Monitors	NGOs	Non-governmental Organisations
CPTED	Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design	NIM	Network of Independent Monitors
CSFs	Community Safety Forums	OSF-SA	Open Society Foundation for South Africa
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations	PDI	Participative Development Initiative
CSP	City Safety Project	RCPC	Rural Crime Prevention Committees
CSVr	Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation	RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme
DfID	Department for International Development	SAPS	South African Police Service
GMM	Govan Mbeki Municipality	TLC	Transitional Local Council
Idasa	Institute for Democracy in South Africa	UMAC	U Managing Conflict
IDP	Integrated Development Plan	UNISA	University of South Africa
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party	VEP	Victim Empowerment Programme
ISHS	Institute for Social and Health Sciences	WHO	World Health Organisation

INTRODUCTION

The Open Society Foundation for South Africa (OSF-SA) seeks to promote the values, institutions and practices of an open and democratic civil society. OSF-SA works for a vigorous and autonomous civil society in which the rule of law and divergent opinions are respected. Within the context of this mission, the Criminal Justice Initiative (CJI) engages in specific interventions relating to both crime prevention and the criminal justice system.

Over the past four years, the CJI has engaged in a programme of crime prevention activities with the intention of generating learning about ‘what works’ in crime prevention in South Africa. In seeking to promote innovation and learning, OSF-SA provided grant support to a range of civil society initiatives, all with the objective of preventing or reducing crime. Initiatives in the following areas of crime prevention were supported: schools-based crime prevention; diversion and reintegration programmes for young people; prevention of victimisation of women and children; and local crime prevention. The CJI provided the funds for the implementation and the evaluation of each intervention. The CJI also hosted annual workshops with the intention of generating exchange, discussion and debate between crime prevention practitioners and researchers regarding their experiences.

This report focuses specifically on local crime prevention initiatives, i.e. initiatives focused on specific geographical areas (the learning emerging from other areas of crime prevention practice is documented in other such publications). This report attempts to document and analyse the experiences of local crime prevention practitioners, with a view to extracting learning and ‘good practice’, for the purposes of informing future work of this nature. It should be noted that the intention is to offer a critical ‘review’ across several different initiatives, and that this report does not pretend to offer evaluation data in relation to these interventions.

The CJI sincerely thanks the communities and government agencies that participated in the various crime prevention initiatives under review, and in the production of this review. We are equally indebted to the NGOs that participated in the study, whom we acknowledge for their great creativity, energy and tenacity; and thank for their generous participation and sharing of knowledge and expertise. It should be noted that one of the projects that is reviewed was not funded by OSF-SA but has been included in this review with the kind permission and co-operation of Idasa and its donors.

The CJJ also offers its sincere gratitude to the researcher on this project, Dr Richard Griggs, for his great commitment and his respect for the views of all involved in this process.

Cheryl Frank

Director: Criminal Justice Initiative

OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATION FOR SOUTH AFRICA



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BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY

The Open Society Foundation for South Africa (OSF-SA), under its Criminal Justice Initiative, has funded a variety of civil society organisations (CSOs) to pilot local crime prevention initiatives. Six of these were reviewed along with one other (not funded by the OSF-SA) in order to capture learning and generate information about good practice. Evaluations and reviews are part of good practice and furnish the material to raise many critical questions that might advance our understanding of crime prevention. Evaluations employ social science methodologies for data collection and analysis that measure the outcomes of an intervention. Reviews use mainly secondary sources of information to provide a broad comparative analysis of many interventions. A review affords organisations and interested parties the opportunity to learn from a variety of experiences.

The main focus of the review was on the strategies employed by the seven implementing organisations to facilitate crime prevention initiatives in various areas of the country. The strategies, areas and organisations involved are given in **Figure One**:

FIGURE ONE: THE SEVEN REVIEWED STRATEGIES

1. Establish multi-agency community safety forums	U Managing Conflict	Urban, peri-urban and rural areas of the Western and Eastern Cape
2. Develop community safety forums and rural crime prevention committees	Network of Independent Monitors	Rural and peri-urban communities of KwaZulu-Natal
3. Empower local councils	Institute of Security Studies	Transitional municipal councils in two provinces
4. Build capacity among officials and managers in six metropolitan areas	Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation	All six metro areas in South Africa

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5. Empower low-income volunteer women to lead safety programmes	Centre for Peace Action	Low-income neighbourhoods on the urban fringe of Cape Town and Johannesburg
6. Build the capacity of institutions at ward level	Participative Development Initiative	Low-income wards in urban and rural areas of Durban
7. Capacitate integrated sustainable rural development with a multi-sector crime prevention committee	Idasa	A rural policing area in Limpopo Province

The variation in strategies and areas proved to be very useful for our understanding of what works and what does not in South Africa. The target areas are at scales ranging from neighbourhoods to a magisterial district. This includes wards, policing areas, former group areas, traditional areas and metropolitan areas. The spread also includes many different types of institutional targets at these scales. Some targets are not easy (local government councils) but seem to offer good value. Other targets are way too big to measure impact (six cities). Some are more manageable for delivery (wards) and for research (neighbourhoods).

This review also covers interventions working from different perspectives. The first four take policy documents as their departure points. One employs a public health model. The last two approach crime prevention in terms of integrated sustainable development. Broadly, these perspectives cover security, development and social health frameworks.

Different programme theories also led to different interventions. For instance, four intervened by facilitating a new structure of some kind (three of these were multi-sectoral structures for integrated governance and one was a volunteer group). This allows us to consider the debate between ‘add-ons’ and targeting existing structures. Some based interventions on research, such as safety audits and epidemiological studies. Five out of seven organisations employed these kinds of baseline studies but in different ways. This allows us to reflect meaningfully on research-based approaches.

METHODOLOGY

The researcher engaged in a participatory process of information gathering and analytical feedback to reach the conclusions identified in this review. The documents used to understand the interventions were those provided by the implementing organisations. This included proposals, progress reports, annual reports, training materials and evaluations. This information was supplemented by reference material on international practices and by visits to the organisations and their target sites. Interviews were held with relevant managers in each civil society organisation and the implementing staff. Focus groups were held with the targeted participants. The purpose of these two interview methods was to gather the information for clarifying data emerging from the documentation, so that intervention practices and impact could be described more accurately. Capturing this information was not always easy and this leads to some recommendations in the final chapter of the review.

The writing of the review was undertaken by the researcher but was influenced by feedback and commentary. First, every draft chapter was sent back to the organisation under review to ensure that the intervention theories and practices had been accurately captured. After this, the researcher amended each chapter as necessary and finalised the analysis. Then, a draft of the entire review (all chapters) including the reviewer's initial conclusions was circulated to the participating organisations. The document was then discussed at a feedback workshop. This method was designed to assure accuracy and to allow for discussion and debate that could impact on the final analysis. This acknowledges that research and knowledge are communal productions and that our methods should therefore allow for participation.

THE STRUCTURE OF THIS REPORT

Each strategy is covered in a chapter of the review and each chapter includes twelve identical sections. All the chapter sections comprise the format for the interviews and focus groups that were held. Therefore participants in the review supplied the information that furnished the basis for the researcher's analysis. Each subject covered and some of the analytical issues raised are further described under the subheadings below.

1. Introduction

At the start of each chapter, the key themes under review are raised. Each chapter has been ordered so that we can progressively follow certain themes. For instance, the first chapter aims to create a replicable multi-agency model for delivery on the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS). The second chapter deals with the attempt to transfer that model to KwaZulu-Natal. Both chapters raise the question of how to sustain new structures. We attempt to examine that issue further in the next chapter by looking at targeting an existing structure: a local government council. Issues of scale are then raised when we consider capacitating metropolitan councils in Chapter Five. The following chapter brings us to the question of methodology in the design of our programmes. A public health model offers a good example of rigorous methodology in programme design. Finally, the last two chapters present an opportunity to examine a contrasting paradigm: integrated sustainable development. There are, of course, many other cross-cutting themes and these are also raised below.

2. Organisational background

Each chapter sketches a background of the implementing organisation. This is sometimes significant for explaining the role that organisational culture plays in the type of intervention that develops. Not every organisation is equipped to play an identical kind of role. In other words, one cannot recommend every strategy in this report to every organisation. Rather, each organisation must measure its own background, organisational culture and capacity against the type of interventions that it undertakes. This is demonstrated when two different implementing groups engage in the same strategy. For instance, Community Safety Forums (CSFs) implemented by the Network for Independent Monitors (NIM) are not the same as CSFs implemented by UMAC. Therefore who is implementing a programme is often of significance in understanding the design of an intervention and its impact. In fact, sometimes the very facilitator undertaking delivery changes the nature of impact (see Chapters Seven and Eight).

3. Programme theory

Programme theory refers to the underlying ideas and assumptions upon which an intervention is based. One must always consider programme theory with great care because it is the philosophical foundation that guides all work that is undertaken in the way of social programmes. It affects who we target, the kind of outcome that is envisioned, how we deliver it and how we attempt to sustain an intervention. Developing a sound theory in advance of an intervention allows us to both test our theories and reflect on practices that work well and to discard practices that do not work. There must be consistency between programme theory and delivery strategy. It becomes very difficult to measure impact when we say one thing and do another.

4. Structures (if any)

Sometimes implementing organisations create new structures in a community such as a volunteer group or a multi-sectoral forum that is empowered to carry out the intervention. Sometimes organisations empower existing structures.

An interesting debate was identified in the course of the review. Some organisations think it is not appropriate to set up new structures and others see it as added value. What is the appropriate role of a non-governmental organisation (NGO)? Should NGOs be experimenting with communities by inserting new structures? Four organisations under review set up new structures. Two voiced opposition to that approach. One organisation did neither and engaged in original research production. The two that were opposed to new structures had framed programme theories around the belief that existing structures should be targeted. Is there a middle ground? Are both approaches needed? The researcher found that most of those that added structures found themselves spending a lot of time trying to negotiate a place in government for administration of those structures.

5. Geographical targeting

Some weaknesses in the criminal justice system at an international level have been attributed to the lack of attention to local conditions and dynamics. What works in New York may not work in Johannesburg. What works in the city centre may not work on the urban fringe. Yet, we seldom discuss geographical targets in terms of factors such as distance from the implementing organisation, scale and specific patterns of specific crimes on the ground.

One reason we forget geography is because of a common interest in creating a replicable programme that might work everywhere for crime prevention. This is not surprising since we are all influenced by trying to standardise national policy. Police all over the country are given the same type of vans even though they are not suitable for all kinds of terrain. Policies are written as if all environments are the same.

Much of the world is shifting toward the understanding that locality counts. The greatest feature of the NCPS is that recognition. At the same time we need integration between national, provincial and local strategies but in a local place. This cannot be done without some careful geographical targeting of our efforts. How do we consider this? This is a subject in great need of research but there is some good evidence that initial research, such as safety audits (Chapters Two, Four and Eight) or an epidemiological study (Chapter Six), scientifically done as part of a baseline assessment, can help guide us. Recommendations for the content of a professional safety audit are fully discussed in the final chapter.

6. Delivery strategy or process guidelines

Every organisation operates on a set of guidelines (or 'strategy') for implementation but it is not always the one given in the original project plan or funding proposal. In most cases, the delivery 'strategy' is really a set of guidelines and what happens on the ground may differ. Reviewers and evaluators need to track what happened. Often, they have to identify the actual process through observations and interviews. One organisation operating from a public health approach offered a very detailed strategy that is worth considering as an example of methodological rigour (Chapter Six). One intervention was based more on organisational culture and was difficult to pin down (Chapter Seven). This last can lead to some kind of standard organisational practice and it may even work but this does not permit an accurate assessment of impact. Another organisation (Chapter Two) 'puzzled out' the strategy over a period of years. While that may have been good for policy implementation, it was difficult to follow and therefore a difficult study for identifying good practice. In every chapter the delivery strategy is outlined and briefly discussed. Then, the key elements are detailed as parts of the sections that follow below.

7. Getting started

In many plans for social programmes, it seems that one of the two greatest deficits is insufficient planning for the time and effort it takes to get an intervention started (the other is insufficient planning for evaluation, which is discussed later). An 'entrance strategy' is seldom addressed. How does a civil society organisation get entry into a community and gain the trust to carry out an intervention? For instance 'trust-building' or 'community buy-in' is a time-consuming process that can take months or years. Sometimes implementing organisations lay a solid foundation for co-operation at the national and provincial level, but still underestimate the length of time it would take to build the local 'buy-in' to get an intervention going. This section is therefore specifically about the problem of laying the groundwork for delivery. One organisation offered some excellent lessons (see Chapter Seven).

8. Ensuring relevant crime prevention outcomes

How does the organisation ensure that the activities in which the target group engages have a relevant outcome with respect to crime prevention? For instance, bumper stickers, leaflets, sports activities, theme days and marches on crime topics are common practices in many places but have very little impact. How can one insert a degree of scientific rigour into local crime initiatives when capacity is limited? In the United States and Europe the target communities have access to funds and direct support from well-funded planning departments. Those societies are wealthier and can look beyond the basics of policing practices to investigate innovative crime prevention practices.¹ Can we? What is relevant to our situation and what can we do to ensure an appropriate outcome? One answer seems to be methodological rigour in the design of our interventions and testing our ideas in pilot sites with good geographical targeting by crime types. Chapters Six, Seven and Eight are very useful to consider together in this regard.

9. Measuring impact

It is very difficult to know what works in crime prevention in advance of testing our ideas in practice. Afterwards, we must still ask: 'What kinds of problems arose and how can they be resolved?' This process refines our theories and programmes. This section discusses measuring impact according to the internal systems of each organisation. What worked? What did not? We cannot know the answers if the monitoring and evaluation systems are weak.

It is something of a national crisis that *most* South African crime prevention initiatives are not properly evaluated. Evaluations may expose failures and for this they are feared, ignored and sometimes obstructed. But, evaluations also document our good practices and successes and an enormous amount of data is being lost because of poor methods of evaluation or none at all.

Frequently, impact evaluations are only considered in the last stages of implementation when such an evaluation is not possible since there is no baseline against which to measure changes. Problems relating to evaluation are identified in the review of each strategy but discussed in more depth in the last chapter as a serious problem in need of correction.

10. Making an exit

It is commonsensical to think of the exit strategy as the last item of delivery but it may be the first item in a good strategy. It governs who we target and how. If we visualise the end of the intervention, we can then ensure a sustained outcome. One case where it was considered first is described in Chapter Four. The outcome was a sustained and workable crime prevention programme owned by a local council as part of its poverty alleviation planning. Many others who considered their exit strategy last (or added a new structure) struggled to sustain their intervention.

11. Lessons learnt by the organisation

Each organisation was asked to share some 'lessons learnt' in the process of implementing local crime prevention initiatives. These are simply quoted and listed verbatim as bulleted points with no analysis. This results in some useful tips and also allows us to see that it is sometimes in the detail where we find what works and what does not work. Small matters like the letterhead we use for communication (should it be that of the implementing organisation or from the participants intending to sustain the intervention?) can make a difference in the outcome.

12. Reviewer's comments on practices

At the end of each chapter, the researcher identifies some key themes and issues that have to be raised for discussion. This includes good practices that may be transferred to other places and some ideas or practices that may need to be further debated.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Chapter Nine concludes this report. It offers an overall analysis of the central themes and debates that emerged through the research process. The chapter was initially drafted as a tentative set of conclusions, and presented at the feedback workshop that was held with participating organisations with the intention of generating further discussion and debate. The feedback obtained during this process was integrated into the review. Thus, from beginning to end, a high level of participation contributed to the production of this review of local crime prevention initiatives.

References

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COMMUNITY SAFETY FORUMS

U Managing Conflict (UMAC)

INTRODUCTION

This chapter reviews a pioneering project to facilitate the local implementation of the NCPS. Eight initial pilots to facilitate CSFs saw various government departments and civil society role-players come together to engage in crime prevention planning and projects at the local level. This convinced many role-players that CSFs should go nationwide:

- The Eastern Cape government made CSFs an official part of their provincial strategy on crime prevention.
- In the Western Cape, the province's Department of Community Safety assumed the role of facilitating and funding CSFs as mechanisms to embed crime prevention and safety issues at local level.
- The Department of Correctional Services chose to use existing Safety Forums for interacting with communities regarding community sentencing and the handling of parolees.

The pilots met with certain successes but at this stage we cannot be sure that the same strategy and structures employed in the pilot areas will work in all of South Africa's diverse communities. UMAC argues that one model and one strategy *will* be applicable to the diversity of South African places. In the different CSF pilot areas, different approaches were used to create these structures. The structures do not all function at the same scale or in the same manner. Therefore, the central question in this chapter is about the replicability of structures in the different geographical and social conditions we find on the ground. Can we design structures and social programmes that are suitable everywhere?

ORGANISATIONAL BACKGROUND

UMAC is an NGO based in both the Western Cape and Eastern Cape. It has changed its name twice since its 1985 founding date without changing the initials that make up the acronym UMAC. Before South Africa transformed into a democracy, UMAC was the Cape Town-based 'Unrest Monitoring and Action Committee'. In the mid-1980s, apartheid South Africa declared a state of emergency. This was coupled with severe police repression of both political activities and media coverage. UMAC monitored political demonstrations and passed on information about human rights abuses by the police to sympathetic parliamentarians who would then raise the issue in parliament where media restrictions were absent.

By 1989, UMAC's early anti-apartheid activism had established both a knowledge-base and a grassroots network that enabled the organisation to expand into conflict resolution on a fairly wide scale. UMAC was a major role-player in addressing the conflicts over housing and transport ('taxi wars') that followed from the explosive growth of informal settlements on the urban fringe of Cape Town. The political dynamics of the early 1990s were complex but still included state security tactics that fomented rather than resolved conflict, and therefore required monitoring.

From the 1990s, UMAC found itself in a changed role. Whereas it had at one time worked in opposition to an oppressive state, in the post-apartheid period it was co-operating with police and other government services in the transformation of the criminal justice system. This included being an active member of the Peace Accord structures, developing policies (especially around the community policing approach that was eventually adopted by the South African Police Service), retraining police in new methodologies and helping to mediate solutions between police and various 'township' communities of the Western Cape. This move from anti-apartheid activism to neutral manager of conflict warranted the first of two name changes and UMAC became the 'Urban Monitoring and Awareness Committee'. Demand for such work grew and during 1997 UMAC expanded to the Eastern Cape to open offices in both Port Elizabeth (Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Area) and East London (Buffalo City Municipality).

By the turn of the millennium, it was clear that the old name no longer applied. UMAC had expanded into three provinces and was increasingly working in rural areas. It no longer focused on monitoring but was a partner in government programmes (i.e. CSFs are a provincial initiative). UMAC was now focused on helping government and communities to work together on service delivery in the field of human safety and security. In 2000, UMAC renamed itself again as 'U Managing Conflict', referring to the effort to build the capacity of communities of all kinds to manage their own conflicts in constructive ways.

Today UMAC focuses on human safety, security and peace building, especially by empowering communities to manage their own conflicts in a non-violent manner. This is accomplished through monitoring, facilitation, advocacy, dispute resolution, conflict management training, crisis intervention and publications. UMAC's projects and programmes include:

Crime prevention and policing (both the CSF project and efforts to strengthen Community Police Forums).

Women in peace-building (training unemployed women to become peace-builders).

- Crisis intervention and training in conflict management.
- A youth programme that addresses both child justice issues and skills development.

The CSF project was a product of UMAC's participation in the Western Cape's Crime Prevention Committee, which was formed as a provincial implementation arm of the NCPS. The provincial body eventually formed itself into the Multi-Agency Delivery Action Mechanism (MADAM). Chaired by the Director-General of the Province, it is a management team that focuses on coordinated and integrated approaches to development.

UMAC proposed to MADAM that the implementation of the NCPS could be assisted by consolidating the integration provided at national and provincial level with integrated structures at local level. A MADAM subcommittee brainstormed a possible structure and function for the proposed local multi-agency body as well as the government departments and groups that would take part. The result was 'Community Safety Forums' or CSFs. These would bring together the appropriate range of government departments (local, provincial and national), community organisations (e.g. the CPF, development and youth forums) and CSOs to coordinate crime prevention strategies and projects. It was assumed that the interdepartmental and intersectoral boundaries standing in the way of good crime prevention strategy would be transcended when various representatives met regularly in a forum to develop projects and programmes.

MADAM officially launched CSFs as a provincial project in October 1998. UMAC's role was to develop eight CSFs as pilot projects in the Western Cape. The organisation would link up key role-players and facilitate them into forums that met regularly. Initially the CSFs would identify and try to address gaps in service delivery. As a provincial initiative, the CSF project would be overseen by a provincial Steering Committee with a representative each from the South African Police Service, the Departments of Community Safety, Local Government, Justice, Correctional Services, Education, Social Development and the Community Policing Boards.

UMAC obtained the funding for the CSF pilot projects. Both OSF-SA and the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (Dfid) funded eight pilot projects in the Western Cape (initially from 1999 to 2001). In 2001, the OSF-SA granted additional funds for CSFs in rural areas while the Dfid extended its funding for the urban areas. That same year the OSF-SA also funded the effort to replicate the project in KwaZulu-Natal using a different implementing organisation, the Network of Independent Monitors (NIM).

PROGRAMME THEORY

CSFs seem to be more a product of historical policy development than theory. They emerged in the context of developing government policy on crime and in terms of related policy work that UMAC had been doing in the Western Cape.

First, the national government responded to the spiralling crime of the transition period with the 1996 National Crime Prevention Strategy and the 1998 *White Paper on Safety and Security*. Whereas addressing crime had previously been seen as a law enforcement issue, these new policies adopted by Cabinet, proposed that crime was a social problem that could also be prevented by social means. These types of measures go beyond traditional police responsibilities and require many government departments and stakeholders at national, provincial and

local level to work within an integrated strategy. The 1998 *White Paper on Safety and Security* started to explore this role by promoting multi-sectoral and multi-agency approaches but a structure was not created for such interaction nor any budgets allocated to prepare local government for such a role.

Secondly, as the new national strategy was forming, UMAC was completing its role in setting up CPFs as part of the Western Cape Community Policing Project. The final evaluation of that project stated that CPFs, although operative from 1994, were found to be an inappropriate way to address crime prevention. They lacked a developmental perspective and tended to emphasise law enforcement. CPFs did not interact with a wide enough range of criminal justice agencies (e.g. Justice, Correctional Services, Welfare and Education) either. Issues like bail applications, sentencing or the release of parolees required interdepartmental co-operation to resolve. UMAC reasoned that there needed to be another wider forum for engaging criminal justice agencies, civil society and local government in a sustained way for social crime prevention to be implemented.

According to UMAC:

CSFs are based on the premise, articulated in the National Crime Prevention Strategy, that increased co-operation and interaction would improve the functioning of the criminal justice system and the delivery of crime prevention projects. To achieve this, the CSF project has created a replicable structure for integrated problem-solving at local level.¹

This programme theory distinguishes UMAC from other NGOs that might choose to strengthen existing structures to perform their roles or NGOs that might advocate that the government design and create appropriate structures. UMAC partnered with provincial government to define a type of structure, and then pilot it. UMAC also attempted to facilitate each CSF to the stage of sustaining projects independent of its involvement.

A tremendous amount of facilitation is required for this type of intervention and the risks and challenges are enormous. Even though integration was starting to happen at national and provincial level, UMAC would have to break into old mentalities at local level. There was no history of co-operation and large knowledge gaps existed between role-players in the criminal justice system. It can take many years to achieve integration when this has not been the reality in a community. The intervention was also timed during a huge period of transition in local government and this would affect the pace of delivery.

Thus, a serious commitment to conflict management and mediation are required, including months of NGO workshops for one group after another. Not every NGO has the kind of organisational culture, history or capacity for this type of approach. UMAC had a long history of conflict management in some difficult conflict situations (e.g. the Western Cape taxi wars) and saw this task as part of their historic peace-building role.

The UMAC Director was clear about the need to pursue the avenue of creating a replicable structure:

If we are serious about the NCPS and crime prevention, then we must locate capacity at local level to take this forward. Otherwise it is without a foundation. The CSF is about putting these basic building blocks in place. No other forum space existed for the NCPS work. The CPF came close but adding new complexities and role-players would have diluted the energy needed to address its prime mandate – that of monitoring

and oversight of police. The legislation also made it difficult to get to grips with issues of Justice or Corrections that could be dealt with under the Police Act. Finally, crime prevention includes things other than policing and therefore it is important not to focus the initiative *in* policing.²

Additional forums and models of governance can burden small communities and even larger ones as many of the same people must attend the same forums. Department heads are overtaxed with meetings and simply may not attend. For these reasons, ‘add-ons’ do not have a great history of success and often ‘fall-off’ when the NGO stops maintaining them. There must therefore be a very good theoretical justification for creating a new structure.

UMAC argued that the CSF would *limit* duplication and meeting overload through interaction on a single forum. Departmental forums such as those for Correctional Services, Justice and Social Services could be integrated into one criminal justice forum, the CSF.

STRUCTURE

‘Structure’ typically refers to the purpose, composition, characteristics, activities and powers of a body established to do something.

What is a CSF set up to do? UMAC intended that a CSF should create greater co-operation among government departments and key institutions at local level around issues that prevent crime and improve the effectiveness of the criminal justice system. The defining characteristic of a CSF as facilitated by UMAC offers even more: an interagency body that can identify and prioritise crime problems, offer a joint plan of action and implement projects through the line functions of each participating department. The overarching objective therefore was to create CSFs that could identify their local crime prevention needs and act on this information with clear plans and projects.

Who belongs to a CSF? As a mechanism for integrated planning around crime prevention, the CSF *must* include a wide membership to be deemed effective. The ideal membership of the CSF would include all members from national to community levels of leadership and governance who can make decisions affecting social crime prevention in an area. According to a UMAC publication³, the representatives involved in a typical CSF include:

- National government – South African Police Service (Station Commissioners), Department of Justice (Chief Magistrate, Senior Public Prosecutor), Correctional Services and Labour.
- Provincial government – Social Services, Community Safety, Education, Economic Affairs, Health, and Arts and Culture.
- Local government – law enforcement (municipal police), Health, Housing, and Sports and Recreation.

Community organisations – community police forums, development forums, youth forums and NGOs.

Ward councillors were not listed in this publication but became central role-players as the strategy was puzzled out and as local government transition progressed. This is readily apparent in both the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal where it seems that this strategy is a favoured one for rapidly integrating the CSFs into local government. Councillors are also chairing many Western Cape Forums (e.g. in Mitchell’s Plain and Khayelitsha). One could

“Add-ons” do not have a great history of success and often “fall-off” when the NGO stops maintaining them. There must be a very good theoretical justification for creating a new structure.’

even argue that elected councillors with a democratic mandate to participate in governance are the first to approach regarding experimental new forms of integrated governance (See Chapters Two and Four).

What would characterise a CSF? UMAC offered the following characteristics in its documentation to OSF-SA:

- A multi-agency body that recognises the limited and dependent character of any one agency of governance with regard to crime prevention.
- A body developing its own innovative capacity in crime prevention.
- A structured relationship with the community through delegation and representation.
- A problem-orientated approach.
- A good flow of information between partner departments.

There must also be some regularity and structure to meetings so that these do not become ‘talk shops’. In the actual implementation of strategy, there was great emphasis on project management (partly guided by two evaluations). So, this item should be added to the list above.

The list in its entirety is not overly prescriptive, which is good practice since it allows for innovation at a community level. However, from a national and provincial level, there is a desire to be very precise about the model in order to replicate it. This illustrates the fundamental tension within the task of replicating social programmes. The more we try to define a structure for communicating policy, the less innovation there will be at local level.

What kinds of activities should be the focus of a CSF? The main tasks under the present strategy as articulated seem to include identifying priority crimes in the area and generating a plan of action. The focus on projects belies what CSFs have done most successfully i.e. problem-solving and conflict management. The following description of ‘project’ activities was provided in an article on CSFs.⁴ Problem-solving characterises most of these:

- Adding value to established initiatives (e.g. conflict management in an existing housing project).
- Making input into existing government initiatives (e.g. assisting with the local safe schools initiative).
- Facilitating an integrated approach to existing community initiatives (e.g. bringing the NGOs and other role-players working on victim support into the larger CSF forum).
- Resolving conflict between the community and the government over development issues.
- Identifying original projects on the basis of research (e.g. using a safety audit to locate crime ‘hotspots’ or gaps in service delivery and developing projects to address these).

The first four are problem-solving activities and not projects at all. Only the last one is project management and commenting on this, the authors wrote that progress has been slower than in the others described above and that it was too early to see results in this area. Most of these structures do function as problem-solving groups and to good effect (e.g. solving problems around housing allocation in the Nyanga CSF) and some do engage in project management (e.g. setting up citizen patrols in the Nelson Mandela Metropole).

What powers does a CSF have? At the time of writing, a CSF is a non-statutory body without executive powers. Implementation can occur but only through the member organisations and government departments of the CSF. If the organisations or government departments making up the CSF take forward the decisions and recommendations of the body then it can be seen as a very powerful body. On the other hand, government departments can fail to carry forward the decisions of the CSF and there is no legislative framework to ensure that they do so. UMAC argues that there must be some mandate for first bringing the role-players together and getting them to talk since they have to address new policies of integrated governance.

At best, the CSF can streamline the criminal justice system by creating a sound strategy that identifies and fills the gaps in service. At worst, it can serve as a ‘talk shop’ with little action. Both examples can be seen. Peer pressure exerted on colleagues in the forum can help to move decision-makers along but this does not equal the force of a legislated mandate. Not all participants are equally enthusiastic or motivated in the absence of legislation so hardly any CSF has complete attendance.

A legislated mandate might help create a situation where a greater number of CSFs operate with efficiency and enthusiasm.

GEOGRAPHICAL TARGETING

UMAC has piloted or helped to pilot CSFs in three provinces including ten in the Western Cape, three in the Eastern Cape and two in KwaZulu-Natal in partnership with NIM. The 15 CSFs projects are mapped in **Figure Two** and categorised as urban, peri-urban and rural. The original pilot projects are also indicated.

A critically important idea behind these pilots was to find a replicable structure that could make the NCPS work in any locality on a national basis. In a 2001 paper, the UMAC Director, Sean Tait, described this as follows:

From the onset it [the CSF project] has gone out, not only to address specific problems and points of breakdown but to create a structure that can be utilised for any eventuality within this field and that can itself be replicated to other areas irrespective of the particular demographics of the location.⁵

The replicable structure would progressively be worked out by setting up CSFs at a variety of scales and in many different types of locations. It was theorised that a structure would emerge that would fit all circumstances. Some areas were enormous (such as Umlazi) and were restructured with CSFs at ward level (15 CSFs). One attempt was made to create a CSF for the entire Wynberg Magisterial District and this too was split into three smaller forums because it was simply too large. One CSF, Robertson, expanded to cover an entire municipality of five towns and farming lands (the ‘Breede River Winelands Municipality’). Now it is re-dividing into five sub-forums. Another remained focused on a police precinct (Khayelitsha). No clarity has emerged as to the best scale but that presumes that only one scale is appropriate and that geographical circumstances will not affect our choices.

Delivering appropriate local crime prevention structures at a national scale may call for the development of multiple strategies in practice. This is because a huge number of geographical, political, social and economic


‘Not all participants are equally enthusiastic or motivated in the absence of a legislative mandate, so hardly any CSF has complete attendance.’

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factors can influence the type of strategy and structure deemed appropriate. Examples of these factors include:

- Institutional capacity.
- Literacy.
- Education levels.
- Personalities.
- Leadership.
- Access to services.
- Access to resources.
- Community income levels.
- Transport and terrain.
- Systems and departments of local government.
- Socio-political dynamics.
- Culture (organisational and social).
- Human rights functioning.
- Levels of good governance.
- Demographics.
- Scale.
- Available crime prevention partnerships.

FIGURE TWO: THE 15 COMMUNITY SAFETY FORUMS



Can we accommodate all these variables in the same ‘replicable’ structure? We can only do so in the sense of creating a meeting space and bringing role-players around the table to discuss crime prevention in a regular and sustained way. Otherwise the meeting spaces differ, the role-players differ and the focus and projects that develop in each geographical area can be quite distinctive. CSFs can also evolve into different forms and be absorbed into different bodies. In KwaZulu-Natal, the CSFs are distinguished by a number of features including integration with a system of crime prevention monitors (see Chapter Three for details). In many contexts, e.g. rural areas, one cannot discard traditional structures and faith-based organisations but this can change the dynamics (see Chapters Three and Eight). Distances and bad roads can also make it very difficult for role-players to meet.

CSFs also assume a certain level of functionality that does not exist in some areas. Generally speaking, capacity is lower in many rural areas and this may need to be addressed *prior* to the formation of a CSF. There are unique problems of terrain, distances and livelihoods affecting the speed and pace of delivery. Some rural areas have no CPF yet this structure is viewed as an important member of a CSF, sanctioned to represent the community on policing issues. Often rural areas are poorly serviced with government departments that are not even functioning, let alone ready to work in an integrated way with other departments. The CSFs in rural areas are often disadvantaged in terms of the opportunities to partner (there are many more projects and programmes in urban areas that increase the critical mass of inputs needed for success). There needs to be a system to deal with the unevenness in resources and capacity from place to place as we set up multi-agency structures.

There are also distinctions developing between the kinds of internal functions that CSFs have. Some tend to be problem-solving and facilitating CSFs, others manage projects and some even tend towards advocacy in their approaches. The level of democratic functioning is another factor. One cannot create a workable system of integrated governance without good governance. This prompted NIM to implement CSFs in some areas and to pilot rural crime prevention strategies in others. Community members in the rural areas were not very aware of their basic rights and education and capacity building had to precede the establishment of CSFs.

The geography of CSFs, properly studied and analysed, could inform us of the multiple approaches required for creating the local space(s) for integrated planning on safety and security issues. The experience in piloting CSFs in 15 areas provides a substantial body of comparative knowledge that could furnish a system for geographic targeting if fully captured. At a conference where national role-players in crime prevention met in October 2002, one of their conclusions was a need to reach consensus regarding the approach to CSFs. This still seems critical because variations in the targeted areas produce different kinds of delivery strategies that are not documented in a study. In the effort to find a replicable strategy, the variations in the strategies that were utilised was not a focus.

In sum, CSFs are emerging in different areas and adapt programmes and functions to suit local circumstances. This is commendable but a critical questioning of the terminology that is being used might deepen our understanding of this event. Will CSFs be ‘rolled out’ as a single replicable model based on the same delivery strategy? Or is the term CSF a convenient conceptual marker for the evolution of various place-based practices? If the latter is the case, ‘replicable’ might not be the appropriate term for what are really geographic spaces influenced by a range of actors who agree on certain *kinds* of outcomes. In that case, we could turn to an analysis that focuses more on local ways to deliver on those outcomes. Documenting the mix of good practices

contributing to safety and security forums in a variety of areas could contribute to the work of local councils and Integrated Development Planning (IDP) forums as they work out how to include safety and security in *their* development planning.

DELIVERY STRATEGY OR PROCESS GUIDELINES

UMAC uses project managers and field facilitators to establish, develop and consolidate CSFs. Each uses a different approach. A 2001 evaluation examined this and suggested that delivery followed seven main steps. The reviewer used additional documents and interviews to identify 12 components of delivery. These are in a rough order because not every CSF was facilitated in the same way:

- 1 Negotiate, consult and co-operate with provincial-level and national-level departments to ensure their support for local level projects and pilots and to integrate the NGO efforts on crime prevention with those of government (e.g. UMAC fit within the NCPS, MADAM in the Western Cape, and is overseen by a provincial Steering Committee – see ‘Background’ above).
- 2 Locally, introduce and market the CSF concept to primary stakeholders in the criminal justice system to obtain a core group of participants who can form the nucleus of a CSF.
- 3 Network and facilitate those who participate into an official CSF structure (signified by the nomination of an executive committee).
- 4 Officially launch the CSF and thereafter hold monthly meetings.
- 5 Conduct workshops that clarify the purpose of the CSF structure, build co-operation among participants, resolve conflict and motivate the body toward joint planning with regard to crime and safety issues.
- 6 Facilitate problem identification and planning to address particular issues, develop priorities and formulate a draft plan of action to address these priorities.
- 7 Lobby appropriate stakeholders so as to ensure support for the forum, clarify roles and responsibilities and meaningful input in the process.
- 8 Finalise approved interventions within the framework of a business plan which specifies key deliverables, time-frames and responsibilities.
- 9 Allocate activities and responsibilities to participants and begin implementing projects related to a safety plan.
- 10 Implement a system of reporting to the political and administrative heads of department at both the provincial and local government level.
- 11 Evaluate the intervention.
- 12 Make an exit: consolidate the CSF into a local government structure.

The first step was discussed in giving the background to the organisation and is also referred to in the section immediately below. The remaining ones are explained in the context of getting started (2–9), ensuring relevant outcomes (6–10), measuring impact (11) and making an exit (12). It should be noted that at the time of the review, many facilitators were integrating safety audits into delivery some years after the establishment of the CSFs.

GETTING STARTED

The CSF project was essentially a provincial one undertaken by MADAM (later this was reorganised and the CSF project was integrated with the Urban Renewal Strategy). So, the NGO began by marketing the CSF concept to groups of targeted government role-players. Advocacy, lobbying and negotiations first took place at provincial level and this facilitated local level activity.

With provincial backing secured, UMAC gave presentations to each of the core criminal justice departments in the target areas. This might include the South African Police Service, the Community Policing Forum, Correctional Services, Social Services, Justice, Welfare and Education. This enrolls a group of initial enthusiasts around crime prevention that helps get a structure going. Gradually other stakeholders get involved including NGOs and local government role-players. This gradual approach can be good practice but comes with the caveat that political dynamics change as other role-players join. In one case, the CSF chair was ousted as other members came aboard.

Once a committed group was assembled, UMAC facilitated workshops, shared information and training took place. Many discussions were held defining the role of the CSF. Selective information sessions were also undertaken based on an informal assessment of needs to prepare the CSF for its role. UMAC maintains a library of reference materials from which appropriate readings are selected for the target group. These materials are read and discussed to bring the group up to speed on the latest theories and practices in social crime prevention. Finally, UMAC employs its own training manual on project management to prepare the CSF members to identify and manage appropriate projects.

According to the facilitators, keeping role-players committed to the multi-agency process was tough. It required: (1) a continuous focus on attendance; (2) constantly updating new participants; and (3) conflict management (resistance to the new structure by older structures).

Even after four years as a structure, representatives in many places still failed to attend meetings. UMAC facilitators sometimes chased after people with phone calls, letters and office visits to ensure their buy-in and participation. Facilitators even found themselves attending meetings not vital to the UMAC agenda just to show good faith and an interest in certain government departments. One facilitator commented, 'there seems to be an unwritten agreement within politics that I support your process if you support mine'. UMAC developed a system of reporting between the local CSFs and the Provincial Steering Committee. Sometimes these reports indicated non-attendance and the provincial Steering Committee would rectify the problem with departmental pressure. Perhaps the initial step of networking provincially and working through a provincial-level steering committee structure can be seen as a good practice in terms of establishing and maintaining new local-level forums.

One technique being utilised by UMAC was to have all the parties sign a pledge committing themselves to the process. Although this is somewhat ceremonial it does create some clarity and determination. There is also a CSF launch with invited speakers and ceremony that has a similar impact.

UMAC lobbied and advocated at all levels to keep stakeholders in the process. This included recommending a more powerful mandate by government for departments to serve on the CSF. This was seen as a way to reduce the time it takes to get a CSF going. A model of that is already operative in terms of the provincial CSF board. All

departments are required to meet at provincial level, so why not shift this policy to local level too? One must be careful about what is mandated because too much structure can reduce rather than increase local initiative and enthusiasm. International reviews suggest that the role of national and provincial government should be to encourage local initiatives but not dictate too much structure. The basic finding of the latest international review of crime prevention methods is that we need to shift our thinking to situational tactics in which the local context of the problem and the local applicability of a range of solutions are taken into account.⁶

Conflict is also endemic to getting a new structure started. In every CSF, a different cast of characters and organisations seems to affect the pace and direction of the body. Politics can also simmer below the surface leading to problems and delays for no apparent reason (e.g. factions within a political party that are not openly discussed). The most common conflict was that members of either CPFs or development forums felt that their role was being challenged by the new body. In such a circumstance, UMAC often brought its expertise in mediation and conflict management to bear. This helped to establish stable structures but contributed to a dependence on the NGO. A CSF that is weak in managing its own conflicts and problems is likely have a reduced rate toward achieving a sustainable structure and this was identified as a problem for certain CSFs in the 2002 evaluation report for UMAC.⁷ One might consider making the CSF a problem-solving structure from the start (CPFs and development forums might look at the CSF as less challenging). Another option is to start the CSF by working through the CPF and Development Forum structures and construct it with their participation (see Chapter Seven).

In a focus group discussion, the experienced UMAC facilitators made the following suggestions about how to handle conflict:

- Know the community well in advance (use baseline studies or contract facilitators from the targeted community).
- Handle conflict immediately or it grows.
- Engage participants in an early project that builds consensus (participants on both competing structures might believe that schools should be safe).

ENSURING RELEVANT CRIME PREVENTION OUTCOMES

Some informants for this review argued that the only relevant outcome of CSFs is measurably reduced crime levels. It is not possible to make this correlation because CSFs are too new and have few projects on the ground. Furthermore, no baseline studies or monitoring took place to confirm this. It would be very tough at this stage to unravel the vast collection of community inputs and isolate UMAC's influence.

Owing to the original objectives, it seems inappropriate to evaluate the progress of the intervention on the basis of crime statistics (see programme theory). Reducing crime may be one of the long-term benefits of the CSF project but the intervention was not premised on that idea but rather on increasing the efficiency of the criminal justice system with regard to crime prevention. The task of establishing CSFs and making them operational to a level that improves the functioning of the criminal justice system is a grand task on its own. It involves coordinating departmental functions and engaging in an integrated strategy of crime prevention that is necessarily long term (e.g. educational programmes in schools, urban renewal and improved police–community relations through victim support).

While it would be premature and counter-productive to insist on reduced crime rates in the short term when long-term projects are just getting underway, one can still press the question: how does one ensure that the activities in which the CSFs engage have a relevant outcome with respect to crime prevention? Most of UMAC's time was expended on seeing that CSFs were structured and capacitated to coordinate crime prevention projects without arriving at the project management stage. The NGO monitored the progress of the CSFs according to four identifiable stages of development from the formation of the CSF to the initiation of projects. This offers a reasonably clear yardstick of how far a CSF has progressed. These four stages of development were listed in the 2001 evaluation report as follows:

- 1 Relevant role-players meet regularly as the CSF.
- 2 Improved understanding and information sharing is taking place among the members.
- 3 Increased co-operation around service delivery.
- 4 Initiation and implementation of new projects.

Figure Three offers a rough description of the situation of each forum with regard to the stages and includes information on the type of area, the number of sub-forums and the situation with the exit strategy (CSFs have to be institutionalised somewhere for sustained administrative functioning). One can see that most CSFs remain at the problem-solving stage. At the time of the review, many had not yet been housed for administrative functioning. This seemed well underway with the Department of Community Safety assuming the helm in the Western Cape and with strong buy-in from the Eastern Cape, both locally and provincially.

FIGURE THREE: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CSFs ACCORDING TO UMAC'S FOUR STAGES

George	3	Urban	No	No	Based on SAPS plan
Wynberg	2	Urban	Split into three	No	
Khayelitsha	3	Urban	No	No	Safety Plan
Mitchell's Plain	3	Urban	No	No	Safety Plan
Nyanga	3	Urban	No	No	Safety Plan
Tygerberg Central	3/4	Urban	No	No	Safety Plan
Atlantis	2	Peri-urban	No	No	Safety Plan
Beaufort West / Central Karoo	2	Rural	No	No	
Breede River Winelands	3	Rural	5	No	Safety Plan

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Worcester	2	Rural	No	No	
Nelson Mandela Metropole	3	Urban	Yes	No	Audit
Lukhanje Municipality	3	Peri-urban	No	No	Audit
Mhlonto Municipality	3	Rural	No	No	Audit
Umlazi	2	Urban	15	No	Audit
Nseleni- KwaMthethwa	1	Rural	No	No	No

Do CSFs really need to reach Stage Four and implement projects in order for them to be considered successful or is the creation of a problem-solving body also to be considered a success (Stage Three)? For instance, the Khayelitsha CSF helped to *facilitate* many projects of significance in relation to crime prevention, e.g. training in neighbourhood watch projects, regulating shebeens and establishing a victim-support centre at one police station. The CSF played a major role in mediating conflict over job opportunities promised by a new court. Through negotiations, it set up a facility to allocate the jobs and thereby overcame threats to prevent the court from opening. This stands out as a success story but the CSF may still be considered at Stage Three. These successes are not diminished by the expectation that CSFs would play the role of managing projects but should the expectation be questioned as a tool for monitoring progress?

In the 2001 evaluation, participants of the George CSF questioned the implementation of projects as an indicator of success. They looked at the CSF as a problem-solving forum in which the day-to-day problems of both law enforcement and crime prevention could be resolved. One respondent was quoted in an evaluation as saying ‘We mustn’t make things complicated with a business plan. I only have time for a one-hour meeting on Friday – I don’t have time for projects and plans. It is more than enough that we solve problems’.⁸ The evaluator listed a number of problems that had been resolved in the forum such as zoning streets in Thembaletu for more prompt police and ambulance services and saving lives by reducing road accidents on a section of the N2 through an education campaign, negotiating new speed limits and fencing around the highway from Knysna to George.

Significantly, the delivery strategy went beyond ‘integrated problem-solving’ as defined in the programme theory and attempted to create a sustainable institution for planning projects and programmes. The following were given as the objectives of delivery:

To establish CSFs as a means of facilitating the active participation of primary stakeholders and role-players in the planning and implementation of multi-agency crime prevention projects in selected pilot areas.

- To enhance a coordinated response by the departments of the criminal justice system and other agencies (non-governmental organisations) and community-based organisations to specified priority crimes in the pilot areas.

Projects would have to be implemented through member departments and organisations since the CSF has no legislated status. Can we decide prior to local consultation that their purpose is managing projects? Can a forum that includes government departments, agencies and organisations with their own mission statements and objectives generate independent projects and plans and then manage them as a body without legal status or budgetary allocations? The evidence shows that it is difficult but not impossible. One can see that CSFs have already helped foster some significant projects and programmes (e.g. a Street Children Forum in George). A technique suggested by the reviewer would be to see that all initial projects fit with job descriptions and government programmes. This was very effective for the multi-agency project at Bolobedu (Chapter Eight). Some members in the CSF participant focus groups seemed to feel that they are engaged in an 'extra' activity.

In both the 2001 and 2002 evaluations of the project, it was deemed that certain CSFs had created unrealistic goals by not adhering more to what the individual departments had the capacity to do and the lack of action generated disappointment by some members. One must therefore be careful that problems of departmental operations and interdepartmental communication and coordination are not overlooked in the rush to do projects. Often the most practical step toward ensuring a relevant outcome is to integrate *some* departmental work plans and activities on crime prevention issues. It may be too ambitious to include all departments because these departments are understaffed, overworked and under-resourced. The task is complicated because the boundaries of various service providers are not aligned. A different mix of departments covering partial areas is problematic for full coordination.

Another activity that UMAC employed to ensure relevant outcomes is the use of safety audits that assess the crime situation and the local capacity to address it. This helped to focus participants on appropriate long-term plans and offered the CSFs a way to invite 'community' feedback (by workshopping the results of the audit). The audits entered the strategy too late to provide a baseline and therefore will be discussed in more detail in those chapters where the audit was an initial and central focus of strategy (Chapters Four and Eight). In the two CSFs visited by the reviewer, the safety plans were generated prior to the safety audit. This seemed to be the case in many places.

Training also plays a role in ensuring that the CSF members have the information, knowledge and expertise to deliver on crime prevention. As yet, no precise package or toolkit of training and guidance materials has evolved for CSF development (recommended by the December 2002 evaluation). Usually, UMAC offers project management and conflict management training along with information sessions about crime prevention strategies. The training recommended by the report included:

Project planning.

Crime prevention strategies.

Drawing up a community safety plan.

Conducting safety audits and their value.

'One must be careful that problems of departmental operations and interdepartmental communication and coordination are not overlooked in the rush to do projects.'

- Collecting and analysing information for safety audits.
- Lobbying and advocacy.
- Role clarification.
- Monitoring and evaluation.

The training suggested is also premised on the project management model. Could training for some CSFs also serve a problem-solving model? This might have two benefits. As indicated earlier, this would facilitate a speedier path to sustainable structures since the CSF would be less NGO dependent. It would also promote what most CSFs do most of the time anyway: solve problems.

Another common practice for ensuring relevant outcomes is to establish a set of indicators using participative research techniques. This must be done at the outset of an intervention and necessarily means that there must be a budget available for this research process or a research department on call. An important omission in the original strategy, identified and corrected by UMAC and defined as a 'lesson learnt' (see final section of this chapter), is developing a set of indicators for each community or CSF.

Some general indicators were established but so late in the project (part of the December 2002 evaluation report) that they could only be utilised in the last year of a five-year project cycle. By then, each CSF had its own internal dynamics and the race was on to make them sustainable. The indicators were also based on the assumption that one set of indicators can be designed and applied to all CSFs. That assumption rests on another idea: that a replicable model can be created for CSFs. The indicators for the December 2002 evaluation report included:

- Full and consistent participation.
- A shared vision of a safer society.
- Information and analysis for the development of a community safety plan.
- A more efficient criminal justice system.
- A co-operative approach to problem-solving.
- Sustained CSFs (housed in government).
- Greater confidence in the criminal justice system.
- Integrated plans.
- Good governance and accountability.

Funding.

The above is useful for characterising any multi-agency initiative, but there is too much variability in CSF functions to measure every one by the same yardstick. An expectation that all the same indicators, stages and objectives apply to every CSF proceeding along stages of development is probably unrealistic. Such an expectation can even dampen the enthusiasm of a group of people otherwise making progress according to their own socio-political, economic and geographical situation. Generic indicators are also vague (e.g. 'full participation'). Local

indicators can be clearer, more specific and require no interpretation of their meaning (e.g. ‘full participation’ vs ‘Jacob Moodley, CPF Chair must attend the monthly meetings’). Furthermore, only some of these generic items are relevant at the local level, some are not, and others arise.

Measuring impact

UMAC commissioned two external ‘evaluations’ to analyse the progress in establishing functioning CSFs and this generated some good information. However, because these were undertaken three and four years after the project was underway, they would be better termed project assessments. The CSF projects were not monitored and evaluated from indicators and baseline studies with the result that assessments of their success are largely based on perceptions and testimony. Conditions change once a programme is underway, meaning there is no longer an accurate way to measure change. The best solution to this is to include a research programme that starts from the date of the inception of the project and is involved in action research throughout the length of the project until the dissemination of findings.

In May 2001, Insideout Research in partnership with the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) completed an evaluation of Community Safety Forums using the CSFs in Robertson, Tygerberg, Khayelitsha and George as a sample. In December 2002 another evaluation was completed by the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) in partnership with Insideout Research focusing on Robertson, Worcester, George and Beaufort West in the Western Cape and Umlazi and Kwambonambi in KwaZulu-Natal. **Figure Four** draws on these two sources to offer a table of challenges. Possible solutions were added based on interviews and discussions with UMAC staff. This should help any organisation with plans to implement multi-agency coordination of crime prevention planning.

FIGURE FOUR: SIX CHALLENGES AND SOME SOLUTIONS

<p>Activities recommended by the CSF are not always translated into the line functions of the departments concerned.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Only decision-making senior members attend CSF meetings. ■ A structured report-back system disseminates information more widely within departments. ■ Ensure projects fit with departmental priorities and budgets.
<p>Sometimes the CPF is not functioning well yet this serves the CSF as the community voice on policing issues.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Address the deficiencies of the CPF as part of a safety plan. ■ Include more community representation.
<p>Previously established forums (e.g. the CPF, a Justice Forum) fear the new CSF is taking over their role.</p>	<p>Joint workshops defining the respective roles of the forums at a very early stage.</p> <p>Develop the CSF with the full participation of the other forums.</p>

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<p>It can take so long to establish the CSF that members lose their enthusiasm in the early stages of development.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Include some short-term deliverables at the start of CSF activities that keep all concerned parties enthusiastic. ■ Frequent CSF meetings (every 2–3 weeks) in the beginning stages seem to maintain more enthusiasm than monthly ones. ■ Carefully consider the timing of interventions (the local government transition slowed the pace).
<p>'No attendance' by some role-players, irregular attendance by others and the 'changing faces' syndrome where a different and new representative is sent who must then be updated before the process can move forward.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Restrict participation to senior members. ■ Have participants sign a pledge committing them to a process. ■ Make sure CSF activities fit within the job descriptions of the representatives. ■ Advocate a government mandate for participation on CSFs. ■ Exercise clout through a provincial steering committee.
<p>Participants need more information in written form so that they have a reference for sustaining the intervention after the NGO exits.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ The evaluation recommended a 'tool kit' or guideline packet that covers all aspects of setting up and sustaining a CSF and many examples of good practices. This would be an excellent addition but should come very early in the intervention and participants should be trained in the content as part of delivery strategy. In this way training and mentoring in the toolkit could replace the intensive process of facilitation utilised by UMAC that is not sustainable on a large scale.

Both the 2001 and 2002 evaluations were concerned that few of the CSFs arrived at the stage of managing concrete projects to prevent crime. This refers us to the earlier question of whether the objective that forums should manage crime prevention projects is realistic in all cases. If not, measuring success on this yardstick could be demoralising. If so, then every CSF may need to be fully recognised in legislation and empowered as project managing bodies. It was this disjuncture between expectation and the capacity to manage projects that led the ISS evaluators to comment, 'The expectation that participation in the CSFs would necessarily lead to the initiation of crime reduction activities and actual CSF projects is misplaced'.⁹

Surprisingly, the evaluation recommended that UMAC further engage in efforts to facilitate actionable safety plans and project development. In the reviewer's opinion, this would put many CSFs into difficulties if this role was beyond their capacity or not appropriate.

The second evaluation also addressed the question of limited project managing forums:

The previous evaluation showed that there was a conflict between the stated purpose of CSFs (as articulated by UMAC) and what forums had actually been able to achieve. The misplaced expectation of respondents in the

2001 evaluation was that participation in the CSFs would result in concrete activity, rather than information sharing. This resulted in disillusionment and inconsistent participation. As suggested by the ISS research team, UMAC should review its assumptions in relation to the purpose of the CSFs.¹⁰

Again, the 2002 evaluation team made the same recommendation as the 2001 team, i.e. persevere with the planning and implementation of multi-agency crime prevention projects. The idea of geographical variation was not addressed by either study. It is revealing that at the time of the 2002 evaluation the George CSF still had not developed a safety plan nor managed projects and yet steamed ahead with its problem-solving model. Furthermore, it developed a system of combining the work plans of the relevant departments so as to create an initial integrated safety plan that is compatible with departmental priorities. Crime prevention could expand from there to audits or other programmes as deemed necessary.

The 2002 evaluation revealed that the CSFs had helped many stalled projects to get off the ground, which would not have happened without this involvement. This further indicates that some CSFs, at least those without any formal status in local governance, should be re-considered as problem-solving structures that integrate the work plans of various departments, facilitate partnerships, lobby and advocate. A greater emphasis on problem-solving methodologies would allow the CSFs more freedom to assume shape according to local conditions, needs and the capacity of the group.

Evaluators concerned with making improvements often seem more thorough when pointing out the challenges of an intervention, but the benefits and good practices must also be identified. Most important is that UMAC accomplished its main task of creating a local space for multi-agency interaction and co-operation around crime prevention. It also demonstrated that new policies require facilitation if they are to be implemented. That nearly all UMAC's pilot CSFs developed and approved safety plans show evidence that facilitation can lead to an improved level of understanding and co-operation between departments around crime prevention. Not all the CSFs produced realistic safety plans (later, audits were identified as a way to manage this) but service delivery was enhanced in some measure. The participants were also deeply imprinted with the realisation that modes of governance were changing. That is enough to confirm that a multi-agency approach can improve the functioning of the criminal justice sector.

In the ISS portion of the 2001 evaluation, it was stated that the CSFs had succeeded in providing a structured opportunity for:

- Developing a better understanding of crime prevention amongst a range of role-players within and outside the local and provincial spheres of government.
- Government departments to receive input from a range of civil society organisations that may not otherwise have had such an opportunity.

Developing a better understanding amongst government and civil society role-players regarding the relationship between their roles and activities.

Developing agreement amongst these role-players on priority issues to be addressed.

Developing a coordinated response to these priority issues.¹¹

These reports did not show the degree to which UMAC consulted, lobbied and advocated at provincial and national level. It resulted in a great deal of national recognition for the CSF effort. The first step in delivery was actually a consultative process with key government role-players at provincial and national level. In many ways, this culminated in a strong partnership between the NGO and the government at provincial level: the CSF project was implemented by UMAC but launched by the province's Multi-Agency Delivery Action Mechanism (under new provincial leadership this changed to a UMAC partnership in the Cape Renewal Strategy).

Secondly, consultations took place at national level in terms of conferences and seminars. A national consultative seminar was held in Cape Town in October 2002 specifically on the CSFs with some 200 participants including: the National Minister of Safety and Security along with deputy ministers, standing committee chairpersons, director-generals, representatives from the National Secretariat of Safety and Security, provincial MECs, provincial standing committees, representatives of the House of Traditional Leaders, and many other distinguished role-players from all branches of government concerned with crime prevention. CSFs were widely endorsed as a way to make the NCPS a reality at local level. This level of support is very promising for CSFs even if there are still refinements required for a national strategy. According to UMAC Director Sean Tait, 'The ground has shifted and the CSFs are here to stay and expand.'

A second and potentially more important accomplishment is the amount of knowledge generated by the 15 pilot projects for understanding crime prevention practices under a variety of different social, economic and political conditions. This was addressed in the geographical targeting, and the comparative data needs to be captured without delay. For interventions of such magnitude and importance, researchers should be integrated into the project as part of the implementing team from beginning to end. Otherwise, gaps in documentation and staff changeover lead to a loss of valuable knowledge.

MAKING AN EXIT

The exit strategy was considered very late in the implementation process owing more to historical circumstances than to any strategic error. Three changes in provincial leadership occurred in the funding period resulting in a reorganisation of provincial structures including MADAM. The Municipal Demarcations Act¹² and the municipal elections (December 2000) retarded progress. The elections created new role-players for the CSF (councillors, committee members). The boundaries for carrying out the NCPS at local level were only created prior to those elections and *still* fail to line up the role-players at any particular scale. The service providers such as SAPS and Justice did not make their boundaries conform to the new municipal ones. So, sustaining an inter-agency structure in these historical and geographical circumstances was not easy.

Complicating the exit strategy is the limited funding duration that all NGO programmes have. In the case of the CSFs, most of the pilots were initiated in late 1998 or early 1999 with funding ending in December 2003. It was *only* in the final phase of funding, after local government was restructured, that UMAC could advocate that municipalities assume the administrative role that the NGO had played to ensure their sustainable functioning. UMAC facilitators felt pressure under funding deadlines to ensure that all the CSFs had an administrative home on their departure.

Even though the drive in the last year or two toward sustainable structures was difficult, many successes are on the horizon. In the Western Cape, the Department of Community Safety is taking over from UMAC in facilitating the resources and capacity for local government to provide the leadership. In the Eastern Cape, solid progress toward sustainability was made sooner because the strategy was introduced later in time, and included local councillors at ward level. Similarly, once local councillors were invited to participate in KwaZulu-Natal, the pace toward sustainable structures quickened.

The central strategy at the time of writing is to make CSFs part of the Integrated Development Planning (IDP) process of provincial and local government. This fits with the vision of the 1996 National Crime Prevention Strategy and the 1998 *White Paper on Local Government*. If governance is to move from the bottom upward, local authorities need to identify their development needs and communicate their plans to partners in provincial and national government. No department will be able to develop its plans in isolation and will have to be linked to the IDP. CSFs are well placed in the new style of governance and may provide one of the core sectors (Safety and Security) within the new framework of integrated development planning. Local government is required to include a crime prevention component in its budget. So, there is a potential CSF role wherever this capacity has been developed.

Could the road toward sustainable CSFs have been smoother? Perhaps it may have been with a funded mandate and certain strategic considerations. First, the lack of a legislated and funded mandate for the CSFs had a negative impact on resources, levels of commitment (the attendance problem) and increased dependence on the implementing agency. However, the question of how and if it should be legislated is unresolved. The 1995 South African Police Service Act is under review and some are lobbying to insert CSFs into the process (similar to the statutory CPFs). This would place the Department of Safety and Security in control of crime prevention, possibly returning us to the dominance of policing issues in the crime prevention agenda. Is crime prevention better placed both in theory and practice as a component of development planning than perhaps could have been anticipated?

Strategically there were problems too. UMAC often assumed a large secretarial, problem-solving and administrative role. CSFs that are too dependent on the NGO might not be sustained after the NGO exits. The George CSF took a greater role in the secretarial administration of the project and quickly sustained its own activities without UMAC. The practice by the Khayelitsha CSF of compiling quarterly reports to monitor its own progress also seemed to build a greater sense of ownership in the intervention.

KEY LESSONS LEARNT (offered by UMAC Director and staff)

These are some of the lessons suggested by UMAC for other organisations that may attempt this strategy:

‘Limit the number of pilot areas in the beginning so that there is time to really concentrate on working out the model rather than just trying to keep things going.’

‘Do a powerful briefing explaining exactly what you are doing and why because over the lifespan of the project there are many changing faces and each time there is a need to bring that new person into the process quickly.’

‘Know when to move from facilitation to lobbying and advocacy and be ready to make that change at a moment’s notice.’

- 'Do a risk management assessment of an area with regard to politics and factionalism because this can retard progress if you have not planned for these eventualities.'
- 'In the beginning be flexible and do not aim too high. Setting up a CSF is a very dynamic process and it grows as one moves along. For instance, secure the core of the criminal justice system in an area and start to work on initiatives then gradually more role-players will come to the table.'
- 'Be very clear about roles and responsibilities when engaging in a partnership. Keep these very defined.'
- 'Use quality control indicators from the very start of the intervention to monitor processes so as to ensure an effective outcome.'
- 'Develop toolkits for each CSF including power-point presentations and handbooks. These are needed to maintain momentum, provide quick information, assist with the buy-in that is needed on a continuous basis, and play a role in sustaining the structure after the NGO exits.'
- 'One needs satellite offices as close to the target areas as possible to enable the facilitator quick access to the community.'

REVIEWER'S COMMENTS

The greatest value of the CSF project seemed to be the understanding that the NCPS was not going to happen on its own and that a significant amount of facilitation and conflict management would be required to make this new policy succeed. In this case, it was decided that a new integrated structure for crime reduction and prevention had to be piloted to make the policy succeed. In the absence of a mandate, such efforts seem too problematic to recommend as a good practice for CSOs whatever the eventual outcome of the CSF project. Organisations might confront the following kinds of problems:

- Not having a mandate can create a situation where the participants are not fully accountable to those facilitating the structure and therefore the CSO finds itself taking on a strong administrative role that cannot be sustained.
- Ensuring attendance and creating coordination between role-players can consume most of the time period of the intervention.
- Once the piloted structures appear to be working, one might have to situate ownership of the crime prevention structures in government involving a long marketing drive.
- There is inevitable resistance from other structures in the community such as development forums and CPFs.
- Owing to community conflicts, the organisation might have to engage in conflict management, which in turn can lead to a dependence on the CSO for conflict problem-solving (slowing the advance toward sustainability).

Government officials may show no incentive for participation without a mandate.

There also seem to be alternatives to this CSF approach which are easier. The intervention described in Chapter Four shows that it is not always necessary to bring all role-players around the table in a sustained and regular way. One can focus appropriate partners on appropriate projects and have this monitored by a department or the local council. Action groups with a cause are often more effective than forums that inevitably spend long periods of time

discussing their purpose. Chapter Eight suggests that we might first conduct a safety audit before we even decide what a community needs in the way of social crime prevention. The audit can then be used to inform the community about the crime situation and the good practices that might apply. Then the community decides what structures its needs and then designs and owns the strategy. This would reduce conflict in cases where existing organisations feel challenged by the imposition of a new one.

The variety of experiences emanating from 15 pilot projects offered an unprecedented opportunity to refine our methods of geographical targeting but the emphasis on creating a replicable structure limited the attention to this aspect. Delivery strategy varied according to area but these variations were not documented in research. Documenting all the different ways to deliver on the strategy would be invaluable for understanding the types of multi-agency efforts that work in various kinds of places. In Chapter Three and Eight there is discussion of a strategy for traditional rural areas where the dynamics are quite different from those in the Western Cape.

The pilot projects seem to have illustrated two items of significance for an exit strategy. Firstly, consideration of the exit strategy as early as possible can greatly reduce the difficulties related to establishing sustainable structures. Secondly, CSFs that worked through the local councils seemed to enjoy the greatest apparent level of local support and therefore appear sustainable (e.g. Nelson Mandela Metropole). Perhaps many of our multi-disciplinary efforts on crime prevention should be initiated in partnership with local councillors or officials to ensure that they can help sustain interventions after the NGO departs? Project management also becomes less problematic in cases where such multi-agency bodies have been integrated into local government and budgets have been allocated.

At the time of the review, UMAC was working on a plan that would make CSFs the safety and security sector of the IDP forums in the Western Cape. Could this have been anticipated in the programme theory such that integrated development planning was targeted from the start and charged with a crime prevention capacity, given that the *White Paper on Local Government*¹³ came out around the same time as the *White Paper on Safety and Security*?

It might be more appropriate to question the role that CSOs play in facilitating the implementation of government policy and the relationship that results. Should government policy be the departure point for our programme theories on crime prevention? In this particular case, it seems that without a second-party intervention, a CSO that supplied professional facilitation, these multi-disciplinary structures would not have emerged (see also Chapter Four for the same pattern).

Finally, do we need to consider the timing of our interventions more formally at proposal stage? The road to CSFs was not easy and it might have been ideal to have started the initiative after the municipal elections. We will find the same pattern of problems for other organisations that attempted to work with government at a time of great transition.

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3

RURAL CRIME PREVENTION STRATEGY AND COMMUNITY SAFETY FORUMS IN KWAZULU-NATAL

Network of Independent Monitors (NIM)

INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapter, we asked whether strategies and structures in crime prevention can be replicated from one area to the next or if we should vary our strategies and structures according to different types of geographical targets. The experience of the Network of Independent Monitors (NIM) in the province of KwaZulu-Natal helps us to address this question.

NIM has worked in partnership with UMAC since 2001 to create Community Safety Forums (CSFs) in the peri-urban area of Umlazi outside Durban and in the rural area of KwaMthethwa. NIM developed a strategy that it could use effectively for both places but found that the *approaches* to establishing the structures and the *functioning* of the structures differed between rural and peri-urban. NIM used the same strategy again in three traditional areas with the same result. The strategy also contains adaptations to KZN's political and social conditions. Since a human rights culture and good governance are pre-conditions for making integrated governance work, this was addressed first in many rural areas. NIM's organisational culture also played a role in the outcomes. It integrates monitors into all projects and links these to its in-house research unit (Crime and Policing) that conducts investigations and works with both the criminal justice sector and the media to *ensure* a crime prevention impact.

ORGANISATIONAL BACKGROUND

NIM is a Durban-based non-profit human rights organisation (voluntary, not Section 21) that seeks to reduce political and organised violence in KwaZulu-Natal and to promote law-abiding communities. As its name indicates, NIM started out as a network of monitors. Initially, this involved organising people to monitor elections in Africa during the early 1990s wave of democratisation (including South Africa's 1994 elections). Owing to its extensive network of monitors, NIM became deeply involved in investigating and reporting on election abuses within South Africa including the infamous 'no go' areas where opposition political parties could not campaign without encountering violence. Investigations also uncovered arms caches that might have disrupted peaceful elections. NIM developed an organisational culture strong in media relations, advocacy and public information campaigns. It also developed a knowledge base regarding political and organised violence.

From 1994, funding slowed for election monitoring. NIM continued monitoring but shifted focus to good governance, crime prevention and democratisation. In addition, HIV/Aids and domestic violence would be integrated into all their work. The investigative approach to these issues dominated throughout most of the 1990s. NIM's monitoring network was deep within both rural and urban communities. This allowed the organisation to uncover startling information that attracted much press coverage about the factional and political violence that threatened the new democracy. Their public information and advocacy campaigns brought attention to warlords, hotspots of political violence, intimidation, gangsters, vigilantism and factional violence.

In the new millennium, NIM assisted the Secretariat of Safety and Security and the National Crime Prevention Centre to draft a policy document for rural crime prevention. In the course of this, NIM obtained OSF-SA funding to pilot a rural crime prevention project in three areas of KwaZulu-Natal. This added a new approach to the organisation's work. The idea was to extract best practices and then share this information with others through a practical manual. Owing to the success of CSFs in the Western and Eastern Cape, NIM also decided to partner with UMAC to pilot two Community Safety Forums. UMAC would provide the knowledge and expertise and NIM would provide the facilitation. The partners obtained OSF-SA funding to replicate the strategy in a peri-urban and a rural area of KwaZulu-Natal.

Piloting crime prevention strategies was a new approach for NIM, but it was still within the mission statement:

To reduce political and organised social violence, by enhancing coordinated state service delivery, promoting the rule of law and a respect for human rights and increased civil society participation in safety and security.

By 2002, NIM had divided its work into four integrated programmes/projects including:

- 1 Crime and policing.
- 2 An ex-combatant peace-building initiative.
- 3 Rural crime prevention programme (RCPP).
- 4 Community safety forums.

While this chapter is mainly concerned with the last two programmes listed, there is a strong interplay between all four programmes that needs to be understood. Firstly, the Crime and Policing Programme (the research unit) is an integrated part of every project and programme. Their main focus is on baseline studies, to monitor, evaluate, furnish safety audits, provide research-based advocacy and serve a watchdog function. The latter function includes working with the criminal justice system to identify and address problems identified in the target areas. Through action research they also help identify the mix of programmes and projects appropriate to an area. It might include training ex-combatants, networking partners onto a CSF, and using monitors to provide early warning information about likely political or organised violence. Secondly, the rural crime prevention programme aims to prepare rural areas to develop their own CSFs.

Similar to UMAC, NIM has a history of monitoring, working in areas with political tensions and direct pro-active engagement in conflict. However, there are some differences in organisational culture that may contribute to a variation in the CSF experience in KwaZulu-Natal. Whereas, UMAC is pro-active about mediation and conflict management and has applied these skills in ensuring sustainable CSF structures, NIM is proactive about the need to reduce crime. NIM will map out areas where gangs are active, work closely with police on investigations, advocate the arrest of perpetrators and help follow through on prosecutions including pre-trial services and witness protection.

PROGRAMME THEORY

NIM intends to advance both rural and peri-urban communities toward an integrated criminal justice system that delivers on projects and programmes in crime prevention. This means that the goals and objectives of the CSF project as outlined in the previous chapter and the rural crime prevention programme are virtually the same. NIM, like UMAC, seeks to make the NCPS operative by creating an appropriate structure for interaction at the local level. However, NIM found that it needed to consider the rural and peri-urban areas differently. According to NIM Director Fatima Essay:

The multi-disciplinary approach to crime prevention is the best approach but not necessarily the fastest. One has to take the dynamics of each area into account. With the rural crime prevention programme we have the same goals, the same objectives and the same strategy as CSFs but the approaches to getting there and some outcomes along the way are different.¹

NIM theorises that localising National Crime Prevention Strategy means consideration for where each community is in terms of development. Research findings indicate that most rural communities in KwaZulu-Natal are so disempowered and so neglected in terms of service delivery that CSFs cannot be rapidly achieved there. This suggested to NIM the need for a different *pace* of delivery in many rural areas. According to NIM:

One cannot implement rural crime prevention mechanisms without making the community at large aware of their basic rights with regard to legal education or access to justice. Both these components complement each other and therefore the impact is far greater than just making people aware of crime on its own.²

Since many members of KwaZulu-Natal's rural communities may be little aware of their basic rights and what good governance means, they are not ready to foster a new integrated form of governance. Education and capacity building must *precede* the establishment of CSFs in many rural areas to lay the foundation for democratically functioning structures. Therefore strengthening the culture of human rights, the rule of law and access to justice is linked to our choices in terms of crime prevention structures. NIM sees a need for two programmes with the same objective of making the NCPS work at local level. The first programme would offer a capacity-building approach for rural areas to initiate multi-disciplinary crime prevention work. The objective would be to:

- Maximise and sustain community participation in crime prevention.
- Enhance respect for human rights.
- Enhance awareness of the justice system.
- Improve state service delivery.

The second programme is the more sophisticated CSF project that was established at Umlazi, one of South Africa's largest townships. This seemed to work well for NIM but the rural pilot programme at Nseleni-KwaMthetwa was hampered by political instability. Like the other rural areas, establishing a CSF requires some preliminary work. For instance, the Community Policing Forums (CPFs), which often form the core group for jump-starting the CSF, are neither very well developed nor effective. Prior to NIM's arrival, the CPF structure had never been introduced in one of the targets (Izingolweni).

Ultimately NIM found that conditions for good governance and key areas of service delivery had to be developed before a CSF could be established. That seems to reinforce NIM's theory that a rural programme to deal with the conditions in KwaZulu-Natal's traditional areas is needed alongside a CSF programme. Some practices can apply to both the conditions and approaches, and dynamics are so very different that the strategy and outcomes on the ground are not really the same.

STRUCTURE

There are significant differences between the CSFs found in KwaZulu-Natal and the other provinces. NIM did not replicate the CSFs precisely and this outcome points to differences in approaches, organisational culture and place variation. First, UMAC focused more on provincial coordination whereas NIM concentrated on area-based management with no provincial oversight. Second, NIM included features that are an expected part of a pro-active monitoring network. For instance, the two CSFs in KwaZulu-Natal are the only ones in the nationwide pilot project with crime prevention monitors and *elected* area-based steering committees. Third, the dynamics of KwaZulu-Natal's rural areas are different (e.g. no Western Cape rural area falls under a traditional authority).

There are also differences between the local crime prevention forums for NIM's peri-urban area and its rural areas. They are similar enough that some features can be described for both including:

- A ward-level forum (peri-urban) or a ward-level committee (rural).
- Crime prevention monitors.

- An area-based steering committee comprised of elected representatives.

The CSF includes one additional structure not found in the rural crime prevention strategy:

- An executive-level committee similar in function to the provincial steering committee in the other provinces but less official and with more civil society representation.

1. Ward-level structures

The ward-level structures include: (1) the CSFs that we understand from the previous chapter, and (2) the Crime Prevention Committees in rural areas (RCPCs). The RCPC is very local, voluntary and is not as inclusive as the CSF with its structured form of integrated governance. In both the rural and urban areas of KwaZulu-Natal, there are heated political party divisions that can impede processes. The ward-based system bypasses some of this (i.e. conflicts between wards) and helps to ensure that *problem-solving* can take place within local government through the representation of a ward councillor.

The CSF functions differently and has more clout than its rural equivalent, the RCPC. The RCPC works at a very local level to identify problematic areas pertaining to political and organised social violence, the violation of human rights and lack of service delivery and access to justice. These are brought to the attention of a more capacitated group of role-players on the steering committee. They meet monthly to address the problems in a structured way and return to each meeting to analyse impact. Their solutions do not appear to be limited to either a law enforcement viewpoint or a crime prevention one but can be either or both.

2. Crime Prevention Monitors

Both the CSF and the RCPC oversee the functions and duties of the Crime Prevention Monitors (CPMs). The CPMs are more crucial to the functioning of the rural system since it is based much more than a CSF on monitoring and reporting. The rural structures often include youth ex-perpetrators who are being re-oriented to crime prevention, and members from the CPF. The crime prevention monitors have the following kinds of responsibilities:

- Monitoring crime and violence.
 - Monitoring human rights violations.
 - Counselling victims of crime.
 - Counselling those living with HIV/Aids.
 - Collating crime statistics, trends and patterns.
- Conducting workshops, training and education on crime prevention.

3. Area-based Steering Committees

The third component of the KwaZulu-Natal structure is the elected area-based steering committees. The area might be a township or a traditional area. Both usually fall below the level of local government (a municipality or metropolitan area) but cover many wards. The area-level oversight committee offers problem-solving

opportunities at a more regular and local level than a provincial-level steering committee. It also has more clout and capacity than the CSFs or RCPCs. The rural steering committee has more representatives from community-based groups, faith-based organisations, businesses and just a wider spectrum of locally-focused members (i.e. tribal authorities). A generic list includes:

- Local government.
- Traditional leaders (Amakhosi, Izinduna).
- Political party leaders.
- Church leaders.
- NGOs and CBOs.
- School governing bodies.
- Local development committees.
- Taxi associations.
- Community Police Forums.
- Youth desks.
- South African Police Services.
- Correctional services.
- Department of Justice.
- Social Welfare.
- Education.
- Health.
- Transport.
- Tourism.
- Businesses.

The functional level of an RCPC fits more within a monitoring and reporting function than a CSF but since the structures are the same, all RCPCs can evolve into CSFs. The idea is to reduce crime by getting information from the ground filtered to an area-based steering committee that can make decisions. Each RCPC working with crime prevention monitors furnishes each steering committee with this kind of information:

- Crime statistics.
 - Crime trends/patterns.
 - Progress and reports on projects.
 - Number and nature of cases reported.
 - Number of arrests and convictions.
 - Problems encountered in the environments (possibly falling within the ambit of local government).
 - Problems encountered with the criminal justice system.
- Impact analysis.

4. The CSF Executive Committee

Finally, there is a fourth component to the CSF structure that is not found in the rural intervention: an executive committee to which the area steering committees report on a quarterly basis. The reports are detailed and include analysis from the Crime and Policing unit. Through this system, effective action is taken on the law enforcement

and crime prevention problems in the CSF areas. The executive committee meets at the NIM offices and is comprised of a group of powerful provincial role-players that include:

- Safety and security.
- The CPF Board.
- SAPS.
- Safe Cities.
- NICRO.
- Justice.
- Correctional Services.
- Business against Crime.
- Social Welfare.

NIM wants the rural committees to become more and more like CSFs as they become capacitated. NIM sees CSFs as having the following kinds of advantages:

- More capacity.
- More influence to get projects underway.
- People more open to change.
- Less authoritarianism.
- People that are easier to contact.

Despite the advantages, NIM recognises a need for two different programmes since so much preliminary work has to be done in the rural areas.

GEOGRAPHICAL TARGETING

The two CSFs pilot projects, shown in **Figure Four**, were designed to include a peri-urban and rural area of KwaZulu-Natal. In 2000, NIM implemented CSFs in:


- Nseleni-KwaMthetwa (Rural)
- Umlazi (Peri-Urban)

In 2001 and 2002, NIM initiated its rural crime prevention project in three rural areas (shown in **Figure Four**):

- 1 Manguzi.
- 2 KwaNgcolozi.
- 3 Izingolweni.

Geographical targeting involves considerations for: (1) distance from the implementing organisation; (2) scale and (3) the physical, social, political, economic and cultural character of a place as it bears on crime problems. The last issue is really about knowing about crime patterns on the landscape and the capacity to respond. For instance, rough terrain can impact on police delivery. Cultural factors play a role in delivery too (do the facilitators speak isiZulu?). Other examples include population density, access to partnerships or the level of democratic

FIGURE FOUR: CSFs AND RCPCs IN KWAZULU-NATAL



functioning. A full list was provided in the previous chapter under this same section. It is very difficult to have impact on an area that one knows nothing about (a problem with the assumption of replicable social programmes).

Regarding distance, NIM confesses that it is easier to work in areas close to the offices and this is a reason for having a satellite office in the southern part of the province. Reaching Manguzi on the Mozambique border and

having an impact there is much tougher than having an impact on nearby KwaNgqolozini. Regarding scale, NIM works on entire areas and districts that have historic borders (a group area) or cultural ties (a traditional area). However, NIM works within them ward by ward. NIM argues that each ward affects the other so it is not possible to simply ignore the others. Wards also provide a good entry and exit strategy and situate the intervention within local government. Nonetheless, trying to make impact on such large areas will slow progress and NIM's impact by ward is very uneven with some much more capacitated than others.

The geographical character of each area is significant for geographical targeting. Umlazi, the area of peri-urban CSF development, is near the Durban airport. It is split into a township and a traditional area called Bhekithemba which is more rural in character. Owing to this, NIM finds itself having to target this area differently (e.g. approach traditional leadership). Altogether, Umlazi faces huge problems of crime and policing (e.g. gangs, taxi violence and organised crime) and certain forms of political violence. Yet by comparison to the five rural areas it is relatively well serviced. Its local councillors enjoy more access to power and are integrated well within a metropolitan area where one can find more capacity and resources. Unlike most of the rural areas, there is also an active CPF that works well with the CSF.

Five out of six of the listed targets are in rural areas that are very under-resourced. This includes Nseleni-KwaMthethwa (about 250 miles north of Durban), the rural CSF pilot project. So far, it has been too troubled to form an appropriate CSF structure. It is an IFP stronghold with three Amakhosi. It is the site of much violence over a succession issue, conflict over some IFP councillors who crossed over to the ANC, and conflict between two Amakhosi over boundaries. Thus, the area is unstable and serves as an example of the kind of problems encountered when trying to establish CSF in the traditional areas of KwaZulu-Natal. Issues of political violence and good governance require attention prior to CSF development.

The mix of crimes in rural areas can be different than in urban areas, but this does not seem to be the critical factor creating the need for separate programmes for different types of crime prevention forums. Rather, lower capacity coupled with a complex set of socio-political dynamics creates the need for the different approaches. The rural areas have these kinds of issues that differentiate them:

- High levels of political and organised violence.
- Illegal arms caches that are politically related.
- Factionalism and 'no go' areas for opposition parties.
- Traditional social and political structures.
- A weak culture of human rights.
 - Very poor service delivery.
 - Very poor access to justice.
 - Weak and ineffective CPFs (and sometimes no CPF).
 - Traditional policing services under the Inkosi.
 - High rates of illiteracy.

*'It is very difficult to have impact on an area that one knows nothing about,
and this is a problem with the assumption of replicable social programmes.'*

NIM finds it must deal with very basic issues in order to establish forums for crime prevention in rural areas. For instance, starting a CSF will not do the job if the CPF is white-dominated and not representative of the target community. Sometimes violence levels and factionalism are so acute that this issue needs to be resolved before members can consider working together around the same table (e.g. Nseleni-KwaMthetwa).

Manguzi provides another example of an area where establishing a CSF requires some preliminary inputs. It is a desperately poor community on the Mozambique border (seven hours north of Durban). Service delivery is so constrained by low budgets that it may be considered as one of the remote and 'forgotten areas' of the country. It has only one police station and no satellite stations. It is known as the 'AK47 gateway' owing to the movement of arms across uncontrolled borders. Hijacked vehicles often move through this zone too. Distances are huge and the roads are unpaved and difficult to traverse. This contributes to a situation where key role-players are scattered over an enormous area.

DELIVERY STRATEGY OR PROCESS GUIDELINES

NIM presented its strategy for CSFs as very similar to its rural crime prevention strategy. This is because the goals and objectives for each are the same: creating multi-disciplinary forums at local level for the implementation of the NCPS. However the CSF structure in KwaZulu-Natal differs from the ones in the Western Cape (see discussion relating to structure) and therefore elements of strategy do differ (e.g. setting up crime prevention monitors). This outlines NIM's delivery guidelines for both rural areas and the peri-urban area (i.e. all geographical targets):

- Identify and gain support from community and local government structures.
- Meet with relevant stakeholders and look at results in the election of a steering committee.
- Conduct a local needs assessment (communities identify problematic areas pertaining to political and organised violence and appropriate participants for structures are identified).
- Conduct a community safety audit.
- Report back to the community on the audit and consult on the way forward.
- Community prioritises five crimes to address in partnership with NIM.
- Structures are formalised (establishing ward-based CSFs or RCPCs and Crime Prevention Monitors).
- Training commences according to the five priority crime problems.

The community develops projects and programmes.

NIM provides monitoring and assistance when directed.

NIM conducts analysis and research.

The organisation publishes and disseminates the findings.

The structures were discussed under that heading. The remainder are covered in the following sections. It is

critically important to understand here that even on the same NIM guidelines and with the same objectives, the rural structures differ and require different strategies on the ground. For example, the traditional leader is the entry point in a rural area while one approaches a local councillor for entry into an urban or peri-urban area. Training needs differ between rural and urban and so does the speed of implementation.

Differences in character in rural and urban forums emerge right from the beginning. The composition of the structures is quite different. Rural participants come from a much broader range of organisations (e.g. faith-based) and are much more locally focused. In the rural areas, intensive police training and capacity building in structures like the CPF start to occur. One rural area did not have a CPF at all (Izingolweni). By contrast, a CSF like Umlazi that is close to a metropolitan centre is much more likely to achieve some integrated level of governance quickly and to have a functional CPF. In a sense, the delivery 'strategy' is a generic guideline to the strategies that actually develop on the ground. In fact, this was found to be the case throughout the reviewed organisations. There is sometimes confusion between strategy (a very local phenomenon that also must be captured) and process guidelines.

GETTING STARTED

NIM's first objective in delivery is to introduce itself to the target community. According to its Director, 'There is more talking, more buy-in, more conflict management and more capacity building involved in setting up crime prevention structures in rural communities than setting up CSFs in urban areas.' By contrast, NIM finds another kind of problem with CSFs: getting *all* the role-players involved. While the process might be slow in the rural areas, there is commitment and involvement once buy-in is achieved.

In rural areas, the first step is asking the Inkosi permission to conduct work. Otherwise, co-operation is very difficult to obtain in a traditional area. NIM finds that getting started is faster in those rural areas where the organisation and staff are already known and slower where they must be introduced. For instance, the NIM staff is well-known in KwaNgcolozi (about 80 km north of the Durban CBD). The most significant progress was made there.

With the Inkosi's permission, NIM then does a series of presentations to the community. This is done in the local language. The facilitators are fluent in isiZulu and in some of the local dialects. In interviews, they stated that knowing *rural* Zulu can make a big difference in the trust-building stage. NIM also conducts an initial needs assessment to work out an entrance strategy. Therefore, they have a very good idea of the problems facing the community and are ready to offer the community an intervention that helps with identifiable problems. This greatly increases the chances of buy-in.

In both the rural areas and the peri-urban one, the community meetings lead to the establishment of an interim steering committee that can carry the intervention forward. So, it is not necessary to get all potential parties involved from the start, which would delay process. Rather, structures are formalised prior to the phase of training. In both the rural crime prevention strategy and the CSF project, steering committee members are elected. This helps create additional buy-in that moves the early stages of the intervention along. Establishing a core group and engaging in incremental partnership-building appears to be good practice as it is found among most of the reviewed organisations.

'There is sometimes confusion between strategy, which is a very local phenomenon that also must be captured, and process guidelines.'

We have already seen that the CSF structures, whether rural or urban, were often troubled by problems of attendance in beginning stages. Levels of commitment do waver at the beginning stage and it is important to help generate community interest. In the beginning, NIM meets with the steering committees two and three times a month to facilitate processes and keep the momentum. They also use the period to monitor and evaluate progress and to identify training needs in partnership with the community (needs assessment).

Conflict is a major factor in the areas where NIM works and for this problem the organisation has found one element of a solution. NIM found that working at ward level in the rural areas helps to avoid some of the political dynamics operative over the entire rural area and creates a way to initiate crime prevention. In Umlazi, getting the CSFs underway was delayed until ward counsellors were fully on board. So, whether in an urban or rural area, it seems critical to get early buy-in from the local councillors.

ENSURING RELEVANT CRIME PREVENTION OUTCOMES

The key to ensuring relevant crime prevention outcomes in either the CSF project or the rural crime prevention strategy is to capacitate more role-players so that they can fully engage in crime prevention. Usually, more capacity building is required in the rural areas.

Research and chosen projects determine the type of training that will take place. First there is the needs assessment that informs the entry strategy as explained in the previous section. Then there is a community-based safety audit. The safety audits also help focus the community on appropriate crime prevention projects.

Depending on capacity, the safety audit can be conducted by the community (e.g. Umlazi). Sometimes NIM's Crime and Policing Unit undertakes this role in less capacitated areas. It involves interviews with the police, traditional leaders, councillors, youth groups and relevant government departments. As in the case of UMAC, NIM utilises the National Crime Prevention Centre's manual *Making South Africa Safe* to inform the audit process. They are conducted to assess service delivery in the criminal justice sector, the environmental and social factors producing crime and community ideas on the resolution of crime. The reviewer found this process to be helpful and relevant but the quality of the community-based audits was poor. The Institute for Security Studies (Chapter Four) found that the community manual (which they helped to write) was not working and that professional audits offer the best value. The reviewer comments below as well as in Chapters Four and Nine on this finding.

After the two research processes are completed, the community is briefed. Community members offer feedback on how to resolve crime, as well as social and other related problems. This results in a community meeting where crime problems are prioritised and crime plans are generated. The community decides on five priority crime problems to address. Training takes place *according to these priorities*.

The integration of the audit findings with training is a very good practice for ensuring relevant outcomes. For instance, in Umlazi, one of the five priority crimes was rape, and so training women in self-defence and rape prevention followed. Training always includes the CSFs (peri-urban) and RCPCs (rural) and their CPMs and usually involves many other role-players depending on the crime plan. CPFs, schools and the police are very common targets for training.

NIM draws from is a very extensive and well-developed syllabus that includes:

- Monitoring and information gathering.
- Victim empowerment.
- Human rights education.
- The responsibilities and obligations of volunteers.
- Meeting procedures.
- Proper reporting systems and guidelines.
- Communication skills.
- Interview and statement taking.
- Affidavits.
- Social welfare (pensions, disability grants, dependent's benefits).
- General principles of criminal law.
- Administrative law.
- Conflict resolution.
- How to run a workshop.
- Gender and children's rights.
- HIV/Aids.
- Roles and responsibilities of the CPF structures.
- How to do community safety audits.
- Crime threat analysis.

NIM states that participants in the rural areas start out at a very basic level but through training arrive at a point of being able to lead processes and conduct workshops. Some later stand for local elections and others found jobs owing to their new skills. So, the capacity left behind seems to extend beyond rural crime prevention and helps create skills vital for development. Focus group participants identified communication skills and conflict management as two of the most important components of the training. One participant said that knowing 'what to say and how to say it' made a tremendous difference in both counselling victims and resolving conflict and tension in the community. This was a pattern found throughout the review and in the international literature: basic life skills training is linked to good crime prevention practice.

The selection of people to serve on the RCPCs and the CPMs is also a critical process for ensuring relevant outcomes. Rural areas are more likely than urban ones to elect members based on poor criteria (e.g. popularity). NIM wants to ensure that after the monitors are provided with skills, they become people who will continue to contribute more broadly to crime prevention in their communities. So, NIM tries to encourage some selection criteria including:

- Familiarity with local problems.
 - Sensitivity to the developmental needs of rural communities.
 - Indigenous to the community.
 - Familiar with the community history.

Electing the steering committee seems to be a good practice as it creates ownership and helps ensure a sustainable outcome.

'The integration of the audit findings with training is a very good practice for ensuring relevant outcomes.'

One experiment for ensuring relevant outcomes has developed into a standard practice. The crime prevention monitors at KwaNgcolozzi are young ex-offenders who sought reintegration. The community decided to use them as monitors and this proved to be a very successful practice. These youth were committed members and had an understanding of crime that was useful for monitoring. By holding workshops in schools, the monitors helped to convince many students that crime does not pay and this may have reduced truancy in the schools. Using ex-offenders as monitors virtually guarantees a relevant outcome: offenders are deterred from returning to crime and re-skilled to play a more productive role in society.

After training, NIM allows the community to find its own direction. However, NIM remains highly proactive through its Crime and Policing Unit. The research and advocacy department continues to:

- Monitor the intervention according to performance indicators to ensure the timely correction of any problems of delivery (action research).
- Identify problems of service delivery or crime and working directly on investigations units and with prosecutors.
- Warn communities of impending political or organised violence.
- Work at local, provincial and national level on investigations and advocacy issues.
- Gather data for understanding the factors that maximise and sustain community participation in rural crime prevention.
- Develop a manual on rural crime prevention that is accessible to rural people.

The monitors (a unique feature of the CSF project in KwaZulu-Natal and a component of the rural strategy) are also linked to the Crime and Policing Unit. It is this feature that virtually guarantees relevant outcomes. The monitors collect good information on crime and perpetrators and the research unit works directly with the concerned criminal justice departments to bring the matter to a conclusion. For instance, in the Manguzi intervention, research identified problems with the illegal shipment of small arms and hijacked vehicles across the Mozambique border. NIM lobbied SAPS and other role-players to successfully see the Jozini border post reopened with customs officials. This improved service delivery and reduced this type of crime in the area.

Remarkably, NIM's proactive involvement in combating crime does not seem to create a dependency on the NGO. This is because the NGO does not 'problem-solve' for the structures. It remains a neutral role-player in relationship to the CSFs and the RCPCs but targets crime as part of its own proactive agenda in the province. This appears to be good practice. It can also be considered in terms of the role that CSOs should play in a new democracy.

MEASURING IMPACT

Would the impact of a well-implemented model of rural crime prevention result in a reduction in political and social violence in the targeted areas? NIM argues, 'Yes!' and is using baseline studies along with constant monitoring to document this. External evaluations are also conducted.

The rural crime prevention project is too new (2002) to fully evaluate but it does seem that crime is being prevented owing to both local efforts and NIM's pro-activism. Two examples have been given already: (1) the

crime prevention monitors at KwaNgcolozi are reducing truancy in schools; and (2) reopening the border post at Jozini is helping to prevent the shipment of arms and stolen vehicles. A third example is the establishment of a women's group at KwaNgcolozi (Hlomelekusa) as part of the RCPC activities. This is a 'spin-off' from the RCPC that has offered a significant number of crime prevention benefits including new skills that lead to jobs (e.g. exporting beadwork); counselling reintegrating offenders in a community-based way that fits with local traditions and more; and workshops in rape prevention that helped to reduce the incidence of rape. Workshops were held on rape and managing these cases. At the time of the focus group with the Ngcolozi RCPC (April 2003) no more rapes were being reported in the workshops and the informants were convinced that it had dropped.

In a focus group for this review, a member of RCPC explained how crime prevention worked in KwaNgcolozi:

'Previously we saw crime escalating. It seemed that NIM's training programme would help us address this and it did. Hijacking is down, housebreaking is down and so is rape. The strategy we used is simple. We know who committed the crime. So, we turned the criminal around. We invite them to workshops and address the relevant crime topic. We instil a sense of community and community values in this process. Most rape is family rape. The rapist stops, when it is known that the rape will be reported. So these workshops act as crime prevention.'

The focus group thought that training in human rights, women's rights and children's rights along with assertiveness skills had changed the culture and allowed this kind of situation to develop. It was also felt that the women's group had reduced their financial dependency on men (through bead-work projects and sewing) and that this freed them to report. This supports the NIM view that strengthening human rights practices in rural communities (and addressing their economic rights) can create the conditions for more structured crime prevention approaches.

Some of these successes are also related to NIM's pro-active approach. In other words, NIM gets involved with a multifaceted set of interventions based on research and that may include strong advocacy. For instance, when the Ngcolozi RCPC identified a problem with police treatment of rape victims, NIM then trained 15 of the police officers in victim support. The RCPC then monitored the situation and reported an improvement. NIM also worked directly with the police on shutting down the activities of a car hijacking syndicate.

Other examples of crime prevention successes include:

- Eighteen youth in each rural community have been trained as crime prevention monitors. Many of them are ex-offenders. So, the programme helps stop offenders from returning to a life of crime and establishes a mechanism for reintegrating them into the community.

In Izingolweni, monitors reported that the rural areas were not being patrolled. NIM engaged the Port Edward Police Station and it now regularly patrols the rural areas.

Joint training undertaken between the traditional leadership (Amakhosi, Izinduna) and their respective police stations led to an increase in reporting crimes and it had a direct impact on building trust between the community and the police.

- Many of the rural participants trained by NIM went into local government indicating that NIM had empowered the community with important leadership skills that are fundamental to its good governance objective.
- Many of the monitors were capacitated to the extent of finding jobs monitoring local, national and even international elections. Job creation and employment are key tactics in crime prevention.
- The KwaNgcolozi RCPC identified that many crimes happen in and around shebeens and then started a licensing campaign in which 25 out of 30 shebeens were closed down. The remaining five operate Monday through Thursday and must close at 7 pm. The focus group believed that this greatly reduced the number of crimes occurring at night including rape.
- The KwaNgcolozi RCPC wrote its own funding proposals and raised funds for HIV/Aids training.

While the rural crime prevention programme can record some successes, the rural areas are far from ready to host functional CSFs. Relations with the police were often reported as too problematic. The police in the rural areas are also under-resourced and poorly staffed considering the vast areas requiring patrol. Some police members and politicians also get involved with crime. The counsellors involved in these areas are not close to the people as there is no system of constituencies. In focus group, one informant said, 'We only see them on posters. They are outsiders.' It was also expressed that local government does not know its role and that party politics consistently undermines delivery. Many departments are not delivering on basic services and it cannot be assumed that they have the resources and people to deliver.

The CSF at Umlazi is also recording some successes based on a similar delivery strategy. Some examples include:

- Umlazi was identified as having the second highest rate of rape in the province, and the CSF requested training in rape prevention. NIM arranged for training not only in rape avoidance but defence tactics in the process of a rape.
- A clear reduction in crime occurred in Umlazi when police corruption in the shebeen business was identified. NIM called both shebeen owners and the police together and shut down the illegal operations.
- Monitors identified tensions in the schools and this was addressed with an information campaign and workshops in conflict management skills for students and teachers. The research department reported that this led to a decrease in conflict.
- Through advocacy NIM helped to keep a police satellite station open.

Despite many successes, the Umlazi pilot is still in the early stages of development. Based on both the UMAC and NIM experiences it seems that it takes about five years to get a new structure of governance up and running on its own. Both organisations appeared to get bogged down in endless consultative meetings to get the structures formalised. Some of the structures have been highly politicised requiring much conflict management. Relations between SAPS and the CPFs and the slow entrance of local councillors onto the process delayed development. There is still a massive fear of reporting crime and much work needs to be done to improve policing in the area and relations between the CPF and the police. The CSF also needs to be more tightly integrated with local government in order to ensure a sustainable structure.

One irony in the outcomes is that CSFs have operated more efficiently in Bhekithemba, the rural and traditional area of Umlazi. This is mainly because there is less political tension and less factionalism. It may just be that one

needs to look at these foundations regardless of whether an area is urban or rural. What may count in developing strategies and structures for a new form of integrated governance is the level of democratic functioning. This should be identified in an audit prior to designing a delivery strategy as will be discussed in the final chapter.

MAKING AN EXIT

NIM's exit strategy is integrated into all its work including the structures that it develops and the training that it imparts. Feedback and follow-up between the ward-based CSFs or RCPCs and their respective area-based steering committees offers a system of problem-solving that is not NGO-dependent. This form of partnership helps to: (1) create ownership in the community; (2) increases the chances of sustainability; and (3) allows areas to adapt structures to suit their needs. Training ensures that these structures have the capacity to deliver on their own including raising their own funding. One rural structure already raises funds and carries out projects quite independently of NIM (KwaNgcolozi).

The CSF situation in Umlazi is not much different than the one described in the previous chapter. NIM is negotiating with local counsellors to ensure that CSFs remain in the hands of local government. NIM also wants the strong relationship between the CPF and CSF to persist but to strengthen relations with the police. For this reason, it supports legislation to make the CSFs a permanent structure. It sees CPFs as the group mediating between the communities and the police and the CSF as the strong coordinating body for crime prevention. Once legislated, it is hoped that the Umlazi CSF can be sustained through budgetary allocations from local government.

LESSONS LEARNT

These are some lessons learnt in the course of the intervention that are offered by NIM:

- 'Come up with an entrance strategy for both rural and urban areas. In rural areas, people are suspicious of NGOs. So, never go into a community cold. Rather, proceed on the basis of research so that you know the situation before you go in. What are the crucial issues to this community? Be ready to offer suggestions during presentations that maintain community interest in your programme but don't make a lot of promises. Instead, make an impact. In the entrance strategy to urban or peri-urban areas, take a hard lead initially with a time-frame to move people forward or else the organisation will be bogged down in the consultation stage and always include the local councillors.'
 - 'Watch out for party politics. Know exactly who is participating in your processes and why. Know the area politics: when there is a balance, a split or one party dominating. You must know the situation going in or problems will arise that the facilitator will not be able to handle.'
 - 'In rural areas, the relationship between the traditional leaders and the police has an important effect on the reporting of crimes and therefore decreasing crime. So identify this relationship early and address it.'
- 'Faith-based organisations cannot be ignored in rural areas since they are major role-players.'
- 'The pace slows down in rural areas, so be ready for a long-term relationship.'
- 'Increase the community's access to good information through publications in their own language. These are used in workshops and circulated by the monitors'. NIM produces pamphlets in Zulu on topics relevant to crime prevention like domestic violence, HIV/Aids, drugs, and shebeens.'

'An important insight from NIM's experience is that we must look at the level of democratic and human rights functioning before we design our interventions.'

- 'For any of these programmes to be successful, you need good governance. Concentrate there first.'
- 'Use participative techniques when training (e.g. role-playing and mock trials) and train in the areas where people live so that they are thinking about the problems in their areas rather than visiting the local sights.'

REVIEWER'S COMMENTS

NIM did not really replicate the UMAC delivery strategy because it introduced new elements. For instance, NIM uses monitors as informants and then takes very pro-active crime reduction measures. This does not seem replicable in all circumstances but then should it be? NIM seems to have a workable system for ensuring relevant outcomes in a province with special circumstances and based on a very specific organisational culture. Most significantly, the CSF innovations seem relevant, especially the ward-level CSFs with an area-based steering committee, which provides an NGO-independent problem-solving mechanism.

The organisation used the same CSF strategy at Umlazi and Nseleni but the latter is totally different in terms of the factors outlined for geographical targeting. It is rural, traditional and suffering from political violence, human rights abuses and poor service delivery. Both the experience in setting up a slower-paced strategy for multi-sector forums in rural areas and the failure of the CSF at Nseleni (owing to political instability) reinforces the argument that different strategies are required for different areas. The belief that social programmes are replicable regardless of the place or the implementing organisation does not appear to be valid. This is reinforced again by experience at Bolobedu, another rural intervention creating a multi-sector structure (described in Chapter Eight).

Out of seven reviewed organisations, five conducted safety audits. NIM is one that uses these audits at the start of the intervention to inform the design of training. The audit also assists the community in selecting five key crime prevention initiatives. This can help to ensure a relevant outcome. The NIM audit reviewed for Umlazi was a community-based audit. It was found to be of a much poorer quality than those that are constructed professionally (see Chapters Four or Eight). The reviewer recommends finding ways to ensure that such an audit is rigorous. The prioritised crime problems and associated projects may not be the most effective for ensuring relevant outcomes if the information is not thorough. If a professional audit cannot be done by the implementing agency or contracted, then partnerships with university-based criminology or geography researchers might be considered. A range of options for lowering the cost of safety audits while not sacrificing rigour are listed in Chapter Nine.

One of the most important insights offered by the NIM experience is that we must look at the level of democratic and human rights functioning in an area before we design our interventions. This then should be an item that falls within an initial safety audit or baseline study depending on the approach and paradigm given in the programme theory (i.e. a social health perspective uses an epidemiological study).

Perhaps a flaw underlying much of the work is a matter of scale. NIM takes on very large areas, which reduces the overall impact of the organisation.

References

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4

EMPOWERING LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCILS

Institute for Security Studies (ISS)

INTRODUCTION

The last two chapters focused on developing and sustaining multi-agency forums for locally-based crime prevention plans and projects. In the exit strategy, many of these structures were to be integrated into local government for administration or incorporated as components of local government planning processes. Then, why not start with local councils in the first place? What would happen if we provided local government councils with the initial support and skills to develop their own strategies and structures for crime prevention?

The Institute of Security Studies (ISS) helped to produce a manual to guide local government in developing crime prevention strategies. The organisation then tested it out in two communities during a challenging time of local government reorganisation (e.g. new boundaries, municipal elections). One of the projects lost momentum when the targeted community was incorporated into the Nelson Mandela Metropole. The project in the second municipality regained momentum in the post-election period and today manages multi-agency crime prevention projects based on an integrated plan. It was not the manual that made the difference. The ISS used professional research, change agents and facilitation to capitalise on some post-election developments including a new Department of Public Safety.

ORGANISATIONAL BACKGROUND

The ISS is a non-profit trust established in 1990 as a 'think tank' to 'conceptualise, inform and enhance' the security debate in Africa. The ISS is based in Pretoria but also has an office in Cape Town which runs a programme on organised crime and corruption in SADC and assists with parliamentary liaison. The organisation has also recently started a two-year project in Malawi to build capacity in the National Statistics Office for the collection and analysis of information on crime and criminal justice issues.

Altogether the ISS has six programmes:

- 1 Peace Missions.
- 2 The Defence Sector.
- 3 Arms Management.
- 4 Tracking and Analysis of Conflict.
- 5 Organised Crime, Corruption and Terrorism.
- 6 Crime and Justice Programme.

In addition to these programmes, the ISS runs several smaller projects on issues such as children in armed conflict, the impact of Aids on security and governance in SADC, and inter-governmental structures on the continent.

All the programmes target decision-makers with good information, capacitate them and engage in policy formulation and debate. All focus on elements of security that might lead to a peaceful and stable Africa but only one, the Crime and Justice Programme (CJP), concentrates on security issues, and more specifically, crime in South Africa.

The CJP helps to explain crime by tracking and analysing crime statistics and trends and engaging in various studies that can inform South African policy. The CJP provides technical assistance, both on request and in a proactive manner, to various tiers and sectors of government in the development of policy around criminal justice issues including crime prevention strategies. Among others, the ISS contributed to policy development on the National Crime Prevention Strategy (1996), the *White Paper on Safety and Security* (1998) and the Municipal Policing Act (1999). They have also offered assistance in the development of numerous crime reduction strategies (e.g. Johannesburg, Pretoria and Durban).

Not long after the 1998 *White Paper on Safety and Security* was published, local governments were requesting guidance for carrying out their mandated new role to develop and coordinate crime prevention strategies. In response, the Social Crime Prevention Unit of the SAPS proposed the need for a user-friendly manual. By early 1999, the ISS and another Pretoria-based organisation (the CSIR¹) were commissioned to produce the text. The guide was written by mid-1999 and published by the Department of Safety and Security in late 2000. It was entitled *Making South Africa Safe: A Manual for Community-Based Crime Prevention*. Owing to its pink cover and pages, it also became known as 'the pink book'.

In the gap between the writing of the manual and its publication, two transitional local councils, one in Mpumalanga (Secunda) and one in the Eastern Cape (Uitenhage), approached the ISS. Each requested assistance in developing local crime prevention strategies. This seemed like the perfect opportunity to test out the manual. The ISS proposed a project in 'Strengthening Local Level Crime Reduction in South Africa' and in November 1999 received the first of two grants from the Open Society Foundation. The project commenced in April 2000 and concluded in April 2002.

PROGRAMME THEORY

In contrast to the theories encountered in previous chapters, the experience with Community Policing Forums (CPFs) made the ISS sceptical about new structures for crime prevention. According to CJP Head Antoinette Louw:

‘The state did not support the CPFs enough to make them properly representative. So we were not going to pursue new structures without serious support at national level. What is on paper is very important. We need to know the positive impacts of making our existing systems work. For that reason, we wanted to look at putting crime prevention into local government hands and the council seemed an appropriate place to start.’²

The theory was that by empowering two Transitional Local Councils (TLCs) to develop locally driven crime reduction strategies, that local government could become the focus of crime prevention projects as suggested in the NCPS and the *White Paper on Safety and Security*. It was assumed that there would be commitment from local government role-players and that the national policy direction was the correct one. The ‘pink book’ was a government ‘how to’ manual based on national crime prevention policy, and was part of the delivery plan that would be tested.

Since projects that work depend on people, the ISS also considered that a focus on particular people within local government would make the theory work in practice. This would occur in four basic steps:

- 1 Raise awareness of crime prevention.
- 2 Locate appropriate champions.
- 3 Build their skills for effective provision.
- 4 Facilitate the initiation of crime prevention plans.

The CJP did not want a complex agenda of its own going in since it sought to empower the council and other role-players (inside and outside of government) to collaborate on their own crime prevention strategy. The CJP Head said in an interview, ‘The most difficult thing that we do is to try and bring about change from the outside. So we must locate change agents or champions to bring about change from the inside.’ The ISS would then help facilitate the initiation of crime prevention projects using the manual and assess the impact.

STRUCTURES

No new structure was required for the implementation of this project since the focus was on the local stakeholders and particularly the champions who would emerge.

DELIVERY STRATEGY OR PROCESS GUIDELINES

The delivery strategy was characterised by efforts to create ownership of process in the local council, so each stage would involve going to council. This means that the exit strategy was being considered throughout the intervention. For the purposes of the review, the strategy may be considered in two stages. Each is characterised by a stage of

council approval. Stage one includes:

- Identify and obtain the support of an official or councillor in the municipality to act as a liaison between the implementing agency (ISS) and the council.
- Locate relevant stakeholders and invite them to a series of briefings.
- Brief participants on the intervention.
- Have the stakeholders agree to the process to be used for the project.
- The participants then get council approval for the process.

The second stage was the strategy given in the manual with one important addition (council approval of the final strategy):

- A community safety audit to understand local crime problems.
- Strategy development and council approval.
- Strategy implementation by the council (and partners).
- Monitoring and evaluation (by the council).

Council approval at two different stages offered a mandate for the participants to engage in the process and also dealt with a problematic issue: few councillors participated in the early stages of strategy development. This process also gave the ISS a mandate to provide technical assistance. This entire process was intended to conclude in targeted crime prevention projects. It was also intended that the council would monitor and evaluate the intervention but neither stage was reached within the two-year time frame for the intervention. Most significantly, the audit would be professionally done by the ISS (not the community). The *professional* audit, working with a change agent (or champion inside the council) and locating approval with the council are the three keys to the success of the intervention in the Govan Mbeki Municipality.

GEOGRAPHICAL TARGETING


Figure Five shows the two areas in which the ISS undertook the intervention, the Uitenhage Transitional Local Council and the Highveld Ridge Transitional Local Council. Uitenhage was absorbed into the Nelson Mandela Metropole and this eventually refocused ISS on the new Metropole. Highveld Ridge incorporated two smaller municipalities (Bethal and Leandra) to become the Govan Mbeki Municipality. Secunda became the administrative centre and since this was already the area where the ISS intervention concentrated, it allowed for a continued focus on some of the same role-players.

The audit, which was one of the most powerful tools in the intervention, had a major impact on geographical targeting. The audit was conducted in such a way that geographic disparities in the area became very clear. Geographical elements of the audit included:

An analysis of the demographics and crime problems of each town in the area.

- A victim survey to determine the scope and nature of crime in each area.
- An analysis of SAPS crime statistics by area and the correlation to a place-based public survey of crime.
- An analysis of the capacity in the council, the local SAPS stations and the community for crime reduction in each area.

FIGURE FIVE: LOCAL COUNCILS TARGETED BY THE ISS



The audit really helped to instruct participants and the community that violent crime was mainly confined to three densely populated townships while property crimes affected the suburbs and town centres. There are 650 000 people in the Govan Mbeki Municipality. About 90% of the population are of African descent and 75% of these reside in dense informal housing. The rest are spread out over 2 958km² of dispersed farmland, mining and industrial communities.

The audit showed that both the rate of crime and the fear of crime were very high amongst people living in eMbalenhle, the township next to Secunda. The distribution of police officials was also examined revealing that there was only one police official per 4 000 residents in eMbalenhle as compared to 1 police official to 200 residents in the small town of Kinross. Geographical comparisons also revealed that more police in the township area were functionally illiterate and unable to perform basic duties (80% without driver's licenses).

Identifying these kinds of disparities by geographical location helped with targeting an intervention appropriately. It emerged clearly from the data that eMbalenhle township needed to be a principal focus in the crime reduction strategy. This clarity helped to maintain focus, sustain the intervention and contributed to participants valuing the role of ISS.

The research also helped to build support and recognition for the need to focus attention on eMbalenhle in a council which was initially divided along race and political lines. In this situation, the white conservative (and vocal) political parties strongly favoured focusing crime reduction efforts on the town of Secunda and on the farming areas. The research helped to make a convincing argument that this would not be enough.

The audit had another impact on geographical targeting. One of the greatest challenges for the ISS was its physical distance from the target area. The ISS is located in Pretoria but long and rough roads come between Pretoria and the Govan Mbeki Municipality. By conducting the audit (as an early process) with its focus groups, interviews and surveys, the facilitators came to know the key role-players and managed to reduce the perception of them as 'outsiders'. In many ways they came to be seen as 'insiders'. Therefore it can be an essential instrument of trust-building if initiated at the start of an intervention of this kind.

GETTING STARTED

The first step in the strategy was to invite relevant members to the briefings. This included:

- Members of the executive committee of the transitional councils.
- SAPS area commissioners and management teams.
- The SAPS station commissioners and management teams.
- Representatives of the CPFs at these stations.
- Representatives of Health, Welfare, Justice, and Correctional Services.
- NGOs and other members of civil society.

The representation is unlike the CSF structures because the ISS was looking for a core group of champions and not seeking to have every possible role-player participate. However, the type of participation was not always the anticipated one. While some municipal officials were very supportive (and the ones that initially invited the intervention), many of the elected officials were slower to get involved. The bulk of initial participants were outside of local government. This is because many local government members questioned their role: no budgets had been allocated for crime prevention strategy. SAPS, CPFs, civil society organisations and the business community seemed to show the greatest interest in the projects in the early stages. This was

the group that was exposed to the information and skills-development workshops that would lead to strategy development.

The original targets were *transitional* local councils and the December 2000 elections were just ahead when the intervention started. Local government councillors concerned about elections wanted quick deliverables and were not too interested in long-term crime prevention. Even after the elections, officials and administrators were coming to terms with their new roles and this engaged them in internal planning processes. Key people were then shunted around and new people brought into the process. When Uitenhage was absorbed into the new Nelson Mandela Metropole, so was the champion driving the project, the town clerk. The ISS pulled out and shifted its focus to the metropole with a new strategy. Restructuring complicated matters in the Mpumalanga municipality by bringing new stakeholders into the project (i.e. repeat information sessions) but it did not refocus the entire effort. The ISS audit and the municipal strategy still had relevance.

No doubt the timing of the intervention could have been addressed more carefully at the proposal stage. The CJP Head was clear about this in the interview: 'We should have kept abreast of government restructuring plans because the timing of the intervention was a big problem in getting things underway.' The ISS met this challenge in Mpumalanga in an instructive way. They hired a process facilitator who lobbied senior local officials and worked with them to regain some momentum on crime reduction strategies. This positioned the ISS to play a role in two important post-election developments: (1) the establishment of a municipal 'Department of Public Safety'; and (2) a provincial 'Multi-Agency Mechanism' which sought to create a mechanism at local level to implement the NCPS. The process facilitator helped to identify points of cohesion and coordination between these different initiatives and smoothed the way to an integrated plan.

ENSURING RELEVANT CRIME PREVENTION OUTCOMES

The ISS told the reviewer that the 'pink book' alone did not achieve the relevant outcome, i.e. crime prevention projects. It did have impact in that it helped people understand crime prevention and enabled the development of a plan but it faltered in relation to implementation. Neither project, nor the evaluation phase were achieved within the two-year lifespan of the overall project. Except for the poor timing of the intervention, most of these problems were based on assumptions in national government policy (e.g. NCPS) and therefore also in the manual:

- Local government functions.
- Local government has sufficient finances to take up these activities.
- Local government can deliver on unfunded mandates without facilitation.

Local government representatives are close to the people when there are no constituencies.

Local government has the kind of capacity to conduct safety audits and generate business plans.

These findings suggest that relevant outcomes require professional facilitation. Does this mean that such processes should be outsourced to an external organisation? The ISS argued for outsourcing facilitation in a 2002 paper evaluating the experience.³ The participant focus group for this review concurred that they needed an external actor to facilitate. At the time of writing, Govan Mbeki is the only municipality in Mpumalanga with an

'These findings suggest that relevant outcomes require professional facilitation.'

integrated crime reduction strategy located within local government. It is highly unlikely that this would have taken place by following a manual independent of an external intervention.

The manual excluded some things relevant to the success at Govan Mbeki Municipality including the need for:

- Step-by-step council approval.
- Lobbying local role-players and councillors.
- Champions and internal change agents.
- Strategic alliances developed in an incremental way.

As given in the delivery strategy, the ISS was adamant about the need for council approval. Another method they used towards the end of the project to ensure ownership was to use only council letterheads in communications and reports. In addition, the ISS hired a facilitator who lobbied, advised and worked with senior local officials. Through this method, one local council member was identified and became an enthusiastic change agent. Targeting only the local council does not ensure a relevant outcome. The ISS was willing to work with those role-players who wanted to push the project forward. Their technique was one of strategic alliances rather than a structured forum as discussed in previous chapters. By networking people interested in the crime reduction strategy, they worked incrementally to develop support. This might be less of a battle than trying to bring all necessary role-players onto a forum at once.

According to the participant focus group in the Govan Mbeki Municipality, the audit was essential and instrumental in creating the safety plan. They also praised the facilitators in these terms: 'They did their research and knew the area.' Furthermore, when asked about lessons learnt, the local government officials all concurred in one statement: 'Do your research first.' Therefore the practice to recommend is the use of an audit at the beginning of an intervention if it is outsourced and professionally done. The audit helped:

- Various stakeholders to work together on clear geographical targets promising clear outcomes.
- To rapidly integrate the ISS facilitators into planning processes since they were recognised for offering a valuable service.
- To identify and ultimately foster partnerships between organisations and people involved in crime prevention programmes.
- Provide an integrating mechanism to bring about co-operation between tiers of government and various departments.

To integrate various crime prevention strategies scattered amongst organisations and departments.

To keep the participants focused on crime reduction despite the challenges of the local government transition.

MEASURING IMPACT

The main purpose of the intervention was to test a manual on crime prevention practices and to see if it worked at local government level. The ISS used three main indicators:

- The extent to which crime prevention is taken up by the council.
- Whether a crime strategy is developed for the area.
- Whether or not the strategy is sustained beyond project completion.

By these criteria, the manual failed but the ISS succeeded (some time after the exit). At the time of ISS departure in April 2002, a crime prevention plan had been finalised and went to council. The facilitation role had been passed to the new Department of Public Safety. Furthermore, an enthusiastic Deputy Director of this department was part of the ISS training and tasked with crime prevention.

In September 2002, the crime prevention plan was approved and included this process:

- Monthly crime reduction workshops are held with all the local departments to fit components of the crime reduction plan into existing budget lines.
- The departments then send reports to the Department of Public Safety on their progress.
- There is a monthly meeting of all municipal departments, the council and the public where the Public Safety Department reports and discusses progress.

Therefore the intervention was deeply embedded with the council that approved plans and monitored progress. Five crime reduction projects were designed:

- 1 Improving environmental design.
- 2 Public education and awareness campaign.
- 3 Services for children and youth.
- 4 Victim support.
- 5 Law enforcement.

Each one of these projects includes many different activities assigned to relevant departments. For instance, hostels are being upgraded in eMbalenhle by the housing department (improving environmental design), while several departments (Social Services, Education and SAPS) and others co-operate to provide education on rape to school children. The activities include clear geographical targets, performance indicators and time frames so that they can be monitored. It is weighted more toward deterrence (through environmental design, law enforcement, information campaigns and victim support) but does aim to prevent criminality through a targeted youth programme (**Figure Six**).

Based on another OSF-SA review, *Preventing Crime and Violence in South African Schools*⁴, the strategic component addressing criminality prevention is fairly good. It integrates families, schools and the community into a strategy that includes many appropriate partnerships. Additionally, the information campaign offers supportive materials, talks and experiences (e.g. prison visits) that may help prevent criminality as well as drug and alcohol abuse. Prison visits have not worked elsewhere based on some stringent international reviews.

'The activities include clear geographical targets, performance indicators and time frames so that they can be monitored.'

LESSONS FROM LOCAL CRIME PREVENTION

FIGURE SIX: CHILDREN AND YOUTH SERVICES COMPONENT OF THE GMM STRATEGY

1	Rape: Arrange after school care for primary school children	Education Welfare	eMbalenhle	Established after care system	Planning
2	Crime prevention through skills development: Train young people to participate as tour guides as part of tourism strategy	Tourism	GMM	List of young people trained	Training underway
3	Establish a youth information centre to provide information on crime, victim support, health issues, and services services and to function as a referral	GMM	Secunda Library	Centre established	Underway
4	School service delivery improvement programme	Education	All GMM schools	Department reports and minutes	Underway
5	Provide after-care, homework support and recreational programme at school designed to provide a protective and supportive environment for pupils	Education	Primary and High Schools in eMbalenhle	List of pupils in programme	Design stage
6	School vacation programme: supports curricula learning, provides structured recreational activities and a protected and supportive environment for students on holiday	SASOL Education	Primary and High Schools in eMbalenhle	List of pupils in programme	Design stage
7	Implementation of effective parenting programme to reduce dysfunctional families	Social Services Religious Groups Women's Groups	eMbalenhle	Reports, List of targeted families	Design stage

Another component that needs to be strengthened to ensure crime prevention is for conflict management, human rights and democracy education to be fully integrated into the school curriculum. A few talks and experiences are not adequate. It is flawed in the sense that it does not address two key components of a successful strategy:

- Reforming school management practices, which are often authoritarian and a factor in reproducing the cycle of violence we see in our society.
- Targeting educators with classroom management skills to ensure respect for pupils while also managing outcomes based education effectively so that life skills are properly developed.

Despite the problems identified, it is an impressive start – manageable, and ensures some short-term deliverables and long-term benefits. Presumably the strategy will be improved and refined over time.

In April 2003, the crime reduction strategy was integrated into the Municipal Council's Poverty Alleviation Plan. Thus, crime is factored in as part of development planning (this may be a predictable trend throughout the country). Furthermore, the province's Multi-agency Mechanism intends that the Govan Mbeki Municipality be a model for crime reduction planning and wants to establish similar systems in other districts. It was even proposed in the participant's focus group that one municipality teach the next.

Did the project actually lead to a reduction in crime or prevent criminality? This is unknown and would require an evaluation. SAPS members in the focus group believed that crime had gone up (e.g. housebreaking, motor vehicle theft, armed robberies, assault and domestic violence and rape). This was attributed by focus group members to the complex demographics of the area: immigration into the area is high because of the SASOL plant, mines and the new Maputo Corridor. Informal settlements are expanding rapidly and criminals concentrate in these areas and are hard to track.

MAKING AN EXIT

The exit strategy was considered first in this intervention. The ISS situated responsibility with the local council and tried to take a secondary role. However, the new municipal demarcations and municipal elections forced the organisation to extend its planned one-year exit. It decided to see the project through to the second year with stronger facilitation. This included identifying change agents in the council and some local-level lobbying. It was such a difficult process that the ISS stated in a 2002 paper that the coordinating role given to local government in the NCPS and the *White Paper* did not work.⁵ This was written before the municipality took on a coordinating role. The statement is valid in that a strategy must involve more than the local council initially but it did seem to work incrementally. Councillors gradually came on board especially after the local government transition. In this municipality, it resulted in a sustained programme of crime prevention that falls under the Department of Public Safety but that is monitored by the council.

KEY LESSONS LEARNT

These are drawn from statements from the CJP Head, the facilitators and participants when asked about the lessons they learnt in the project:

'Get financial and written commitment for these interventions right up front or don't go in.'

'Make sure one official has been allocated to the programme as a change agent. This must not be someone too senior (i.e. too busy) and working in the right sector (perhaps in the right portfolio on the council).'

- 'Involve all sectors of the community and not just councillors.'
- 'Don't have a lot of meetings without a purpose in mind. Meeting regularly with all 'role-players' can be a waste of time. This focuses the effort on participation rather than projects.'
- 'Do your homework on local government. Know what works and what does not work and see how these institutions function.'

REVIEWER'S COMMENTS

Despite some initial problems, this intervention created a sustained crime prevention programme approved and monitored by a local council. The 'pink book' did not work as planned. The capacity was not really there for the community to do a good audit. Maybe in hindsight it was a little naïve to target a *transitional* council too. However, the ISS adapted to the situation and made the intervention work with these practices:

- A scientifically rigorous safety audit.
- Incremental strategic partnerships.
- Skills-building.
- Step-by-step council approval of process.
- The use of carefully-chosen change agents.
- Local-level lobbying.

The value of each has already been demonstrated. The only question is: who will pay for an expensive process like this? Not every community will have access to the resources of a large organisation of professional researchers, trainers and facilitators with detailed knowledge of crime reduction strategies. Therefore we do not yet have an adequate strategy but we have just described some key elements pertaining to it.

Above all else, this intervention demonstrated that targeting a local council is worthwhile because, in the final analysis, these are role-players that can actually sustain and institutionalise an intervention. UMAC has adopted this practice in the Eastern Cape. NIM learnt quickly to work very closely with ward counsellors in KwaZulu-Natal. Of course, having a change agent on the council worked for the ISS intervention. Targeting the decision-makers is good practice because it places the exit strategy first. So, making the target the exit can be a very good plan.

The timing of the intervention was obviously problematic but what about the length of our interventions? Do we allow ourselves enough time for all the processes involved in identifying a sustained crime prevention strategy? ISS was almost convinced that it had failed but a year later the Govan Mbeki Municipality had implemented crime prevention projects. How long does it really take to build trust, build capacity, plan and take a community to the project planning stage? Most CSFs started three or more years ago are still at the problem-solving stage (Chapters Two and Three). This municipality reached the project stage in the same amount of time and is being administered and monitored by the local council. If we cannot afford longer interventions, then we at least need to set up an evaluation process that follows through a year or so after an intervention. Otherwise these kinds of successes will not be documented.

Manuals are seldom the driving force behind a sustained intervention. Many organisations and authors (including the reviewer) have produced research materials, strategies and handbooks in high hopes that they will mobilise people into action. This seldom occurs. Our materials are supplementary to facilitation (or mentoring) and to simply distribute them and expect them to work is leaving things to chance. Information distribution as a means of crime prevention is not supported in international reviews of best practice unless it is accompanied by professional facilitation.

ISS mainly referred to crime reduction strategies rather than crime prevention. Politicians and many officials prefer the former to the latter. The term ‘crime reduction’ seems to allow for a wider focus and some negotiation between role-players. For instance, local councillors were interested in setting up municipal policing, which entails both crime prevention and law enforcement. However, for councillors the word ‘crime prevention’ did not seem to include their pet project. Law enforcement ended up in the final strategy anyway. Do we limit our actions and our bargaining power with the more circumscribed term of crime prevention? Does crime reduction describe the juncture between prevention, deterrence and enforcement? On the other hand, we might be avoiding what is really important: preventing criminality. The Govan Mbeki Municipality action plan based on crime reduction allowed heavy weighting toward deterrence, rather than criminality prevention. With the high levels of migration and the rapid development of informal settlements in the area, the tactic of deterrence may not work. In the long term, setting up sustained systems to prevent the youthful population from turning to crime in the first place might prove to be far more important.

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5

CAPACITY BUILDING IN METROPOLITAN AREAS

Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSV)

INTRODUCTION

The last chapter examined a very challenging effort to sustain a crime reduction strategy by empowering two local councils. The City Safety Project (CSP), the subject of this chapter, focused on an even bigger target for building crime reduction capacity: six metropolitan councils. Like so many other projects in this review, the CSP arose from a new policy environment. The NCPS, the 1998 White Papers on both safety and security and local government proposed a new framework for fighting crime. These documents identified crime prevention, crime prevention through environmental design and law enforcement as three pillars in a new strategy that would be coordinated at local government level. So, in 1999 the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSV) started writing proposals to develop a knowledge base around all three pillars in six cities. By 2000, the organisation had obtained a grant from the OSF-SA.

The approach taken by the CSP was far more research-based and less specific about local outcomes than the other interventions described so far. In fact, the project manager said that it was not an ‘intervention’ in the classic sense: ‘There were no expected outcomes.’¹ The aim was to measure the responses of cities to the new policies and to see what opportunities would arise if the implementing agency helped to network and capacitate key role-players. Many workshops were held and many research reports were produced to:

Enhance the capacity of the six metropolitan local authorities in South Africa to improve safety and security in their jurisdictions.

Contribute to knowledge about urban safety in South Africa.

Assist metropolitan local governments to increase their capacity for effective law enforcement and crime prevention.²

These were large objectives with uncertain outcomes. The underlying idea was to assist the new metropolitan areas by supplying original research and creating networking opportunities.

In staff interviews, opinions were split on whether these were adequate objectives. Some argued that these were adequate programme goals because it created the dialogue and knowledge that cities needed to implement new legislation. Others argued that it produced a situation where research production was seen as an end in itself. The reviewer suggests that the CSP took place at such a large scale in terms of geographical targets (large, complex cities), institutional targets (officials and managers in many different departments) and in terms of wide-ranging subject matter that it is now difficult to identify the impact with any precision. No evaluations were undertaken nor could they be, considering the nature of programme goals and the scale of the work. Without identifying specific outcomes according to specific targets and designing a delivery strategy accordingly, we cannot be certain of the impact.

These circumstances add further evidence of the need to refine our understanding of geographical targeting. It will be argued that the scale and range of the effort were too wide, especially considering the timing. As in the ISS interventions previously discussed, many participants left government or were relocated in the local government transition and others were too deeply involved in restructuring to participate. There were many 'no shows' at workshops. Further evidence of this problem was the difficulty encountered by the reviewer in finding focus group participants who were still in government and to ensure their attendance. Some who did participate were rather hazy about impact. This is not to say that the work and published reports were not useful, but it is clearly difficult to measure the impact of an intervention at such a broad scale. The impact was certainly spread too thin and wide to document in the short period of the review.

ORGANISATIONAL BACKGROUND

The Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) is an NGO first established in January 1989 as the 'Project for the Study of Violence' at the University of the Witwatersrand. In mid-1997 it separated from the university and became a Section 21 company. Today it is one of the largest NGOs in the country with some 70 employees who engage in violence prevention and democratisation projects in both South Africa and Africa more widely.

Despite its separation from the university, the CSVR retains a strong research and publication focus. It has increasingly engaged in community-based projects but is also focused on policy-making at national level and in democratisation and human rights issues at an international scale. The organisation uses research, training (e.g. conflict management), lobbying, advocacy, trauma counselling, curriculum design and various kinds of projects to address and heal the conflicts that have arisen from social injustices. Altogether these activities are embraced within six different programmes including:

- 1 The Criminal Justice Programme.
- 2 Transition and Reconciliation Programme (research).
- 3 Youth Programme (e.g. safe schools).

'Without identifying specific outcomes according to specific targets and designing a delivery strategy accordingly, we cannot be certain of impact.'

- 4 Gender Programme (research, advocacy, monitoring, lobbying).
- 5 Victim Empowerment Programme (e.g. trauma counselling).
- 6 Africa Programme (building a human rights culture and a democratic Africa).

The City Safety Project started in 2000 as an independent CSVr project not falling under any programme. From 2001, the CSVr integrated the project within their Criminal Justice Unit to create the Criminal Justice Programme. Most of the Unit's projects were agency or community specific but the City Safety Project was broadly aimed both in terms of subjects addressed and geographical targets. According to the CSVr, it was a challenge 'to translate the theoretical knowledge acquired [by the project] into practical, workable and effective interventions with law enforcement agencies and communities'.³

The City Safety project began with OSF-SA funding in late 2000 but from June 2001 there was a five-month break in delivery while the project awaited approval for a second round of funding. It resumed in October 2001 with delivery completed in March 2002. Ultimately, it was a two-year project split by some months into two funding periods.

PROGRAMME THEORY

The programme theory was simple: generating appropriate information about the theory and practice of crime reduction and disseminating it appropriately would increase the capacity of metropolitan councils to reduce crime. This involves three basic premises that would inform project delivery:

- 1 The project must be based on a researched understanding of current conditions.
- 2 One must not separate social crime prevention, law enforcement and environmental design but treat them as integrated parts of crime reduction.
- 3 Good communication (i.e. research, dynamic workshops, networking opportunities and an electronic newsletter) will raise the level of awareness about ways to combat crime in the cities.

First, the premise that the project should be research based fits best international practice. However, research production should be distinguished from research-based interventions. Producing general information for wide dissemination is less targeted with a less certain outcome than monitoring and evaluating a place-specific intervention.


Secondly, the holistic approach to crime reduction makes sense. In all local crime prevention initiatives discussed so far, law enforcement, crime prevention and opportunity reduction played an integrated and significant role. Both the CSVr and the ISS seem to have accepted that these ideas cannot be separated in practice.

Third, good communication, research production and sharing information can help to capacitate role-players. However, one cannot assume that the participants are interested, motivated and able to put the information into tangible projects. We have seen that there may be no structure for interdepartmental co-operation (Chapter One) and that many kinds of dysfunction might have to be addressed in terms of services, departments and systems (Chapters Two and Three). The timing of the project has already been mentioned and troubled every project described so far in the review (the first four under review took white papers as departure points and these very policies were ill-timed).

STRUCTURES

No new structures were required.

FIGURE SEVEN: THE SIX METROPOLITAN AREAS IN THE CITY SAFETY PROJECT



GEOGRAPHICAL TARGETING

The geographical targets are shown in **Figure Seven**. This includes six major cities: Cape Town, Durban, Ekurhuleni (East Rand), Johannesburg, Nelson Mandela Metro (Port Elizabeth) and Tshwane (Pretoria). Two elements of geographical targeting will be considered here: scale and distance.

One can question the scale of this project. These are six huge areas no longer definable as simply urban but also including peri-urban and rural areas. They are beset by large and significant crime problems. Arguably, focusing on one crime issue in one city would have been a massive project to undertake. Durban faces problems with the narcotics industry and is reportedly becoming an international drug capital. Why not meet with all the role-players on this urban issue and have a specific and measurable impact on reducing the supply and demand while still covering the lessons in the *White Paper*? In other words, there are ways to scale down an approach and thereby refine targets. Another way would have been more selectivity with regard to participants (e.g. only the mayors).

The CSVr theorised that the metro problems were not yet defined adequately and this required research and workshops among many different types of officials to find out what needed targeting. In that sense, the wide-ranging geographical focus of the CSP did have benefits for the organisation even if the impacts on the ground are not clear. For instance, it was identified that the newly incorporated rural areas on the fringe of the new metros had different kinds of dynamics requiring different kinds of approaches. Traditional governance is now on the city agenda along with issues pertaining to rural areas (i.e. stock theft). How does a city move away from its urban bias to consider these kinds of issues appropriately? The Criminal Justice Programme set up a project to examine this independently. This finding adds more evidence to the view that various kinds of places (often at scales below metropolitan level) require independent research and delivery practices. The purpose of geographical targeting is not for organisational learning but for impact on the ground. How can one project with five to six staff members (at its peak and not all full-time) capacitate six huge metro councils on all relevant topics? It seems that the scale of the project – a critical component of geographical targeting – was too large and impacted on our ability to assess deliverables. Information and networking can have great value but if not precisely targeted may be likened to a ‘shotgun’ approach that scatters the impact too widely to be observed. An example might be considered from attendance records at national workshops – 40 to 50 participants was a good turnout. This number of city representatives from different departments and posts does not impact on a critical mass of role-players for six cities. Yet it is an expensive undertaking. It was justified in terms of developing information and defining approaches, but why not focus research, staff and resources on one city and later move on to the next (after exit and evaluation) with lessons learnt?

The targeted group could also have been scaled down to include influential transitional city management, an idea the CSVr debated in later stages.⁴ This may be good practice in transition periods but then leads us to the question of the timing of an intervention. Some city managers also left government in the post-transition period. One might invest in social capital, only to lose the investment.

Distance is also another factor in geographical targeting that needs to be addressed in a better way in nearly every strategy under review. It is hard to build trust from a distance. The CSVr is in Johannesburg so it naturally developed close ties to city officials there more quickly and more easily. The earliest training interventions took

place there and one in the Nelson Mandela Metro where the project worked in partnership with the ISS and UMAC (and therefore the CJP was integrated more quickly). Trust-building was much slower in the areas where the organisation was less known or had fewer political connections (see Getting Started). The factor of distance has affected every intervention discussed and should be considered carefully as a component of geographical targeting.

DELIVERY STRATEGY OR PROCESS GUIDELINES

The delivery strategy was described in proposals and reports in terms of three main activities. These included:

- Conduct research into local-level crime reduction and prevention to identify areas for workshops and training.
- Use research to design training facilitation and capacity building for local government officials and councillors.
- Facilitate networking and information sharing between cities twice a year to share research findings and to share crime reduction practices (that feeds back into research).

Research would inform workshops. In turn, it was believed that workshops (including the national ones that shared crime reduction practices between cities) would inform crime-reduction activities. Since the idea was to research and deliver good information, there was no exit strategy. The expectation was that learning and information sharing between cities would help facilitate an understanding of the role cities would play in crime reduction. There were no measurable outcomes other than seeing that good information was delivered and networking activities took place. There were no clear indicators and no process of monitoring and evaluation.

This delivery strategy reflects a programme theory that is very information orientated, but not necessarily integrating research into all delivery practices. For instance, twice-yearly workshops to promote 'horizontal learning' between the cities did not lead from research findings but was designed at proposal stage as an opportunity to utilise and disseminate research findings. Furthermore, in practice the training did not arise from research as designed but was offered at the request of the participants who spent much time discussing this. So, process evaluations were not integrated into delivery strategy because the focus was on information production and sharing. Owing to the scale of the research subjects (e.g. the state of by-law enforcement in the country) it was difficult to achieve integration between research and delivery at a local level.

GETTING STARTED

In previous examples, entrance into the community was a complex and difficult process. This generated the need to consider the entry strategy more carefully. This project had a very broad national focus – the cities of South Africa. So, 'getting started' involved using research to describe metropolitan government crime reduction efforts nationally (starting with a focus on four cities). Entry was an evolving process and it was considered that deliverables would be negotiated based on the research findings and discussions in workshops.

The researchers used available materials, interviews and field visits to write assessments that described:

The state of by-law enforcement in the country.

The state of social crime prevention in the country.

'Owing to the scale of the research subjects it was difficult to achieve integration between research and delivery at a local level.'

- The state of municipal policing in South Africa.
- City specific reports on safety and security arrangements in each metropolitan area.

The first three could be drawn from primary and secondary sources but the last offered an opportunity for a useful baseline study. However, these 'baselines' were neither safety audits informing a planned intervention nor pre-intervention data documented in preparation for an evaluation. They offered 'baseline information' for understanding how local governments worked in relationship to crime issues, which would inform workshops with the city officials and the possible negotiation of other kinds of work. The intention was to share all this information at workshops, obtain feedback and engage in discussion and then to identify training needs. The research also allowed the organisation to network and to establish the agenda and content of the workshops. Presentation materials and content were readily available from research materials.

The output of research reports in the first year was quantitatively impressive. Informative if considered only in those terms, but slow progress at city level for anyone oriented toward outputs on the ground (the key issue under debate). Before the end of 2001, certain workshops were held such as:

- Trauma awareness with the Johannesburg Metropolitan Police.
- Training Johannesburg car guards in the inner city (crime prevention or deterrence).
- 'Mindset change' and strategic planning with the management of the Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department.
- By-law enforcement in the Nelson Mandela Metro.
- Training for CPFs on local government's role in public safety.

Only two cities were addressed in the first year (Johannesburg and the Nelson Mandela Metro). This was not surprising to staff considering the delivery strategy and its emphasis on research production the first year. On review, it seemed that a small staff had engaged in an unlimited field of study that could involve a huge variety of interventions if not curtailed. Indeed, some of them were large enough to be programmes and projects in their own right. Again, it is the scale that proved unwieldy in terms of ensuring relevant outcomes. For example, these are just some of the wide-ranging interventions across subjects and geographical space that the team of three or four full-time staff were considering in the second-year proposal:

- Piloting training materials in victim support.
- Training town planners in social crime prevention.

Gender sensitivity for traffic officers.

Training council officials in public order management.

Relationship building between SAPS and the Municipal Police.

Public education on by-laws.

National workshop with municipal court officials.

In addition more research was proposed to identify what individual cities were doing and then more nationally-focused reports were planned (and many delivered) on crowd management, municipal courts, municipal policing, urban renewal and city safety in peri-urban areas. This range and wide-targeting is good for an informational approach but for a targeted intervention-based approach it reinforces the evidence that the scale of our projects must be considered more carefully. There is no clear outcome in this informational kind of approach and it becomes a debate as to whether or not there should be.

Aside from scale, getting started was also complicated by timing. The CSP staff had to work hard to get people involved with government transition to attend workshops on crime reduction. Janine Rauch, the project manager, stated that ‘You have to persuade cities that they will benefit unless you have good political connections. Where we had those connections, the process was much easier.’ She also stated that one must be responsive and resourceful regarding the stated needs of metropolitan areas in order to get their commitment to a process. One can be drawn into processes not on the agenda:

There are no ribbons to cut with long-term crime prevention. Politicians think about short-term deliverables and advocate this right from the beginning. Working with councillors and council officials is not that easy. Some things turn them on like municipal police and other things turn them off like refugees and xenophobia. This makes it difficult to work with crime issues holistically and draws us into government processes.⁵

This is clearly not a problem exclusive to the CSP. It echoes the sentiments of staff members interviewed in most of the interventions under review that took policy papers as their departure point. This raises the question of the civil society role in local government. Should we be advocating our own agenda or assisting government with its agenda? The question of CSO roles will be addressed in the final chapter.

ENSURING RELEVANT CRIME PREVENTION OUTCOMES

One can argue that the outcome of the CSP should be to deliver a safer city. However, the project staff would not have seen that as the appropriate intent. According to one interviewee, ‘It was about producing research and knowledge that could be broadly utilised.’ Funding seems too limited for organisations to take the chance that research production will be utilised if distributed or that partnerships will be formed if people are networked. Ensuring a relevant outcome requires a delivery strategy that takes full account of where the targets of the intervention will be at the exit stage, the precise distribution of delivery (geographical targeting) and the strategic path to get there.

The second year followed a break in funding cycles while the project was discussed. This did result in designing some indicators of success for the project. These included:

Evidence emanating from the six local authorities (in policy documents, development plans, speeches) that concepts of social crime prevention and local by-law enforcement were being better understood and more enthusiastically adopted among local officials.

The delivery of the training as planned with positive evaluations from the local authorities about training packages and demand for more training.

- The volume of demand for and readership of the various reports and the newsletters in print and on the internet.
- The rate of networking between the four cities and a qualitative improvement in relationships and information-sharing between them.

Indicators are very hard to develop for a project of this size and scale. Therefore poor geographical targeting and a poor consideration of geographical factors (e.g. distance, complexity in each area) played a strong role in the inability to ensure a relevant outcome. Not all these goals were met. There was no evaluation to establish the first factor and the research reports were only widely distributed in hard copy at the time of the review. The methodology for establishing a rate of networking would be complex and this was not really undertaken. There was positive feedback and a demand for more training and workshops.

The organisation also reported that the breaks in the funding cycle impacted on delivery. This can clearly play havoc with project teams trying to achieve their targets. A five month interruption in two-yearly funding cycles makes it challenging to retain staff and complete deliverables on time. Members need an income and may take up other work, get involved in other CSVr programmes or take a leave of absence. The project also suffered a tragic and demoralising setback when one member associated with the project died in a car accident. There were challenges in the external environment too:

- Building relationships with city officials was slow work.
- The distances between the organisation and at least four of the targeted cities did not allow for much trust-building (and perhaps the kind of constant *in situ* facilitation and local lobbying required for a sustainable outcome – see previous chapter).
- Social crime prevention was not a priority issue with politicians and bureaucrats during the period of the CSVr intervention.

Despite the internal and external challenges to attaining a relevant outcome, these are also the factors that must be anticipated in delivery strategy. Information exchanges, networking and the publication of research findings do not always guarantee results given the problems of service delivery that we face. People do not always read what we give them to read, remember what we have told them or have the capacity to implement what they learn. Sometimes there are structural problems within an organisation that do not allow it to adopt new learning easily. Often, one trained person cannot break old mindsets. There is a national and international trend toward *in situ* mentoring and follow-up to ensure that what is learnt gets implemented. In-house process evaluations and external outcome evaluations can also help in this process (next section).

It is clear that the training itself was of a high quality and this always helps to ensure a relevant impact. Two experienced trainers were utilised but their efforts were stretched thin owing to the scale of the project. The qualities of trainers that were important included:

- Innovative and dynamic people.
- Being responsive to needs but offering strong chairmanship.
- Having expertise in the subject matter.

- Good presentation materials identified through research.
- Willingness to engage in conversation.

One person in a review focus group suggested that this had a particularly good impact on the management of the Johannesburg Metropolitan Police and led to a change in organisational culture. Testimony does not constitute an evaluation but it stands to reason that these skills directed toward a clear target at a manageable scale and dealing with one subject (the need for team-building on the issue of social crime prevention) would have good effect.

MEASURING IMPACT

No evaluation was conducted and it was difficult to even assess impact at participant focus groups. First, it was hard to find available participants. Many had left government or shifted departments. Those from Durban were a little unclear on the content of the metropolitan and national-level workshops while Johannesburg participants failed to attend. The Metro Police from Ekurhuleni provided most of the information and allow us to assess some positive impacts in that region.

It can be seen that a significant amount of research was produced covering the following subjects:

- An assessment of the state of by-law enforcement in the country.
- The state of local government social crime prevention in South African cities.
- City-specific reports on the safety and security arrangements in each of the metropolitan cities.
- The state of municipal policing in South Africa.
- A baseline report on local government crime prevention efforts in the Nelson Mandela Metropole.
- Youth crime prevention in South Africa.
- Urban renewal programmes.
- Victim awareness and trauma management in metro departments.

Only one researcher was engaged full time and much of the other work was contracted. So, it might have been possible to contract for process and outcome evaluations. Furthermore, the proposals suggested that training needs would be designed in accordance with a baseline assessment. That would have integrated the research with outputs and allowed for a process of monitoring and evaluation. Instead the participants were asked at workshops to define their own training needs. This created a challenge instead of integrating research into delivery:

Allowing the cities to define the training workshops that they require has proved challenging and time consuming. This is particularly because the cities are often unclear about their needs and tend to focus all their energies on municipal policing without creative thought about other crime reduction projects.⁶

In the absence of evaluations, the clearest project outcomes are evident in three ways: (1) research documentation; (2) organisational learning; and (3) testimony from review participants.

The effect of the research is difficult to judge but it does seem to fall into two categories: (1) city assessments that may have been useful locally; and (2) broad descriptive material on the state of various criminal justice issues such as municipal policing in South Africa. The latter produces some informative reading that can update someone not involved directly in the issues or offer a better understanding of theory. Recommended is the Youth Crime Prevention Report by Ingrid Palmay and Catherine Moat because it fits the issue of social crime prevention firmly into the local government agenda. The city-based assessments may have helped with strategy but it is difficult to know in the absence of an evaluation as it requires strict methodology to ascertain.

The impact on staff members and organisational learning was clearer. Research on important topics increased staff expertise and the publications, papers and workshops increased their profile. It was useful that members came into demand because consultancy work helped to maintain the project during the lapse in funding. Ironically, the consultancy work was more focused and therefore could assist in specific projects of importance in specific locations. This included:

- An evaluation of Johannesburg's Municipal Police Department conducted for the Gauteng Department of Safety and Liaison.
- Assisting the Medical Research Council with an analysis of the Road Accident Fund database for the commission of inquiry into the Road Accident Fund.

The City Safety Project also built organisational capacity in important ways. Various elements of the City Safety Project were absorbed into other programmes to strengthen them. For instance, the Metropolitan Policing Project was a direct outgrowth of the CSP and came to examine and contribute to major issues like civilian oversight. Likewise, a new Rural Safety Project was generated to look at crime and safety on the urban periphery. Staff members in the new projects said in interviews that the CSP taught the CSVr the importance of focusing geographically and of the need to engage in problem-solving. The broad-based theoretical work of the City Safety Project also had another value for the organisation: the CSVr accepts that social crime prevention, law enforcement and environmental design (opportunity reduction) are integrated and inseparable parts of crime reduction.

It is beneficial if the skills and capacity of the implementing organisation are enhanced owing to a project. The new projects are much more focused. It is unfortunate that the outcomes on the ground cannot be measured as accurately. One staff member even argued that there was 'little concrete change' while others tried to defend aspects of the project. It is hard to know because the organisational learning did not accompany a clear and *measurable* impact on crime reduction.

The CSVr invited eight people to attend a focus group in their Johannesburg office with the researchers but only three attended. An additional focus group planned for Durban failed to materialise. So, the reviewer identified two Durban participants from attendance lists and conducted interviews. Many of the other Durban participants seemed to have left government. One of the interviewees still works on safety issues in the city and the other had moved to take up new work elsewhere. Both had attended the large national conferences and felt that this methodology was problematic since people were removed from their environments and often had other agendas.

Impact was identified in Ekurhuleni (East Rand) through the attendance of two officials of Metropolitan Police.

They were involved in the Metropolitan Policing Project that emerged out of the CSP. The testimony of one officer indicated that the police were better informed about crime prevention strategy and were using some of this knowledge in practice:

We are only one year and one month old. We come from traffic backgrounds and it really helped to get involved in the workshops. We engaged with people who have done research and we also used the web pages of the CSVR to keep abreast of what was happening. We have come to understand the significance of social crime prevention and have now divided ourselves into two – law enforcement and social crime prevention – but are trying not to leave any gaps.⁷

The Ekurhuleni officers also discussed how they had used elements of crime prevention through environmental design to identify hotspots of crime (e.g. an abandoned quarry for dumping stolen cars) and to deal directly with these problems. Their enthusiasm was such that it did seem that the metropolitan police managers in this area were very serious about their crime prevention role.

MAKING AN EXIT

In many ways, CSVR staff did not see this as an intervention from which one exits. One person described it as ‘taking the elements of the *White Paper on Safety and Security* and elaborating on it by networking with the cities’. Without a known outcome, there is no exit. The exit therefore was the date funding ended and the project concluded.

KEY LESSONS LEARNT (offered by the organisation and participants)

- ‘Do not engage in local interventions during a time of city restructuring. We should have stuck with research until the transformation was completed.’
- ‘Now that the cities have settled, the best targets are public safety portfolio committees, public safety officers, Metro Police and City Safety Management Teams.’
- ‘Define training and capacity building in terms of accreditation. This creates more buy-in.’
- ‘Publications on web sites do not always get used. There is still a role for distributing hard copy in a timely way.’
- ‘Understand the incentives that people have for going to workshops before you plan one.’
- ‘Access in relationship building is not a once-off. You must keep building and maintaining relationships with city role-players in order to be effective.’
- ‘Dealing with politicians is very difficult because many are driven by ambitions and other kinds of agenda that may be hidden. One must be politically literate to deal with them and have knowledge about how the game of politics is played.’

‘At the end of the day, the only appropriate role for an NGO might be advocacy. Government is the one that should deliver.’

‘Stop using the term social crime prevention! Early childhood development is the place to start that effort. Refer instead to local crime prevention initiatives that combine the elements of crime prevention, law enforcement and crime prevention through environmental design.’⁸

- 'NGO coalitions offer good practice and this is what occurred in the Nelson Mandela Metro. It overcame the city trying to bid one organisation against the other and made a large range of skilled people available.'
- 'Announce your findings in workshops. Then immediately send out the research report. It gets people to read.'
- 'Be specific about geography. Have a specific target and organise the intervention according to a specific issue like domestic violence of rape.'

REVIEWER'S COMMENTS

Creating opportunities for dialogue and producing research may be a useful component of strategy for a crime reduction initiative. It can be insufficient on its own since it is so difficult to measure impact without follow-up (facilitation, mentoring, monitoring and evaluation). Much useful literature sits on dusty shelves in environments where there is no motivation, time, capacity or enabling environment for implementation. This makes information distribution on its own a gamble in a limited funding environment.

The impact of the City Safety Project is not known. It is very difficult to measure impact when the scale of a project is very large. Sometimes even a district or a municipality is too large for a single intervention and we have to find ways to scale back so we can prioritise depth over breadth and measure the response. This returns again to the matter of geographical targeting and this will be raised as a discussion issue in the last chapter.

The lasting legacy of the CSP may be the confirmation of the NCPS view that deterrence, law enforcement and crime prevention are linked concepts that cannot be seen as separate engagements.

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- 7 Focus Group with Ekurhuleni Police, Johannesburg (CSV offices), 18 March 2003
- 8 One CSV informant disagreed with the other on this point when reading the draft. She wrote 'ECD may be a crucial social crime prevention initiative but not all social crime prevention can be collapsed into ECD. I think the problem is rather one of the increasing disrespect that social crime prevention has earned because it is seen as soft and indefinable in a context where "tough policing" is seen as the only solution to crime. For CSP the term crime prevention was more attractive to members of local government.'



6

EMPOWERING LOW-INCOME WOMEN TO LEAD SAFETY PROGRAMMES

**Institute for Social and Health Sciences (ISHS)
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INTRODUCTION

The last chapter looked at a research-based effort aimed at a broad geographical target, South Africa's metropolitan areas. This chapter examines a neighbourhood-based strategy. Its purpose is to engage women living in areas of informal or low-income housing on the urban fringe to become local leaders in injury prevention. The Best Practices for Women-led Safety Promotion in Low Income Communities Programme is based on the public health framework that addresses crime from the perspective of preventing *intentional* injuries. This paradigm offers something new to the previous approaches that emerge from security frameworks: it focuses squarely on the risk factors that result in offending and victimisation. It does this with great methodological rigour. This chapter introduces an alternative framework for approaching crime prevention practice.

The programme under review involves some senior university-based scientists engaged in long-term applied research in the field of public health. Therefore, the intervention includes some very rigorous methodologies. Some CSOs might fear that they lack the capacity for this. However, there is a model that takes this into account and offers a way for CSOs to contribute within this research paradigm. It involves four steps that most organisations can easily apply:

- 1 Define the problem.
- 2 Identify risks.
- 3 Develop and test an intervention.
- 4 Evaluate over a long period.

This is one way that CSOs could improve their work in a systematic way, share practices and employ an international standard of scientific rigour. This chapter tells us much about methodological rigour in programme design and about how to develop and test an intervention according to a model that targets the causes of crime.

It is also of interest that the university-based NGO under review intends to produce a replicable social programme for injury prevention through long-term research. This returns us to the question of what is replicable (see Chapters Two and Three). In this case, the term ‘replicable’ taken from programme theory does not appear to describe the intervention. The actual content of each intervention is designed at ground level according to a researched understanding of temporal, spatial, environmental and contextual factors. This produces a very precise appreciation for place. What is being replicated are *process guidelines* for working on a specific type of intervention in a very specific type of area (poor areas of informal and RDP housing on the urban fringe). Therefore the debate is about words and not practices. Yet, such definitional distinctions are important for our understanding of crime prevention and will be discussed later.

ORGANISATIONAL BACKGROUND

This intervention involves some research institutions with long names and complex histories. In 1989, the University of South Africa’s (Unisa) Health Psychology Unit completed an epidemiological study of injuries in Johannesburg. Very high rates of both intentional and unintentional injuries were located in the Johannesburg suburb of Eldorado Park. Meetings with a wide-range of role-players (the community, relevant government departments, civil society organisations and business) followed. The meetings resulted in the establishment of the Centre for Peace Action (CPA). This is a university programme that brings academics, service professionals and the affected community together in an effort to prevent violence and trauma in historically disadvantaged communities.

In 1998, the Health Psychology Unit that established the CPA merged with another Unisa research group, the Institute for Behavioural Sciences, to become the Institute of Social and Health Services (ISHS). Today the CPA is the largest of the ISHS programmes. The CPA is the NGO delivery agent, providing administration, facilitation, and resources for programmes designed and monitored by ISHS academics. There is a great emphasis on research production too with some 16 to 20 full-time, contract and intern researchers working with administrative staff members and volunteers on CPA projects. The ISHS-CPA captures this integration of research and delivery while the acronym CPA is sufficient when referring only to the service delivery elements of the programme.

It is important to stress that the ISHS-CPA is engaged in applied research emanating from a university institute. The changing trend in South African universities is toward making community outreach and research as important as teaching. The specific mission of the ISHS-CPA is to:

Function as an internationally and locally recognised African research centre of excellence within the social and health services, promoting knowledge, development and encouraging expertise in the associated methodological, theoretical, policy and intervention areas.¹

The ISHS-CPA is recognised for research excellence. It produces a large number of articles in international journals and chapters in scholarly books on public health issues. Many members of the institute are well known

and represented at international academic conferences. Researchers, students and interns come from around the world to work with the Institute. The ISHS is a designated affiliate of the World Health Organisation (WHO) in its international effort to facilitate violence and injury prevention research and training. Furthermore, the CPA, together with the Johannesburg South Metropolitan Local Council, is a designated member of WHO's Global Network of Safe Community Demonstration Programmes and affiliate support centres. This locates the ISHS-CPA as part of an international effort to develop, implement, evaluate and document approaches to violence and injury prevention for low-income countries.

The ISHS-CPA is also an important South African role-player in conducting research to inform safety programmes. In 2001, it joined with the Medical Research Council in co-directing the Crime, Violence and Injury Lead Programme. This consolidated the work of the two organisations in conducting applied public health research in the area of crime, violence and injury prevention. This programme's injury surveillance studies calculate the extent, nature, causes and consequences of deaths by injury or violence nationwide. They also research good practice in relationship to crime and injury and disseminate this information through publications, training and capacity building. Indeed, its scholars and researchers have generated a large number of significant publications, book chapters, papers and peer-reviewed journal articles that make essential reading for anyone involved in crime prevention work in South Africa.

The OSF-SA began funding one of the CPA's programmes in early 2002. Best Practices for Women-Led Safety Promotion in Low-Income Communities uses test sites in an applied research activity to see if targeting women in poor areas can be developed into a best practice model. The CPA operates from three offices: two in south-west Johannesburg (Lenasia and Eldorado Park) and another one in the Western Cape Metro (Tygerberg). The Johannesburg offices focus on Vlakkfontein and Eldorado Park. The Cape Town office mobilises and capacitates women in Nomzamo and Broadlands Park near the Strand.

PROGRAMME THEORY

The programme theory is relatively easy to understand. The ISHS-CPA theorises that by empowering women to become active in injury prevention, they can lead the community toward an increased level of activity and community awareness. Women volunteers are brought onto safety promotion teams and trained over a period of three years, first in public health research. With targeted information, they gradually move into advocacy, victim support, education campaigns and other leadership roles. It is theorised that this capacitated leadership team will alter behaviour by manipulating the social and physical environment to reduce risk, and that this will facilitate a decrease in both intentional and unintentional injuries for the entire community.

The group targets women in low-income communities for two main reasons. First, there are research reasons. Violence against women (i.e. rape, sexual abuse, domestic violence and homicide) is a worldwide public health concern that needs to be addressed. The WHO estimates that it is the leading cause of injury among women of reproductive age globally.² In the ISHS-CPA target areas in south-west Johannesburg, one in three women might suffer severe sexual violence.³ Secondly, there are strategic reasons for targeting women including:

Consistent community leadership (men migrate in search of work).

- Sensitivity to their own dilemma as vulnerable targets of crime.
- A group that needs support owing to the inequalities of the past.

Only a few men are involved in the women-led safety promotion teams yet men commit most crimes of intentional violence. One might ask if this programme is sufficient to target this factor. ISHS-CPA staff responded in interviews by saying that they have other programmes for that purpose (e.g. addressing youth, targeting schools). This component offers social support by targeting at-risk women and victimised women and strengthening their resilience through home-based support and visits. Furthermore, women-led teams work to create a safer environment for everyone through advocacy and lobbying (e.g. lobbying police to regulate shebeen hours or campaigning for safer roads).

To design a programme that fits the theory, the ISHS-CPA employs the public health model. This approach offers all organisations interested in crime prevention an alternative to the security framework or the developmental framework. The alternative is a scientific approach most notable in terms of rigour: known elements of good practice are employed in every programme theory and in all components of delivery. The reviewer will argue in the final chapter that science is a better departure point for programme theory than a policy paper. It means that we address the causes of crime and engage in *measurable* crime reduction practices.

If we have established reduced risk, then we can measure crime prevention. Therefore, the public health focus is on *risk factors* such as the behaviour of individuals and groups owing to relationships (e.g. poor parenting), products (e.g. guns) and environments (e.g. poor and overcrowded). First, the extent of the problem is identified. Then, interventions are piloted that manipulate these factors (e.g. training parents, getting rid of guns, lobbying for improved housing) to prevent problems of intentional or unintentional violence. These factors must be manipulated both in the community and in the policy environment. Ultimately the intervention must be evaluated. Thus, the whole process can be repeated in the post-evaluation stage until a sustainable solution is located in a community.

The public health model offers some methodological rigour in the design of our intervention strategies. It is theorised that seven key factors (known by seven words starting with E), must be integrated into any intervention in order to reduce crime ('intentional injury'):

- 1 *Epidemiology* is the research one undertakes to identify the distribution of the problem, its patterns, its causes, the risk factors and how to apply all this to health problems (e.g. violence).
- 2 *Environmental intervention* is similar to the concept of using environmental design to prevent crime.
- 3 *Engineering intervention* involves changing the structures and functions of injury-causing products (e.g. guns).
- 4 *Education* refers to communicating information about the risk factors producing intentional or unintentional injury in order to change social attitudes and behaviour.
- 5 *Enforcement* means policies and practices that regulate human behaviour to promote safety.
- 6 *Evaluation* refers to assessing the impact and efficacy of prevention programmes.
- 7 *Empowerment* refers to building the skills, capacity and esteem of disadvantaged people.

This is certainly the most rigorous methodology for programme design of all those discussed in the review. It also neatly packages some familiar elements of practice in crime prevention. For instance, the first stage of surveillance and evidence can be likened to the safety audit that was discussed in Chapters Two to Four. Of course, with a focus on public health, there is equal attention to safety and security issues. The injury focus can entail a mix of safety concerns ranging from the hazards of paraffin lamps, to traffic accidents, to rape. Like most other organisations under review, the ISHS-CPA uses advocacy to affect the policy environment, and training and education to empower communities and to promote behaviour change.

The public health model also suggests that we reconsider our investment in the research process. There is no expectation that finding a ‘replicable model’ (or good practices – as will be discussed later) is a quick process. Instead, there is recognition that a high research investment is required in terms of time in specific and identifiable kinds of locations. ISHS-CPA funding proposals are written for strategic planning cycles of five years:

The ISHS-CPA emphasises the development of replicable models and information management. The ISHS-CPA is concerned that model-development is a long-term process, which at a minimum spans at least a 10-year period.⁴

It has already been recommended that organisations and funding agencies reconsider the time-span of interventions and conduct research into good practices over a period of years using the same pilot areas. Identifying the risk factors and manipulating these also has high value for measurable crime prevention strategy and is recommended as a more scientific focus than beginning from government policy documents. However, the chosen terminology of ‘replicable models’ is questioned. This can send us off in an exclusive policy direction and reduce our attention to factors of human geography that affect the approach and style of delivery. In the present case, the idea that a model can be *replicated* makes three untenable assumptions:

- There are many similarities between areas of low-income housing and informal settlement.
- Community motivation to participate is constant.
- Targeted areas have a consistent population for capacity building.

The last two assumptions were contradicted by a severe disruption in the programme when some residents of Thembelihle moved to a resettlement site at Vlakfontein. The community split over a ‘forced removal’ issue. This caused the site of the intervention to shift, strained relationships between volunteers and the community and stopped the programme for several months. It also had to be redeployed in Vlakfontein after a significantly long investment in Thembelihle (see Geographical Targeting below).

Arguably, the first assumption is contradicted by the methodology used by the ISHS-CPA. Every CPA intervention starts with research to develop safety promotion programmes in response to the injury profiles of a *particular* community combined with the communities’ stated needs. Intervention strategies are also developed in a participative way. Since this is the case, only *process guidelines* (and not replicable models) are being generated based on a set of good practices as the title of the intervention suggests (Best Practices for Women-Led Safety Promotion in Low-Income Communities).

Best practice theory creates guidelines to our interventions but not identical strategies and structures. It assumes which best locality will be adopted and used if we share our experiences in a methodical way. Arguably, fitting good practice into locally-designed strategies takes better account of what is happening on the ground than the idea of replicating models.

It is not the case that the ISHS-CPA attempts to impose one formulaic strategy and structure everywhere. In fact, an analysis of spatial issues enters into the programme design for each place along with a consideration of temporal conditions and context. Furthermore, risk and resilience factors are identified in accordance with an epidemiological study in a target area and this data is used to design an appropriate intervention. A selection of good practices that might work in a particular kind of area are being generated and not a replicable model. So, the term 'replicable' does not really describe ISHS-CPA practice even though the term is used in describing theory. Perhaps it is hoped that ultimately a social programme can be developed that will work in every community everywhere. This would seem doubtful too. Once independent of the CPA, the safety promotion teams are likely to be absorbed into other kinds of structures or change their role and focus over time (as with CSFs). As it is, the outcome between the test areas is not even.

STRUCTURES

There are two structures involved. First, there is the CPA facility that seems critical to the research-based intervention. It brings together organisations, institutions and social services involved in injury prevention and safety promotion. This links them to an outreach centre from which delivery can be facilitated, monitored, implemented and evaluated. For instance, there are Unisa professors and lecturers of community, clinical and social psychology who are linked to the project. There are also full-time field coordinators and administrators. Further linked to this are volunteers, interns and other NGO partners. Thus, the CPA serves an important and vital organising role.

A second structure is required at community level: a safety promotion team. This is a group of volunteers capable of delivering services to each area. Volunteering is not restricted to women but women take the lead and constitute most of the implementing group. They are trained in aspects of public health and charged with the role of facilitating safety in the community. The research function of the volunteers is critical to the intervention. The volunteers are trained in the administration of questionnaires and their first task is to collect the epidemiological data that will inform the entire intervention. It is against this baseline that the success of the intervention will later be measured. The volunteers also serve a monitoring function: they compile a continuous home injury register and track safety problems in the community. Other ISHS research programmes employ these volunteers for data collection too. It is then analysed by ISHS staff and researchers to produce research documentation and to monitor and evaluate the intervention.

The volunteers are not merely research assistants but also the group that organises and engages in safety promotion. They will provide home-based support to women who are at risk of violence and injury or who have been victimised. This is also the target group that must sustain the intervention and they are expected to achieve an independent status similar to a CBO or NGO at the end of programme. This means that they will raise funds and sustain projects that involve education, training, workshops, lobbying, advocacy and research.

GEOGRAPHICAL TARGETING

Public health practitioners would not employ the term ‘geographical targeting’. This model insists on covering four factors when considering a target:

- 1 Temporal.
- 2 Spatial.
- 3 Contextual.
- 4 Environmental.

These refer to identifying the historical and contemporary context (e.g. post-apartheid cities in transformation), the relationships across space (informal settlements on the urban fringe), the current local and global nexus (e.g. Africa caught in a debt trap) and the problems in the social and built environment that undermine safety (e.g. shacks that cannot be secured against break-ins).

Social geographers would argue that those are all factors to be considered in understanding human geography but their discipline does not offer a model that specifically includes these for targeting injury prevention. For that reason, those interested in promoting crime prevention should appreciate the public health model. If CSOs considered all these elements in regard to targeting, there would be:

- Fewer problems with the timing of interventions since this would be taken in as part of developing a delivery strategy.
- A better understanding of the spatial patterns of crime in an area as well as what to target.
- More sophisticated advocacy owing to clarity regarding the macroeconomic and broad political conditions producing problems in an area.
- More structured information on the micro-level and meso-level social and physical environment and how it contributes to intentional injury.

The four ISHS-CPA pilot areas under review are shown in **Figure Eight**. Two of the test sites are in the south-west suburbs of Johannesburg (Eldorado Park and Vlakfontein) and two others are in the Strand area of Cape Town (Nomzamo and Broadlands Park). The work in Johannesburg has been ongoing since 1990. Safety promotion in the Cape Town communities just outside the Strand began in 1997. The targets chosen are justified as areas where crime and violence are most concentrated: low-income areas of informal settlements (and new RDP housing) that have developed around metropolitan areas. The targets are ones where risk factors concentrate and the objective (as stated in the programme theory) is to identify these and reduce them. Risk factors include: high unemployment, widespread overcrowding, poor education levels, weak infrastructure and limited service delivery (e.g. slow police response times and overcrowded classrooms). These and other factors create high concentrations of criminality with high victimisation rates. This includes high levels of violence against women including rape, sexual abuse, domestic violence and homicide. In Eldorado Park, there are between 6 000 and 8 000 violent injuries recorded per year per 100 000 people. In the Cape communities it is less severe and more related to safety problems but high nonetheless (some 1 000 injuries per 100 000).

It is quite important to target these poorest of South African areas where informal housing concentrates, but there are risks involved too. Informal communities on the urban fringe are not *stable* targets but unstable ones – physically, socially, politically and environmentally. The social capital in which one invests can break down grinding an intervention to a halt. Political conflict, floods, fires and bad weather can severely damage these communities in ways not expected in well-developed areas with proper services and well-constructed houses. They are also areas of transient populations making capacity-building work difficult to sustain.

Vlakfontein is a resettlement site for the residents of Thembelihle, where the CPA had been working between 1990 and 2002. It was located in a dolomite rich area deemed to be a health hazard based on geology reports. This led to a provincial decision to move the residents to a safer site where development could be better planned. Politics compounded the problem when accusations were made that the Indian community was using the geology report to force out mainly black residents. From the late 1990s, the proposed relocation divided the community and violence, injury and death rose in a serious conflict between those that resisted the removal and those who sought new homes in Vlakfontein. The police and army had to intervene. In the end, Thembelihle did not disappear but abandoned sites rapidly refilled with new people as some of the old residents moved away. The original community had split between the two areas but the majority of the volunteers chose to relocate to Vlakfontein and this, together with the conflict, brought CPA activities to a standstill for half a year.


The case of Thembelihle is instructive for geographical targeting from another angle. Some of the areas targeted by the CPA are relatively formal by comparison and far less likely to suffer the kinds of problems that the informal community of Thembelihle presented. It appears that some basic infrastructure is needed to deliver on safety. Does this mean that some areas should be targeted first within a developmental framework? The environmental stabilisation of these areas in terms of electrification, roads, shops and general infrastructure would appear to be a priority both in logical and political terms. The environment plays a role in creating the public health hazards. Overcrowding can lead to different forms of violence. Unsafe roads lead to untimely deaths. The lack of public facilities and parks limits human experience and development. At least this tells us that we must analyse the environment first and then respond appropriately.

Despite any disadvantages to targeting impoverished areas on the urban fringe, there are also clear advantages. The areas targeted are neighbourhoods. The ISHS-CPA works in identifiable areas at a human scale. Where populations are large, it will simply work in a certain extension, section or ward. As one CPA facilitator said, 'We work in neighbourhoods. You set your finger on the pulse in an organic way and know exactly what impact we are making'. Another gave the example that there were 20 to 30 volunteers at Eldorado Park, a community of 250 000 to 350 000 people. There is limited impact on the entire community but clear impact in Extension Four where the ISHS-CPA works. This helps us to understand that working at a small manageable scale is critical when it comes to success. Failures at large scale are also very expensive while it is easy to correct a small-scale problem.

Distance is a factor in geographical targeting because this affects access. The Cape Town offices of the CPA are much further from their target communities (60km) than the ones in Lenasia that lay within 4km of their target areas. The Cape Town implementing staff said that distance to the sites was a key problem for them in terms of time, money and efficiency. This was no problem in Lenasia. The community volunteers in Johannesburg have easy access to the resources of the implementing organisation including: facilitator, networking opportunities,

training venues, fax machines, phones, paper and computers. Two or three rands in taxi fare is adequate to reach the CPA while the community volunteers in Cape Town are too distant for that access and have primary contact through a facilitator.

FIGURE EIGHT: THE OFFICES AND TEST SITES OF THE ISHS-CPA



DELIVERY STRATEGY OR PROCESS GUIDELINES

There is no absolute order to delivery at community level because the first stage, research, might locate the need for a changed approach based on the survey of injuries. Negotiation with the community might also alter delivery strategy. The types of service coalitions that are formed will also affect delivery. So, the delivery strategy really follows from a process guideline as follows:

- Evidence collection on injury and resilience.
- Entry, negotiation and community mobilisation.
- Development of community safety and health task teams.
- Facilitation of NGO service coalitions.
- Safety and health education training.
- Environmental development.
- Social development and support.
- Home visitation.
- Advocacy.
- Monitoring and evaluation.
- Information dissemination.

Significantly, all of this occurs within a five-year timeframe as shown in **Figure Nine** below.

FIGURE NINE: CPA INTERVENTION TIMEFRAMES

Surveillance and evidence	Safety and health and education training	Safety health and education	Environmental development	Advocacy and lobbying	Evaluation
Entry, negotiation, mobilisation and support	Social development and support	Social development	Advocacy and lobbying		Information dissemination
Community safety and health task	Home visitation teams	Home visitation			
NGO service coalitions		Environmental development			
		Advocacy and lobbying			

The first five stages are mainly NGO activities and will be described in the next section as these relate to the entry strategy. The social development and support stage refers to strengthening social support to individuals and groups who are at risk of violence and injury or who are already victims. From that point, the trained safety promotion team takes the lead in the programme. The volunteers initiate the home visitation programme that will help women and families to prevent injury and promote healing including help-seeking behaviours. They will also

identify existing women's groups for additional training, particularly those that might be income generating. Increasing the ability of women to run a business or earn an income increases resiliency and reporting levels as described in the NIM intervention in Chapter Three. One of the pinnacles in the programme will be reached when the volunteers are introducing environmental modification measures and engaged in lobbying and advocacy strategies to influence social policy formulation. The environmental activities can include anything from lobbying for electrification to better waste management.

One can see from the timetable that not all stages on the timetable had been reached at the time of the review. For instance, the stage of evaluating outcomes was two years away. Monitoring occurs throughout the intervention and this will be discussed as an aspect of ensuring relevant outcomes. Environmental development (planning and implementing safety modifications in the physical environment) is only beginning to get underway and will be discussed in terms of measuring impact which can take us through the first half of 2003 but not beyond.

GETTING STARTED

As established, the ISHS-CPA works within five-year timeframes for establishing evidence for best practices. Within the first two years of an intervention it is critical to get baseline studies for measuring change and for developing site-specific interventions. The CPA will enter the community and locate informal community leaders. Those that are interested will help with access and to identify others who can be trained to collect epidemiological data.

The trust-building stage is not unproblematic and takes about a year. It involves networking with the multitude of gatekeepers one finds in communities competing for scarce resources. One staff member told the reviewer, 'If you fail to consult them all, your process will be stopped along the way.' Staff also offered two pieces of advice that substantiates lessons learnt in other interventions: (1) start with the local councillor and then address the other gatekeepers at every level; (2) articulate clearly how the intervention benefits the community.

The ISHS designs questionnaires for the epidemiological data collection so these can be utilised by trained volunteers. The information identifies the extent of crime, violence and injury according to demographic details and injury profiles. Interestingly, this is recorded according to the scene of injury allowing for some geographical targeting of responses. The epidemiological study is good practice and is similar to the safety audits discussed in previous chapters. In this case, however, community members collect the data and gain skills in the process. The analysis remains with a highly professional group, which is also good practice.

Once the survey is complete, the next step is to meet with the community and discuss ways to address the problems. The organisation distributes pamphlets and newsletters to all households providing information on the local patterns of violence. From this, discussions follow with formal and informal leadership structures.

In the initial stages, volunteers are used to help mobilise the community and to advise in the process of entry; and they are then trained to collect the household epidemiological data that informs the intervention. Ultimately, some 10 to 20 volunteers are recruited for training in each community. Training is fairly intensive since it is offered about 10 to 12 times per year, for about three years. This leads to an understanding of social health issues, data collection, community organising, fund-raising, project management, lobbying and advocacy. Eventually the

volunteers prepare relevant documentation for funding proposals and are able to submit advocacy documents to the government regarding environmental modifications needed in their community.

Community acceptance of the safety promotion team is neither automatic nor easy. The CPA facilitators and directors will take a lead role in overcoming the blockages to effective service owing to rivalry, competition and gatekeepers. There can be difficult power struggles any time a new structure is being developed in a community by an external group (see also Chapter Two). In Thembelihle, for example, there were interest groups that did not want the volunteers back since they 'broke ranks' by choosing to move to Vlakfontein. There were service providers (i.e. people in a public health clinic) who felt that the volunteer team was assuming their designated community role. Suspicion also arose because the volunteers who engaged in research could be seen as 'information gatherers' (a perspective emanating from a history of apartheid).

Volunteerism is not unproblematic either. Volunteers are not paid and sometimes do not complete required tasks such as the registry for monthly home visits. Often only a small group within the larger team is strongly motivated. Sometimes volunteer services are imparted on the basis of familiarity (a volunteer's church group) rather than according to strategic targets. There is also attrition, a potentially huge problem. One facilitator said, 'You train 35, end up with 14, and then four or five actually do the work.' The CPA believes this system does work but requires a significant investment of time to make it stable. Some of the effective ways for working with volunteers are listed under lessons learnt by the organisation. One of the key ways mentioned here is that there needs to be one strong champion: a highly committed volunteer coordinator who facilitates planning meetings, liaises with the CPA facilitator and organises the team. This validates the practice of identifying change agents.

The CPA plays a strong facilitative role in recruiting the service coalition of NGOs, academics, agencies, businesses and government departments that will participate. Presentations are made to these groups explaining the intervention. Those that elect to participate might include police, paralegal services or a fire brigade. An intervention (often training) is then worked out between three partners: (1) the CPA; (2) the volunteer structure and (3) the service coalition. The CPA staff recommended also including the ward councillor in these processes.

ENSURING RELEVANT CRIME PREVENTION

At least seven processes contribute to the monitoring of the intervention including:

- 1 A facilitator holds weekly supervision meetings with groups of volunteers to ensure progress and relevant activities.
- 2 The volunteers submit weekly progress reports that are reviewed.
- 3 A home visit registry is maintained that identifies injury and resilience (for monitoring and evaluation).
- 4 The facilitators and CPS staff meet weekly to discuss progress.
- 5 A monthly meeting is held by video conference between the Cape Town and Johannesburg branches to exchange information on practices, problems and strategies.
- 6 Yearly process evaluations are done.
- 7 An external annual review is carried out.

For the weekly meetings, the volunteers are asked to record everything they do and to maintain a register of contacts so that their activities can be monitored properly. The next two items in the monitoring of the intervention are evaluation elements. The home visitation record taken by the volunteers will allow for an eventual impact evaluation of injury prevention. This will not take place until the end of the project but is monitored. Monitoring also takes place with staff meetings in each location and between them by teleconference. In the meantime, there are *process* evaluations, which are completed internally to examine the delivery strategy and implementation. There were two external evaluations of ISHS but these were infrequent (1998, 2000) and had a very academic focus with limited value for reviewing the intervention. The last item, the external annual review, consists of an advisory group of public health scientists and policy-makers from various disciplines who serve as a quality control board. They make sure that methodological rigour is being used in the research.

In terms of this review, the training is probably the key element for ensuring relevant outcomes. After all, the idea is to empower women leaders. There are a large number of training sessions with the volunteers at a very early stage. These are site-specific based on the research findings and the intervention that is developed in partnership with service providers, the CPA and the volunteer group. Training covers the following subjects:

- HIV/Aids.
- First aid.
- Domestic violence and child abuse.
- Child traffic safety and accident prevention.
- Safety promotion strategies.
- Public speaking, mediation and advocacy skills.
- Project management including mobilisation, finances and writing skills.
- Legal information.

This involves about ten training workshops per year over three years. Much of it is facilitated by the CPA but involves collaboration with service providers. The CPA is developing teaching manuals as part of the best practices study. It is hoped that the manuals furnished to these communities will help sustain their work. The CPA is also working on accreditation and believes that certificated courses are a best practice for empowering members of these communities.

Another tactic for ensuring relevant outcomes is the production of materials for the community. This includes a newsletter called 'Community Safety News' and certain 'technical' reports that offer information about issues of safety pertinent to the targeted locations. These devices can empower the volunteers with good information and be used to inform the community. The newsletter might provide an important link between researchers and the community. The newsletter is written plainly in the local language and is therefore accessible whereas the internationally disseminated research publications are too academic and theoretical for immediate employment by community members.

MEASURING IMPACT

The ISHS-CPA regularly evaluates their interventions in accordance with the goal of generating research critical to developing a public health model. Process evaluations are conducted every six months and then there is a final impact assessment that covers several years of work. The focus on a replicable model pushes the outcome evaluation to a late stage as seen in the delivery strategy. The evaluation will measure change from the original baseline and the baseline data is sound. It involved multiple indicators and both quantitative and qualitative data for *measuring* change. Therefore, we must await the long-term results on this particular project to make any clear statements on impact.

It is worth noting that the baseline studies had a measurable impact on change. It was sharing baseline data with the community that led to the formation of the CPA. In another example, the publication of statistics on the startling number of people dying or being injured along a highway adjacent to Eldorado Park drove an advocacy campaign that led the government to build a bridge over the highway for residents. So, there are beneficial impacts associated with the continuous research programme.

The four expected outcomes for the best practices project are given in the CPA objectives and will serve as a guideline for evaluating impact:

- To facilitate a decrease in the incidence of violence, injuries arising from violence, falls, burns and other unintentional factors thereby promoting safety and well-being.
- To enhance the capacity of women to promote safety and prevent violence and injury.
- To enhance resiliency and promote protective behaviours among at-risk groups, particularly women.
- To encourage relevant stakeholders, including community representatives and leaders, to advocate for the implementation of safety policies.

The first objective cannot be assessed without an outcome evaluation. In Broadlands Park, the participant focus group said crime had gone down owing to flood lights, speed bumps and a neighbourhood watch but it could not be determined that this was due to the safety promotion team. In the case of the relocation from Thembelihle to Vlakfontein injury appears to have risen, not only in terms of the relocation conflict but also in terms of the influx of crime. Vlakfontein is rapidly expanding with new informal settlers.

Clearly, the other three objectives have probably been reached to some degree based on observations, testimony and the kind of outcome described owing to advocacy (e.g. the new bridge described above).

In the reviewer's assessment, the output that is of greatest value in this intervention is not taking place in the target community. This is an applied research project. The synthesis between data from the test sites and analysis by ISHS scholars produces insights that we can use to better design crime prevention programmes. The ISHS is one of the only institutes in Africa helping us to systematically identify both the risk/resilience factors and the intervention practices that refine our crime prevention strategies. In the absence of any final outcome evaluation, the reviewer did wonder if being part of a university-linked and research-heavy programme did not limit delivery on the ground. Integrating universities with poor communities on the urban fringe seemed likely to weigh the

focus toward research production. This may be evident in that the CPA has only one full-time facilitator in the Lenasia office for the two target communities but a score of affiliated researchers. However, universities are increasing their community outreach and it is probably premature to decide on this. Perhaps CSOs and universities are moving toward each other with CSOs adopting more rigorous research programmes and universities engaging in more outreach. It certainly seems worthwhile to integrate more methodological rigour into CSO work and the public health model offers some avenues without any loss of organisational identity. This is addressed in the concluding chapter.

Research approaches of this kind have long-term value for our society if balance and collaboration is achieved between universities and the non-profit sector of civil society. One offers long-term experience in the theories and evidence that inform our interventions while the other has long-term experience in the area of service delivery. It is important to share experiences. Civil society organisations might achieve this by simply employing the Institute's research information in developing appropriate intervention strategies or through collaboration. For instance, the Youth Risk Behaviour Study undertaken by Crime, Violence and Injury Lead Programme (ISHS and the MRC) can help every school and youth-based intervention take better account of risk and resilience factors in crime prevention. The national surveillance systems for injury (fatal and non-fatal) also undertake spatial analysis that could well contribute to the precise geographical targeting of our interventions. The MRC-Unisa partnership also works with NGOs to empower them with research skills, impart information about the public health model and build capacity. This is probably a good way for NGOs to learn how to include social health methodologies in their crime prevention programmes.

Aside from the utility of the research, it was difficult to find hard evidence of crime prevention or crime reduction impact. The reviewer was not supplied with the evaluations although these are conducted every six months. There are the place-specific impacts that were offered in participant focus groups.

Thembelihle

The intervention was undermined by removals as described earlier forcing a re-establishment of the programme at Vlakfontein. However, one volunteer from the safety promotion team stayed behind and still visits some neighbourhood households on a weekly basis to provide services to residents requiring home-based aftercare.

Vlakfontein

The Safety Promotion Team of 17 people from Thembelihle developed a new 'client' base here. It must restart the home visitation project because of the move. The team registered as a non-profit organisation and are now engaged in fund-raising activities. Among these is a road safety campaign owing to the many deaths along the Golden Highway that runs next to the area. The volunteers are seeking to organise equipment for first aid. TB prevention education and HIV/Aids awareness are also two projects of concern. Environmental targeting is also underway with an income-generating waste management project. It is also notable that the research skills developed among the group were utilised by a number of organisations. For instance, they were employed as census-takers in 2001.

Eldorado Park

The Safety Promotion Team of 20 people organised paraffin safety demonstrations to prevent paraffin poisoning among children. They also organised marches protesting drug and alcohol abuse, which are seen to be a fundamental source of the problem. They appear to face an uphill battle on crime reduction issues. There are some 50 cases of domestic violence per day and child abuse is also spiralling out of control. Gangs, crime, alcoholism and drugs seem rife.

Nomzamo

The safety promotion team of 14 volunteers has functioned for three years but does not yet function independently. It has research capacity owing to the initial baseline study. The safety promotion team was also at loggerheads with the clinic, which was resistant to their community role.

Broadlands Park

The safety promotion team of ten volunteers has also functioned for three years and has significant research capacity. It also has its own office and operates as a CBO independently of the CPA. It designs and conducts community workshops. In focus group the participants said turnout was low for these events.

MAKING AN EXIT

The organisation's exit strategy is based on progressing from an initial volunteer organisation to a fund-raising Section 21 company. Fund-raising skills, leadership and project management are part of the package of training offered to the volunteers leading to this outcome. Good facilitation also plays a role. The result is an NGO, CBO or non-profit group with a recognised legal status. For instance, the Vlakfontein and Broadlands Park volunteers have already achieved this. In both those examples, these new organisations are pushing ahead with projects without direct consultation with the NGO, which is part of the aim: fostering the self-reliance necessary to sustain safety promotion groups. Nonetheless, these groups are not yet financially strong and still have CPA support.

Since the key to the exit strategy is based on a volunteer structure one must ask if this is sustainable owing to attrition rates. One must be very careful in working with volunteers in a research-based effort. They are poor, under-resourced and seeking employment. Many of their activities are perceived in these terms and therefore there should not be the false expectation that altruism guides their activities. Many are engaged in the effort for improving their CVs, getting a letter of recommendation or eventual employment. Once they obtain jobs, the structures could disappear especially in the absence of the CPA.

The ISHS-CPA indicated that there is attrition, but that it has been remarkably low. Vlakfontein has remained stable at 17 volunteers since 1999. In all the interventions the initial core group still comprises in excess of 50% of the members. Valued training and a serious investment of time (the five-year plans) may make a difference. The ISHS-CPA also intends to support these groups until they are 'sustainable' but this may not resolve the problem since the newly engaged non-profit organisation must face this too. Furthermore, registration as an NGO or CBO is no guarantee of success and the reviewer could not find any hard evidence that these organisations were likely

to survive without the CPA although the political will and the structure was there for two communities (Vlakfontein and Broadlands Park).

KEY LESSONS LEARNT (offered by the organisation)

- 'The identity of the safety promotion team is critical and one must help forge this. As silly as it may sound, the T-shirt is an important demarcation of identity.'
- 'There must be consistent procedural practices for dealing with volunteers. Inconsistent practices can lead to distrust and confusion.'
- 'Facilitator continuity is vital and change-over of staff damaging in interventions of this kind.'
- 'Know that this is an energy-intensive kind of intervention. Volunteerism works if you invest the time and energy but fails if the organisation does not have this commitment.'
- 'Do not depend on altruism as if you were engaging high-income or middle-class volunteers. People need jobs and a foot in the door. Help them build their CVs. Support small business groups and enterprises too.'
- 'Create a resource centre that volunteers can utilise. Phones, faxes and a place to meet are important. Also create some kind of facility in the community if possible'. [Note: the CPA used a container to create an office at Vlakfontein.]
- 'Know the group dynamics of the community and especially the gatekeepers or the intervention will not move very far forward. This includes ward councillors, people in clinics and other kinds of pre-existing health forums or groups.'
- 'Don't duplicate the work of another NGO already in the neighbourhood. Instead, target the NGO or CBO and help them to deliver.'

KEY LESSONS LEARNT (offered by the volunteers)

This section is added to distinguish the comments above and since so many volunteers emphasised communication skills:

- 'Encourage people to use their minds and not to be dependent on others. We must organise ourselves and do it ourselves.'
 - 'Knowing communication skills is the key to success. You have to respect people and know how to approach them, even your body language is important.'
 - 'The best thing I learnt was how to listen. I also learned to communicate better at home.'
- 'I learnt a lot about communication skills and how to share problems and ideas with the community.'
- 'I know now that I can contribute and that I am not just living for myself. I can really help uplift other people and that brings great satisfaction.'
- 'The most important training we received was conflict resolution. This helped to both prevent and resolve conflicts in the community.'

REVIEWER'S COMMENTS

The quality of the research and its integration into pilot studies is impressive as is the public health perspective. The first furnishes us with an incredible amount of well-researched and well-analysed information on targeting risk and resilience factors that can be employed in our interventions. The second, the social health perspective, is probably the element of greatest value for the review. In the final analysis, we must consider whether or not this perspective is more effective than a security or development perspective since it directly identifies and targets the risk factors in the social production of crime. It is a model based on a *scientific* approach to prevention, rather than styled after a government policy. The starting point is not a white paper but *data* that identifies a problem via research. Interventions are then designed to address the problem. The intervention includes seven critical elements that ensure methodological rigour in programme design. This is then monitored, evaluated and repeated with a better intervention the next time.

While the perspective and the research offer tremendous value, it seems that the actual targets of the particular programme reviewed are problematic (volunteers in these communities). They need jobs and job programmes. While many in focus group discussions expressed altruistic sentiments, the conversation did turn to their need to develop professional skills. Most enter the programme to give the CPA what it needs in order to get what they need (skills, a better CV, a letter of recommendation, more contacts). When a volunteer in a participant focus group was asked about her role in the CPA, she said, 'I do research in exchange for skills.' Individual impacts are not enough to reduce crime levels. The focus on social support is quite valuable for community safety issues but does not address criminality in a strong enough way to bring about crime reduction. Most perpetrators are men and a good strategy has to take full account of the gender dynamics. The environmental interventions are likely to be the ones that are most sustainable and have the widest impact but these were neither fully underway nor evaluated at the time of the review.

Locating impact in this intervention was difficult in terms of the objectives of the review (crime prevention/reduction). Part of this owes to a wide mix of safety and security concerns. A reduction in traffic deaths is a major impact in terms of the intervention but is not the focus of the review. Therefore the injury focus has to be limited to intentional injury when we adopt the public health approach. Otherwise, we create an overwhelming set of diverse interventions that do not always pertain to crime prevention/reduction.

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7

CAPACITY BUILDING IN WARD-LEVEL INSTITUTIONS

Participative Development Initiative (PDI)

INTRODUCTION

This chapter describes crime prevention interventions undertaken from a sustainable development perspective. It is unlike the approaches from a security framework discussed in the first few chapters, and also differs from the public health model discussed in the last chapter. A Durban-based NGO targets *existing* institutions with capacity building at *ward* level (e.g. schools, police and development forums) in three disadvantaged urban communities and one rural one. Social crime prevention becomes a component of local level development as the efforts of various institutions are integrated with a common plan.

The targeting of existing institutions within a participatory and developmental framework seems to have advantages and disadvantages. The exit was also smooth and left sustainable projects behind. The chief disadvantage seemed to be a reliance on capacity building through training and a participatory approach. Those approaches that are guided by an audit or an epidemiological study seem more focused. Those using a participatory approach can result in quite a range of activities with mixed outcomes. Marches, leaflets, sewing groups, road works, HIV/Aids awareness campaigns, CPF training, craft-making, gardening and brick-making can all result and did. An audit or epidemiological study at the beginning could focus participants and create some methodological rigour in the intervention design. It is very difficult to correlate activities with clear outcomes unless they are part of a methodological approach that first identifies the specific problems being targeted.

ORGANISATIONAL BACKGROUND

Participative Development Initiative (PDI) is a Durban-based NGO established in 1997. Its purpose was to promote sustainable development, as was defined by the United Nations through Local Agenda 21. This philosophy inspired the founder of the organisation (and its current director) to promote sustainable development in Durban. The need for it was clearly evident in the post-1994 development plans for disadvantaged communities. Development was seen by local participants and councillors as infrastructure and housing. The key aspects of human development, environmental awareness and protection and social safety, were all neglected in the development of townships and underdeveloped areas.

PDI seeks to create awareness in local disadvantaged communities of what sustainable development actually is and to initiate projects and programmes that will enable legitimate and established community organisations to build and sustain development initiatives. However, PDI strategic planning with the target groups always revealed that this could not be achieved without a reduction in crime. Crime prevention and reduction is a vital aspect of sustainable development as it assists in creating a suitable and conducive environment for economic activity and prosperity.

Since high crime levels were found to lower the rate of investment in Durban and to complicate sustainable development, PDI sought and received funding from the Open Society Foundation in 2000 to address this. PDI then embarked on social crime prevention programmes in three urban areas of Durban. A fourth rural area (also within the Durban Metro) was added in 2002.

Programmes for HIV/Aids awareness is also an element of holistic and sustainable development. This final component explains PDI's three interrelated programmes:

- 1 Institutional Capacity Building.
- 2 Social Crime Prevention.
- 3 Sinethemba HIV/Aids.

In a sense, it is all one programme because they are so integrated but funding varies for the different components. Altogether, PDI works in 17 communities. This includes independent projects in youth development and juvenile reintegration in Inanda.

The organisation has developed plans to target all places where it works with a social crime prevention component.

PROGRAMME THEORY

Many of the programmes described in the review took security frameworks as the departure point for their intervention theories (i.e. the 1996 National Crime Prevention Strategy or the 1998 *White Paper on Safety and Security*). The departure point for the PDI is sustainable development as formulated through the United Nations Local Agenda 21 Action Programme. According to the organisation, this refers to holistic development that is initiated, coordinated and owned by local people. In this context, crime prevention is not a mission in its own right

but a component of development planning. According to PDI Director Ashish Ramgobin:

Crime does not exist in a vacuum. Crime prevention goes with HIV/Aids treatment and prevention, poverty alleviation and a whole host of other components we call development.¹

PDI understands crime to be a major hindrance to sustainable development and therefore integrates it into a programme theory based on institutional capacity-building. By identifying the significant institutions in a community and capacitating them with the tools for sustainable development, social crime prevention is addressed. In theory, crime prevention is seen a component to be incorporated into many aspects of development planning. It is a significant component because development cannot be achieved in a crime-ridden environment.

Interestingly, PDI is similar to the ISS but unlike NIM, UMAC or the CPA in its opposition to adding any new structures into a community. The organisation argues that an integrated approach to service delivery means taking cognisance of what exists rather than adding to it. This developmental approach means respecting a community and its way of operating but strengthening its institutions when asked. PDI wants to promote an integrated approach to service delivery but believes that creating a new structure can ultimately undermine such an effort. According to the Director:

Our sustainable development approach to poverty came out of the struggle and working with NGOs. We learned that you cannot empower people. You have to acknowledge what they have and find the way to sustain it. And have an exit strategy.²

PDI focuses on all available institutions at ward level as the sustainable group and finds that there are already local institutions trying to achieve integrated governance. This often brings a central focus on a development forum (and the associated ward committee) since this is the where such integrated planning takes place. These already operate independently of PDI. So, in this sense, a good exit strategy is one that targets legitimate and established structures, adds value and exits.

STRUCTURES

PDI's focus on capacitating government-recognised institutions is different than many interventions that might focus on creating a new structure (UMAC, NIM, CPA) or even try to bring together 'role-players' (ISS, CSV, Idasa). PDI works with the way a community is *already* organised. 'We do not do the whole role-player thing', said the Director, 'We work with existing organisations.' This makes it worthwhile to consider the existing structures that PDI tends to target.

The kinds of institutions that interest PDI are those that are legislated and part of the development forum. For most of the areas reviewed, there is a general pattern with regard to structures targeted by PDI. These are the usual ones: development forums and ward committees, schools, youth groups, police and the CPF. There are exceptions such as the traditional authority at Umbumbulu.

PDI is very interested in working with development forums and the ward committees which have been integrated onto that structure. This is because these are the structures that:

'PDI works with the way a community is already organised.'

- Integrate role-players from various departments and tiers of governances along with CBOs, NGOs and CSOs.
- Can be sustained in local budgets.
- Have feedback to metro council through a ward councillor.
- Work on integrated development plans.
- Are community-owned and developed.
- Are receptive to social crime prevention planning.

Once the development forum produces a crime prevention plan, PDI is usually *directed* to work with the other participating institutions. Often this involves the community police forum, the police, youth, and schools and women's groups.

In most areas, PDI found that the CPFs were not functioning adequately. In one case, the CPF was non-existent. One cannot advance in crime prevention if basic structures of good governance are missing. A certain degree of functionality is required. So, the CPFs are targeted as a means of facilitating service delivery through improved community-police relations. In three target areas (Clermont-KwaDabeka, Shallcross and Cato Manor) success in fighting certain crimes (e.g. housebreaking, drug offences and child abuse) followed from facilitating more functional CPFs.


The police are often enthusiastic change agents who are found to be co-operating with other institutions. They have youth desks and are central to such issues as crime prevention, victim support or domestic violence. Yet they often lack capacity for these roles. Sometimes police members are not literate enough to take proper statements. Others need training in how to work with youth. Linkages between schools and police can offer great value but not if the basic functioning of this institution is impaired. Thus, they are a central development concern.

Youth groups and schools are targeted as fundamental subjects for social crime prevention. Young people are frequently offenders and are the most frequent victims of crime. They are also targeted by criminals in drugs and arms syndicates wanting to avoid prosecution. They have been marginalised and are an appropriate international target for crime prevention. Including youth in and out of schools is international good practice, as it is internationally accepted that the best place to deal with crime prevention outside the home is in the school and preferably in early childhood.

Women leadership often fits into the developmental framework because they have been historically marginalised and are frequent victims of crime in disadvantaged communities. They also offer practical leadership. For instance, trauma management and victim support programmes are often effectively operated by women who offer sensitive care regarding issues of domestic and sexual violence. Their talents are also under-utilised and can result in profitable enterprises with appropriate facilitation. Entrepreneurial enterprise is one of the best ways to build the resilience of women to crime as the CPA, NIM and the PDI have all found and therefore integrated into their interventions (see also Idasa in Chapter Eight).

GEOGRAPHICAL TARGETING

FIGURE TEN: THE PDI CRIME PREVENTION AND TARGET AREAS FOR INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING



'We cannot expect local people to know enough about crime prevention without some expert assistance.'

PDI concentrates its social crime prevention work in the four areas identified in **Figure Ten**. This includes:

- 1 Cato Manor.
- 2 Clermont-KwaDabeka.
- 3 Shallcross.
- 4 Umbumbulu.

All of these are disadvantaged, high-crime areas falling within the Durban Metropolitan Area. The first three are urban but the last is rural. PDI has been working in the urban locations since March 2000 and added the rural area in 2001.

Geographical targeting refers to issues of distance, scale and human patterns on a landscape of which crime would be one. PDI has no problems of targeting in terms of distance. All these are within easy reach of the Durban office. Concentrating on areas within reach can be seen as a good practice.

With regard to scale, PDI targets institutions found at ward level. This is one of the most manageable targets: it prioritises depth over breadth because it allows for intensive work with a variety of interrelated institutions. PDI also finds that the ward scale reduces conflict. For instance, Umbumbulu is a rural district of a metropolitan area that includes more than one ward and more than one traditional authority. PDI targets Sobonakhona (one ward) that falls under one traditional authority (an inkosi and six izinduna). In the district there is factional fighting but within the ward, conflict is minimised (Sobonakhona is mainly IFP). PDI also considers the policing area in the context of the ward. So, effectively it targets both while looking for impact at ward level.

In terms of human settlement, there was no audit of crime patterns and it is this element that is deemed missing in terms of review findings and that discussion will be fitted into the next chapter (one can also review Chapter Four).

The geographical and environmental variations between the areas are quite substantial. Shallcross is a former group area of mainly Indian residents who are surrounded by new informal settlements. Clermont-KwaDabeka is very mixed ethnically (Sotho and Xhosa settlers in Clermont adjacent to a Zulu area) and in terms of landscape (urban and peri-urban areas bordering the industrial centre of Pinetown). Cato Manor is a large, mixed area of informal settlement with new RDP housing and major new infrastructure right in the heart of Durban. Umbumbulu is a traditional Zulu rural area south of Durban but part of the new metro.

The geographical variation in these disadvantaged urban areas is instructive. Participatory approaches generate responses to geographical and human variations and this is to be valued as appropriate. However, one must then thoroughly capacitate the participants. We cannot expect local people to know enough about crime prevention without some expert assistance. An intervention simply aimed at 'making a difference' according to a negotiated range of individual inputs can result in disaster if one is not careful. Money and energy can be poured into projects that are not well analysed. No disaster was located but impact was uneven and the evaluation has not been done. The Director, the facilitator, the participants and involved institutions negotiate ideas but there is no research-based practice offering methodological rigour and this needs to be added to complete an otherwise well-considered geographical approach.

DELIVERY STRATEGY OR PROCESS GUIDELINES

The delivery strategy can be given in ten steps based on documentation and interviews:

1. Sign a contract for delivery with ward-level institutions that request assistance in strengthening their institutional capacity and individual skills.
2. Introduce the services of the PDI to the community and conduct a needs assessment to see what kind of training, facilitation and local development is needed.
3. Engage in visioning exercises to see what participants want to achieve.
4. Develop a strategic plan for projects in the ward and a training strategy based on assessed needs and the stated goals of the participants.
5. Initiate training for identified participants from development committees, community organisations, interest groups and local government representatives for a train-the-trainer approach.
6. The trained groups are consolidated and the trainee community facilitators co-facilitate with PDI facilitators toward generating development plans.
7. A plan is then developed with indicators and measures for these (for crime prevention components this is for each category of crime).
8. The target institution determines what capacity building needs to take place to carry out the plan, and ensure its sustainability.
9. Implementation takes place by the institution and PDI takes direction from local implementation teams regarding any further training and facilitation.
10. The targeted institution monitors the indicators to see what has changed and what ongoing changes need to take place in order to ensure the sustainability and impact of the projects.

The community, represented by an established community-based organisation or a group of organisations, takes the first step by *inviting* PDI to facilitate a strategic planning process. This is to inform their own development planning and identify the gaps in their institutional capacity. This places ownership of the intervention with the community from the start, and entrenches the strength and legitimacy of the representative organisations. There are many good practices contained within that approach so a very detailed discussion of the PDI entrance strategy follows in the next section (see Getting Started).

After contracting its services, PDI facilitators familiarise themselves with the community through an informal needs assessment. Facilitators interview local authorities, developers, members of development committees and community organisations with an interest in development. This covers prioritised needs, areas of conflict, factors that support and impede development, and gauges the level of democratic governance and human rights functioning.

In the reviewer's opinion, the needs assessment is the weakest aspect of this approach. It informs training but does not capacitate the community with sound information. Plans, activities and training choices are generated through decision-making amongst participants, mostly new to the subject matter of crime prevention. There is no safety audit to guide them. There is no clear identification of risk factors, no epidemiology and no professional research. Therefore, what is generated through visioning and training might not ensure a reduction in crime. The institutions are free to come up with interventions that might or might not work.

It appears that without a study to better inform participants, the results are haphazard, leading to uneven impact. As described in the section on impact, PDI has enjoyed mixed results. Either an audit or an epidemiological study should be professionally undertaken. This will be discussed further in the section on Ensuring Relevant Crime Prevention Outcomes.

PDI develops training materials suited to each community based on the needs assessment and the needs identified by the participants. The quality of training is an area of organisational concentration. Most of the materials relate to the *skills* required to deliver on projects and programmes including:

- Basic and advanced conflict management skills.
- Small business development and management.
- Counselling skills.
- Proposal writing and fund-raising.
- Leadership development.
- The principles of sustainable development.
- Trust and team-building.
- Community policing and crime prevention.
- Gender awareness and sensitivity.
- Customer care.
- Democracy and human rights.
- Project management.
- Basic office management.

Since the objective is to develop institutional capacity so that community structures can sustain their own projects and programmes, the training emphasises *skills*.

There is also process for implementing skills. From within the training groups, community facilitators are selected based on stringent criteria and training is initiated to enable them to sustain the project after PDI exits. They learn to (1) manage conflict; (2) mentor project teams; and (3) develop key strategies for community development. This is a good practice since it puts conflict management mechanisms into the community. Furthermore, empowering local leaders is a practice that introduces into disadvantaged communities a sense of hope and validity. They too can produce people to develop their own communities. They see that they do not need to rely on outside assistance. This process also reduces the overhead costs of the organisation as the only costs are the time of the facilitators and provision of materials.

Training seems to achieve a greater coordination between the groups because the need for integrated planning becomes more apparent. Previously isolated groups are able to consolidate their efforts and issue a joint strategic plan. The territoriality among different development sectors seems to dissolve but there is no specific explanation of this in PDI documents. It seems that in practice, PDI does guide the groups in this direction

meaning that facilitators do have an agenda and seek to change structure. That delivery strategy contradicts the programme theory.

The last itemised role of monitoring by the targeted institution (most likely, the development forum) is good practice. We have already seen that this was critical to the intervention in the Govan Mbeki Municipality (Chapter Four) where the Department of Public Safety took on this task in partnership with the council. One must be careful, however. Local-level monitoring does not replace the need for the organisation to monitor and evaluate its own intervention practices. PDI has systems for this as discussed in the appropriate sections below.

GETTING STARTED

PDI was the only organisation in the review that did not struggle with a long trust-building phase in the initial stages of their work. Instead, all staff regarded entry as 'quick'. The entrance strategy is based on a set of principles found within organisational culture and philosophy. The reviewer found eight of these to be instructive:

1. PDI does not target any community where it is not invited.
2. PDI targets only government-recognised institutions.
3. PDI insists on signing an immediate contract to deliver.
4. PDI declares its funding amount up front.
5. PDI gives the institutions a defined budget for catering and transport.
6. PDI avoids duplication in services.
7. PDI does not create unrealistic expectations.
8. PDI situates conflict management and problem-solving with the target group.

By working by invitation only, PDI is not trying to market an idea or sell a product or lead a mission. There is never a requirement of 'buy-in'. PDI constructs itself as an agent for improved service delivery that can be contracted by interested parties. According to the PDI Director:

We do not target communities where we are not invited. People write or come into the office. We were first invited to work with development forums in Clermont and Cato Manor. Later all the ward-level IDP teams were meeting in Durban City Hall and there they heard about PDI.³

Conflict over entry is greatly minimised because PDI only targets government-recognised institutions that are believed to have legitimacy. These are in part a ward councillor's concerns too. Therefore there is a low-conflict point of entry into the community and council (without having to deal with the council directly). There is also local recognition that the legitimate role-players need to work together in new forms of integrated governance. Since this is part of the PDI mission, their service fits well with local politics. PDI also works with all factions and never attempts to bring structures together that are resistant to collaboration. Thus, unlike many organisations, PDI will not attempt to change a structure nor 'conflict manage' its way into a community. Problem-solving remains a community concern.

Reminding one of a lesson learnt by ISS, PDI negotiates an immediate contract that very clearly explains what is expected of each party. This includes some clear budgetary responsibilities. According to PDI staff, 'Give people money to manage and they learn to manage money.' So, as part of an empowerment tool, the targeted institution is given a budget for catering and transport. PDI is also very clear about what funds it has available and how these will be spent. This reduces suspicions about NGOs. 'It is not a donor-saviour approach,' said the Director, 'we are a very transparent service provider and this works.'

PDI also makes a point of knowing who is working in the ward and of not duplicating the efforts of other organisations. PDI creates strategic partnerships with organisations such as the KwaZulu-Natal Council of Churches or the Centre for Sustainable Development. Such structures are brought into partnership when they are engaged in a related effort or because the community's development strategy requires such input. Otherwise, PDI does not get involved in creating structures or forging partnerships for the community. Thus, it never has to solve conflicts between competing groups such as we saw between CSFs and CPFs or between safety promotion teams and the health clinic workers.

The organisation facilitates the visions and plans of the community, rather than introducing an agenda. This means strategic planning skills and the production of business plans are emphasised, based on what the community wants to achieve.

PDI does not try to resolve conflicts but empowers institutions to resolve their own conflicts. For instance, if the development forum appears not to include everyone that it 'should' include, PDI does not force the issue. It works with the role-players that are networked and capacitates them to network and manage conflict but they choose the pace of advancement. So, PDI will not solve problems for the institutions but will offer the skills for participants to do this themselves. To this end, it trains community facilitators (about five in each area) in an accredited programme to facilitate local conflict handling. At least one-third comprises targeted youth and women. Undoubtedly this is a good practice but one that would have to be monitored and sustained over a period of years to ensure a relevant outcome. Much of that kind of capacity is born of experience and not just training.

No intervention is conflict-free. Most of conflicts are identified in the course of training and facilitation. One of the conflicts familiar to staff that has not been highlighted previously is age prejudice. Sometimes older people do not want to listen to young people and prevent them from making a contribution. PDI has three methods for handling this in group discussion. First, stereotyping is discussed and how categorising people by age is little different than categorising people by race, height, gender or some other criteria. Secondly, the facilitators will have the targeted group engage in visioning exercises. One facilitator said, 'This helps people to see that their visions cannot be achieved through divisions but only through acting in a united way.' Third, power is discussed because divisions are often due to unequal power relations: 'We show people that power can be used in many ways and we try to get people to use their power constructively.'

ENSURING RELEVANT CRIME PREVENTION OUTCOMES

Theoretically, empowering people to make the appropriate choices is a sustainable approach to developmental

interventions. However, participatory processes can be among the most difficult for ensuring a relevant outcome in relation to crime prevention. The difficulty is that people newly introduced to crime prevention may not be aware of what works and what does not. Often what seems like a good idea (e.g. information pamphlets, a march or a new sports ground) can actually have very little impact on crime prevention. Social crime prevention experts have difficulties designing effective programmes, so what about newly skilled participants from the community?

In interviews, PDI staff acknowledged that difficulty and offered some ways to ensure a relevant outcome. The principal area of service delivery is by way of facilitating a strategic planning process that leads the community to decide on its own course of development. This is where social crime prevention is fully addressed. According to a facilitator, it is integrated into the planning discussion because crime is a major hindrance to development and has to be addressed. The PDI staff said part of ensuring relevant outcomes was to be very specific about the crimes. 'One does not target crimes,' said a facilitator, 'one targets a specific crime.' So, crime prevention is integrated in terms of identifying the very specific kinds of crimes that disrupt development and then targeting those within the plan.

The reviewer would argue that the technique described so far is useful but needs to be augmented by professional research at the start of the intervention and with more concentrated training in social crime prevention. A safety audit approach would include all those elements discussed in Chapters Four, Eight and Nine to arrive at a clear understanding of the types of crimes, the capacity to address them and their locations within the context of the Durban Metro. This might be too security oriented for PDI which is developmental in character. So, it might be more appropriate to recommend an epidemiological approach that produced an accessible paper for the community on community risk and resilience factors in relationship to crime. This would merely guide and inform the target the group regarding where to focus but not change the participatory approach. Furthermore, the kind of training the CPA imparted to its volunteers on recognising risk and resilience factors and intervening appropriately would empower the staff.

Another way to ensure relevant outcomes is staff training. The PDI Director said, 'If the organisation is not professional internally, we will not get a professional result externally.' Contrary to PDI philosophy, one facilitator personally contributed to community activities such as transporting people to the police station to give statements in cases of child abuse or domestic violence. This 'enthusiasm' actually created a dependency syndrome that debilitated rather than strengthened the relevant institutions. The Director had to intervene to relocate mechanisms for sustaining the work inside the targeted structures. It also created an imbalance between the communities in terms of delivery because the facilitator was investing an intense amount of time and energy in only one of them. The Director, a fully accredited assessor and trainer in facilitation, has embarked on an organisational restructuring to increase professionalism. This will include integrating more research-based approaches into the organisational culture.

The techniques for monitoring the intervention are mainly in terms of management: (1) weekly, monthly and quarterly reports from facilitators, (2) briefing the Director regularly; and (3) quarterly management meetings that review all projects in terms of obligations to the community and the donor. The Director also visits the targeted institutions.

'Conflict over entry is greatly minimised as PDI only targets government-recognised institutions that are believed to have legitimacy.'

MEASURING IMPACT

No evaluation has been undertaken for the project although one was being planned during 2003. In 2001 a baseline of indicators was established for measuring outcomes that could be utilised in the three urban areas. Part of PDI's organisational restructuring is to formalise research processes, and it is doing this with increasing rigour. It now engages in three types of evaluations: impact, process and finance. The last does a proper accounting of staff costs in relation to output. After each of the evaluations, PDI holds a two-day workshop to discuss the results and to generate an action plan. The action plan is pasted on the wall in every office afterwards.

The following are some impacts assessed according to the reviewer's observations, focus groups, staff interviews and available documentation. It does reflect some important successes but some uncertain outcomes too. For instance, gardening in Umbumbulu was a success but block-making probably will not work out. As stated earlier, this uneven result owes mainly to a lack of baseline research and methodological rigour in the design of interventions. There were also contradictions between programme theory and delivery as previously described. Need assessments are undertaken in a participatory way but this is insufficient. Participation is not adequate for fully assessing the causal factors that produce crime and the capacity that is required to address it. The needs assessment could form only part of such a study that needs to be professionally done and with scientific rigour (e.g. safety audits or epidemiology).

The outcomes in each area are discussed below by area as evidence for the preceding statements.

1. Cato Manor

PDI's facilitated the Siyavikela Committee, a development forum composed of 15 representatives from CBOs, local government and the police. It is located at ward level and is voluntary. In three years, they have arrived at the stage of managing projects that operate from local government budgets. The projects are sustained and PDI is no longer facilitating. The projects include:

- A gardening project was established that provides healthy fresh food parcels to people living with TB and HIV/Aids.
- HIV/Aids support groups that operate from a local clinic and offer home-based care to the people of Cato Crest, Cato Manor and Chesterville.
- An education programme on crime prevention in Cato Manor and Chesterville schools.
- A profit-making sewing group that invites known perpetrators to join their informal meetings for discussion. In this manner, they evaluate what criminals are doing and attempt to intervene. Crime reduction is achieved through information sharing, values that change behaviour and raising the self-esteem of the participants through engagement in a profitable activity.

One of the more outstanding achievements was the marked improvement in community-police relations. The police were seen as unresponsive and uneven in their delivery of services. The police, on the other hand, saw themselves as short of resources and dealing with a policing area that was expanding with no increase in staff or equipment. The Siyavikela Committee found mechanisms to better resolve complaints and to improve police

responses (e.g. hotlines, awareness campaigns). This included a role for PDI in building police and CPF capacity in processing complaints and in trauma management (to reduce secondary victimisation and build resilience for reporting).

2. Shallcross

Delivery in this area targeted the development forum, police and schools for facilitation and capacity building. Forum work came to a standstill when it was decided that membership should be broadened geographically to include the black informal settlements adjacent to the mainly Indian-populated Shallcross. The intended result was more holistic development but racial conflict and power politics impeded progress instead.

PDI found itself working more closely with schools as the forum squabbled (consistent with its philosophy, PDI will not solve the conflict for the development forum). The intention is to impact on the behaviour of youth by integrating social crime prevention lessons into the curriculum.

Earlier work with the CPF had positive spin-offs: the community–police team are recording a stream of successes in arresting drug dealers.

3. Clermont/KwaDabeka

The CPF, SAPS and the development forum are united around a crime prevention plan. PDI worked through the development forum that wanted both schools and police targeted for training. This resulted in two police projects and two school projects with some linkages between them:

- Training to improve the relationship between police and CPF members.
- A victim empowerment programme and trauma centre at the KwaDabeka SAPS station.
- Targeting in-school and out-of-school youth with social crime prevention awareness and training.
- Empowering learner representative councils.

The Development forum is running these projects on its own funding. The biggest success among them is that the CPF now works very closely with police and is proactive (e.g. visible policing).

4. Umbumbulu

The approach to Umbumbulu is both developmental and within a security framework but since it is rural, it stands out as quite a different kind of intervention. First of all, it includes a traditional authority and its institutions. Economically, it is also farming based. A development forum, the Sobonakhona Development Society (SDS) was targeted with these results:

The CPF that had collapsed some years earlier is being revived through PDI training and facilitation.

Income-generating projects are being facilitated such as gardening and brick-making including sourcing materials and finding markets.

- An education programme on democracy and human rights is being introduced in the schools.
- Police are receiving adult basic education to increase literacy.
- The tribal court is working more closely with the police on reducing vigilantism.

The income-generating community garden project is the greatest success so far. The Inkosi easily allocated land while the Department of Agriculture was readily available for partnership. The result is that youth are involved in a community gardens project (i.e. carrots, cabbage and spinach) with the instruction and supervision of the Department of Agriculture. The block-making plan may not have been considered very well in terms of financing. It is too early to assess the results of other programmes.

MAKING AN EXIT

One of the most critical factors for ensuring a relevant outcome (as previously seen with the ISS intervention in Mpumalanga) is to keep ownership within the targeted group. The PDI exit strategy was part of the entrance strategy. Entrance and exit were not problematic: target only legitimate institutions, add value and leave. There is no need in an intervention of this kind to try to find someone in government to take over or house what the NGO has created. Full consideration of the exit strategy in the entrance strategy is good practice.

KEY LESSONS LEARNT [offered by the organisation]

- ‘One must be careful not to duplicate efforts and create alliances and partnerships with other organisations doing similar work in an area. Otherwise conflict can arise that is damaging to everyone.’
- ‘Social crime prevention fits into nearly all development programmes very nicely. We need to address it in order to encourage development. In one Durban community all the sewing machines were stolen from a sewing project causing devastation. So it must be integrated into everything we do.’
- ‘The practice of not imposing values, programmes and interventions on communities has enabled PDI to develop strong and sustainable relationships with community-based organisations. This strengthening of relationships leads to sustained projects and mentorship and support based on mutual respect and trust.’
- ‘Projects and teams cannot be mentored or supported by people or organisations that they do not trust. It is therefore essential to ensure that trust and reliability are established at the outset of the process.’
- ‘The methodology used in entry and exit of communities has enabled PDI to gain the support and participation of the local government officials and politicians, the local community leaders and the influential decision-makers in communities. This credibility has ensured that projects initiated are supported both financially by institutions or government departments and sustained by line functions in the municipality.’

‘It is necessary to draw clear distinctions between facilitators, project leaders and researchers. The organisation made the mistake of incorporating the functions of project leader and facilitator into one job function in order to reduce salary costs, but, unfortunately, it learnt the valuable lesson that it is more beneficial to an organisation to invest more money in skilled and professional staff than to reduce costs by employing semi-skilled people.’

- 'It is critical to improve the documentation and research capacity of the organisation in order to record the methodologies, philosophies and learning of the organisations for future references and for publication as learning tools for others.'
- 'The social crime prevention programme is invaluable in ensuring the transformation of local attitudes towards rehabilitation of offenders, development of social awareness of crime patterns and prevention mechanisms and the successful development of local economies of scale, at ward level.'
- 'Many social crimes at ward levels are inter-linked, and it is important for service providers working in this area to develop interventions and tools to assist communities to identify these linkages and get to the root cause of the crimes and eradicate it from there.'

REVIEWER'S COMMENTS

The geographical and institutional targeting, the entrance and exit strategy, and the programme theory are well defined and offer many examples of good practice. PDI recognises that communities already have their own institutions, leaders and projects. It seeks to identify and strengthen these on a manageable scale. At ward level it can work with all available institutions. Furthermore, PDI neither brings an agenda nor a new structure. This liberates energy for productive facilitation and training rather than constant conflict management and lobbying to get 'buy-in'. Envisioning itself as a service provider that maximises ownership in a community is good practice. It creates easy entrance and exit.

Remarkably, PDI works with groups when they have a common objective and yet does not attempt to impose any kind of co-operation or resolve their conflicts for them. Institutions advance at a suitable pace and make their own decisions. This greatly minimised conflict compared to all the other interventions reviewed.

The implementation strategy was not as rigorous as presented in delivery strategy. The facilitators enjoyed a great deal of independence and the delivery was based more on organisational culture than according to the outlined methodology. This produced contradictions between what was said in documents and what happened on the ground. Not every facilitator carried every principle of that culture forward and this affected outcomes as explained in the section on measuring impact. There were also contradictions between theory and practice which makes evaluation difficult (see Chapter Nine's section on 'Proposal and Delivery' for a full discussion).

The institutions that require empowerment need an injection of rigour as well. Some scientific tool must aid their selection of social crime prevention initiatives. A safety audit may not be entirely compatible with PDI's developmental framework. So, the CPA epidemiological approach that identifies risk factors and designs interventions to reduce these probably fits. It is recommended that this intervention's many good practices regarding *who* to target be combined with some of the CPA's methodological rigour on *how* to design an intervention. Likewise, the CPA could study the reverse from the PDI because a potential weakness is trying to create a new structure and not adequately recognising the community's legitimate structures.

'Envisioning itself as a service provider that maximises ownership in a community is good practice. It creates easy entrance and exit.'

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8

MULTI-SECTORAL CRIME PREVENTION IN A RURAL POLICING AREA

Idasa

INTRODUCTION

Sustainable development was examined in the last chapter as a possible paradigm for crime prevention work. The PDI effort had some significant strength but lacked the kind of baseline research that can really focus participants. The final initiative under review was also within an integrated sustainable development paradigm but this utilised a safety audit. It did mobilise the community and focused service delivery on issues of sustainable crime prevention practices. A multi-sectoral committee, similar in some ways to a CSF, was established. Although an added structure with an uncertain future, the members were enthusiastic and active a year after the end of NGO involvement. It also had community champions who drove the process (a local social worker and a SAPS member).

The value of primary research figures very prominently in this chapter because it was the basis of the programme theory and had such a profound impact. Like the ISS intervention, an accessible audit coupled with skilled facilitation made significant headway toward sustained activities in social crime prevention. In this case, however, the main theory at the start was simple: design the intervention *after* you do the necessary research. This seems to have merit and therefore the real question may be how to make this approach cost-effective.

'The main theory at the start was simple: design the intervention after you do the necessary research.'

ORGANISATIONAL BACKGROUND

The Institute for a Democratic Alternative in South Africa (Idasa) was established in 1987 as an institution seeking democratic alternatives to the apartheid state. That role has long since changed but the acronym remains and despite some early attempts to re-define the letters, the organisation has just come to be known by the word 'Idasa'.

Idasa's impact as an NGO has been rather large. Historically, the organisation played a major role in South Africa's transition to democracy especially in ending violent confrontation by bringing the different political parties to the table. The organisation helped to support and enable democratic elections by training party agents and engaging in wide-scale voter education. Idasa was influential in the formation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. It monitored, tracked and supported transformation processes in many other ways.

Today, Idasa has two headquarters, one in Pretoria and the other in Cape Town. It still engages in supporting constitutional democracy by monitoring parliament, analysing budgets and producing public information including opinion surveys. Such programmes seek to build and consolidate democracy, advocate for the poor and promote greater public participation in governance. Thus, in many ways it is a strong research-based advocacy group building democratic institutions, educating citizens and promoting social justice. Idasa has enlarged its focus and works today in South Africa, southern Africa and the continent.

These are some of the current programmes:

- The Budget Information Service.
- The Political Information and Monitoring Service.
- The Local Government Centre.
- The Public Opinion Service.
- The Southern African Migration Project.
- The All Media Group.
- Governances and Aids Project.

The programme relating to this review does not feature in the above list. From 1992, Idasa had a Community Safety Programme that was recently absorbed into the Local Government Centre (training and research around issues of effective and accountable governance and service delivery). The Community Safety Programme had developed considerable experience in capacity building, facilitation and research. It was involved in facilitating the transformation of the South African Police Force into a service. This included facilitating important conferences and seminars and building community-police co-operation. The unit also worked on developing the NCPS and helped to draft the *White Paper on Safety and Security*. It was also involved with numerous social crime prevention projects in several provinces. All that experience now strengthens the Local Government Centre.

In 2000, Idasa was examining rural safety especially since this seemed to be an overlooked area. The NCPS and

the 1998 *White Paper on Safety and Security* were often criticised for having an urban bias. So, Idasa partnered with the SAPS (Social Crime Prevention Unit) to look at social crime prevention as part of the 'Integrated and Sustainable Rural Development Strategy' that developed from 1999. Bolobedu, a rural area of Limpopo Province, was one of nine pilot programmes for this new presidential strategy. The crime component was vital. Poor service delivery and a culture of violence were having an unsettling impact on victimised young females and women in this rural area of Limpopo Province.

The Bolobedu project ran for two years covering most of 2001 and 2002. The costs were shared between Idasa (basic grant of the Ford Foundation), SAPS and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) which offered some funding for the sustainable development project.

PROGRAMME THEORY

The Community Safety staff working on the Bolobedu project developed a theory based on three premises. First, they theorised that the factors that lead to crime are complex and interrelated making it very difficult to design the right programme for a given target group and area. Therefore the *only* way forward is to do thorough research *before* designing an intervention. Seeing that this is the last intervention under discussion, it is worth noting that this fits with one of the strongest recommendations in this review.

The second foundation of the theory is that funds and resources are scarce and therefore national, provincial and local government have to co-operate on delivery. This means that partnerships are required. This also fits with recommendations of the review although how this is constructed and what needs to be addressed as priorities are factors that can make or break such an effort.

The third foundation was to consider the exit and entrance strategy. In this case, it was decided to construct a local management committee. They would give access to the community and direction and guidance regarding local conditions. This would also be the group to own the process and offer it long-term sustainability. This strategy seems to be good practice since core committees and incremental partnerships were used successfully by four organisations under review.

Aside from the three premises just outlined, Idasa made no other assumptions prior to research. Perhaps reducing our assumptions and increasing our research prior to the design of our interventions has value. This means we survey the ground first and avoid making choices based on assumptions. Idasa had a simple approach:

- What crime problems do we need to target in an area to make a difference (research)?

Who is there that we can work with (partners)?

How do we get in (entrance strategy) and out (exit strategy)?

This programme theory necessitates a description of how the research was used to inform the delivery strategy. Therefore, it is useful to discuss the audit taken in 2001 prior to the design of the intervention. How was it undertaken and what did it discover to inform the approach in Bolobedu?

The audit was produced through collaboration between Idasa and the Social Crime Prevention Component of SAPS (Pretoria). It analysed the following information:

- Main types of crime.
- Main causes of crime.
- How crimes are committed.
- Main obstacles to crime prevention initiatives.
- Where crime occurs.
- Characteristics of the victim (risk factors).
- Characteristics of the offender (risk factors).
- Capacity of the Service Delivery Agencies.
- Potential partners.
- Ideas for what the community can do to promote safety.

Three factors are immediately notable: (1) the audit examined a mix of security, social health and developmental concerns; (2) the components of the audit could be compiled and analysed by most implementing organisations that have access to some research capacity; (3) the audit was designed to assist the community in planning an intervention.

The approach was not singularly developmental but included all angles to crime prevention that seemed to fit the case. Awareness of the literature on risk factors, the problems and stresses of poverty and the need to address poor service delivery all played a role. It was not completely rigorous according to any single philosophical framework but rigorous enough to provide the information that mobilised a community and sent it in the right direction in terms of activities (as will be explained).

Secondly, since the audit was not a fearsome scientific process, it showed itself to be a manageable task for most organisations. The data was not collated by a scientist but by a facilitator (who was empowered by the process) and analysed by Idasa staff in partnership with the SAPS Social Crime Prevention Unit. Organisations could easily consider research partnerships in this way if cost is a factor. What should not be sacrificed is some degree of professional analysis, and this was retained.

Third, the focus was not about creating an agenda for Idasa but about informing the community as to what measures they *might* take. No presumption was made as to the best way to address the problems prior to consultation.

The methodology included a community-based needs analysis (not limited to participants in a workshop), interviews with government agencies, traditional leaders and police. For the community audit, the questionnaire that was used was based on a standard international framework, and documented the crime concerns of 500 people interviewed in 80 villages. This was a substantial sample of community input collected in a geographically even

way to reduce a potential area-based bias. In addition, focus groups and interviews with key informants in both civil society and government were conducted. General demographic information and available statistics (there was an embargo on SAPS statistics at the time) were collected too. All this was correlated in analysis to paint a reasonably good picture of the crime and service delivery problems and how they might be addressed in strategy.

The audit offered the following value for the design of the intervention:

- It explained who was involved in crime prevention.
- It identified gaps in service delivery.
- It showed ways to maximise resources through partnerships.
- It pointed to possible partners.
- It described the social and physical characteristics of the area to help identify and understand the causes of crime and opportunities for crime prevention/reduction.
- It described where the crimes occurred so that the community could understand how and where to target different types of crimes.

The last two items the reviewer refers to as human and physical geography. Knowing the culture, demographics, landscape and characteristics of social life in a community helps with targeting the right people in the right place. Secondly, we need to break down crimes by type and see *where* they occur. Operating without that information as if all places and crimes are the same really limits our capacity to ensure a relevant outcome. Neither every area of South Africa nor every crime is so identical that one replicable crime prevention strategy applies. Certainly there are similarities across the country but the mix and blend of these characteristics is not the same.

Reviewing key findings from the audit can help to validate Idasa's programme theory that research is the first step in an intervention.¹ These selected factors might be considered:

- Male youth in the age range of 10 to 24 years were committing up to two thirds of all reported crimes in Bolobedu. Many of these youths were found to be unsupervised (i.e. no parental control, no parents, or guardians migrating in search of work leave them alone). This had a major impact on crime: (1) the lack of male role-models was leading boys to identify with local perpetrators; (2) most property crimes were committed by *out-of-school* youth; (3) children as young as seven were drinking alcohol and could be found unsupervised in shebeens at night.
- Most victims of assault are male youths under 21 and this takes place outside shebeens, in open fields and public places. Most rape victims were young women and girls under 18 attacked after 6 pm on the weekends. Most children were raped during the day after coming home from school when the parents were still away (men wait in the hut or next to it). Women were victims of domestic violence and rape at night (at home or returning from work) and on the weekends at home.

The majority of crimes were not being reported. Domestic violence, child abuse and rape were estimated at 43% of the crimes based on community perceptions. Often they were not reported because of the economic dependence of women on their husbands and because of cultural values (e.g. abuse as acceptable practice; women seen as the property of men).

- High levels of stress, depression and poverty were correlated with nearly every kind of crime from common theft to domestic violence (e.g. houses that cannot be secured against break-ins; domestic violence and child abuse owing to financial stress).
- The local culture played a *major* role in behaviour leading to crime: (1) boys were encouraged to be promiscuous to prove their manhood; (2) young girls were encouraged to get pregnant to prove their fertility (3) similarly, girls were encouraged to get pregnant to attract social welfare payments; (4) pre-arranged child marriages took place in exchange for debt relief but amounted to statutory rape; (5) domestic violence and child abuse were not considered to be crimes by many but a widely acceptable male way of disciplining 'wives' and children.
- Alcohol abuse was highly correlated with many crimes of violence. The periods of high rape corresponded to the morula beer season (February–April). Furthermore it was normal to find minors indulging in alcohol as a leisure activity. Petty theft was also correlated with finding ways to pay for alcohol. Assault was also related and often occurred near the shebeens.
- Service delivery in the criminal justice sector was so poor that 68% of the community respondents identified a problem in some part of this sector. For instance, SAPS could not answer all calls for help because of personnel and vehicle shortages and the terrain itself. Statement taking was so poor that only 25% of the crimes could be taken seriously by prosecutors. About 70% of the cases of assault and petty crime were simply dropped from the caseloads.
- The geographical terrain was and remains a major factor in policing issues. The population is so spread out that visible policing would require more police than the government can provide; the roads are so bad and the hills so high that approaching police can be seen from a good time-distance away; most villages have no road access; there is one phone per village on average (and the police only have one line). Reporting a crime takes some time and then on average it took the police four to five hours to reach a crime scene.
- The majority of residents relied more on traditional structures (police, courts, traditional leaders) than on SAPS for access to social justice. Furthermore, if people did go to SAPS first, they were sent back to the traditional authorities despite a long day's journey to the station. The courts and the police associated with the courts provided some justice but were male dominated and reinforced the cultural bias against women. Of course, the traditional authorities have few resources to fight crime and the national Department of Provincial and Local Government was resistant to providing for a bigger role.
- Fifty-six per cent of the population have a grade five education or less, and 83% never complete matric so literacy levels are very low (e.g. campaigns based on distributing written information would not be effective in this situation).
- Existing crime prevention initiatives (CPFs, education awareness campaigns, limited police patrols, detective work and victim support) were not very effective countermeasures to the problems described above. The CPFs had gone completely awry and were holding their own courts and imposing penalties leading to conflict with the traditional structures. Illiteracy curtailed responses to education campaigns. Most of the problems were social fabric crimes and therefore law enforcement approaches could not identify or prevent these. The police had not been sufficiently trained in the victim support programme and were showing little interest.

This research fits some patterns found elsewhere but this mix of factors is not obvious from casual observation. With the benefits of an audit, one can clearly see the significance of the traditional structures for

crime prevention. Without an audit, one might never have seen the link between the traditional authorities and the attitude of the police who turn away complainants. Likewise, an outsider trying to make an impact who had no knowledge of the gender dynamics of the local culture might not make any headway in the struggle to reduce child abuse or domestic violence. The strong link between crime and unsupervised children and youth; and between crime and alcohol abuse also offers some very clear direction that might catapult a group to action (and did).

Most importantly, an audit can focus role-players on interventions and activities that might work. For instance, the audit showed that most crimes were social fabric crimes or had causes that cannot be solved by police at all. The causal factors that were considered included a mix of economic, developmental and social health concerns. The kind of intervention required would certainly involve police and be integrated but must be focused on education and community responsiveness. Therefore, a singular policing approach 'misses the boat'. The audit clearly shows this, participatory opinion does not. Casual opinions and ideas had already sent groups in the wrong direction. Both the existing efforts and general opinion (40% thought that safety and security issues were the sole responsibility of the police) were inaccurate. It took the audit, combined with community presentations, to focus the community on social crime prevention.

Despite the empirical evidence just presented, the discussion remains focused on theory. Based on the foregoing discussion, it does not seem that the community was empowered with the information it needed to take the appropriate direction for reducing crime prior to the audit. The safety audit was a key item of programme theory: research should precede our intervention designs. In that context, we are preempting some of the discussion on ensuring relevant outcomes because research at the start allows us to design an intervention that works. In the last chapter, a programme without an audit that led to a wide-ranging group of unfocused activities was examined. This chapter then looked at a similar intervention based on an audit and the result is that it impacted on participant choices. For instance, one village responded with a local women's forum on the basis of the audit. With better information resulting from a briefing and some facilitation they structured a group with an integrated plan to focus on:

- Crimes that affect women and children.
- Challenging the composition of patriarchal traditional courts.
- Capacitating women to lead safety campaigns.
- A village to village democracy and human rights education campaign.
- Literacy campaigns because literate people better understand human rights.
- Victim support in every police station.

These women were mobilised largely on the basis of good information whereas we had earlier read about the CPA effort that facilitated this at great expense. A women's group was catapulted into action and empowered by the accessible information on how their communities were affected by crime. The gender dynamics that resulted in violence had not been previously understood in proper context. Considerable analysis, understanding and experience go into the composition of an audit when it involves professionals employing international standards of research. However, it is not so advanced that it is beyond the capacity of implementing organisations or beyond

'A women's group was catapulted into action and empowered by the accessible information on how their communities were affected by crime.'

explanation in clear terms. The costs of the audit were reduced through a partnership and it was well written and highly accessible. The 75-page booklet with an attractive cover was also very well presented.

The second part of the programme theory really follows from the first. The audit should also uncover the partnerships that would be required to develop an integrated strategy on crime prevention. This it did. These departments were identified as the potential partners in the area:

- Health.
- Education.
- Social Development.
- Agriculture.
- Safety and Security.
- Justice.
- Local Government.
- Correctional Services.

In addition, CBOs, NGOs, CPFs, victim empowerment structures, Youth Clubs and traditional authorities were named.

Thus, through the audit both key crime problems and the people who could partner were identified. Beyond this, an outline was created to suggest the issues this partnership might target. It included dealing with: (1) causal and risk factors that might be called a social health perspective; (2) improving service delivery by the police which one might call a security perspective; and (3) developmental issues both in terms infrastructure, employment and personal development such as early childhood development. This was the list of suggested projects and programmes:

- Develop programmes to deal with poverty, substance abuse and economic development.
- Target police by improving service delivery.
- Fund youth activities and school safety initiatives.
- Involve traditional authorities and communities through public meetings and other forums.
- Early childhood intervention with children at risk or showing symptoms of abuse.
- Safety places, recreational centres and social services for youth.
- Employment programmes and skill development training for youth.
- Reduce the dependency of women through profit-making enterprises.
- Violence counselling.

This was only a suggestion list and the community would be consulted and would come up with additional ideas and information for the design of their own projects. Idasa saw itself as a technical assistant in this community-based task and clearly good information motivated the community to take action. Thus, the programme theory was modest in terms of its assumptions but this led to many activities on the ground. The organisation's limited agenda allowed the community to take ownership.

STRUCTURES

Idasa made one other assumption aside from the need for research. It considered that social crime prevention

requires partnerships. So, it identified these in research and the community accepted the theory that partnerships were essential to the next steps.

The audit identified all relevant stakeholders but Idasa did not have the expectation that all departments should or would attend in the early stages. As with the ISS intervention described in Chapter Four, Idasa worked with a core group of enthusiastic role-players. This included the SAPS and the Victim Empowerment Programme (VEP) run by a social worker and youth volunteers. These became the champions or identified change agents.

This group helped to bring other role-players to the table by methods that will be described later (see Getting Started). Gradually traditional leaders and Correctional Services joined and then it snowballed to include most of the criminal justice sector (Correctional Services, Justice, Police, Social Welfare), the social sector (Education, Health, Economic Affairs, Local Government and Social Development), CSOs, traditional leaders, faith-based organisations, Economic Development, SA Liquor Board, Environment and Tourism, Agriculture and Trade and Industry. Eventually this was structured into the 30-member strong Bolobedu Multi-Sectoral Committee (headquartered on police station facilities in GaKapane where they met regularly).

Interestingly, in a pattern seen throughout the country in all structures of this kind, local government and the Department of Justice were slow to join. They appeared to be integrated and meeting regularly after a plan was in place and the departments were tasked to report back to each other. The opposite was true of the economic sector (Economic Development, SA Liquor Board, Environment and Tourism, Agriculture, Trade and Industry). They were aboard for the early meetings but did not see a role for themselves and left except for Agriculture.

GEOGRAPHICAL TARGETING

Figure Eleven shows the policing area of Bolobedu where the Idasa intervention concentrated.

As we have seen so far, geographical targeting seems to involve elements of distance, scale and an identification of patterns on the ground in relation to crime.

Distance. An organisation can measure the distance to a target area and compute the costs in terms of available time in the community as well as the expense associated with getting back and forth. In this case, the distance was considerable, and the tolls and mileage fees were very high. The facilitators overcame this by spending about five to six working days per month in the community. The audit was also a considerable help in overcoming the distance since it helped to integrate the facilitators into the community. Collecting such data introduces one to all the key role-players.

Scale. The target was a large policing area (92km²) with few paved roads. The original idea was to target the entire district (Bolobedu) within the Greater Letaba Municipality. Neither corresponds to the policing area but it does cover about 75% of Bolobedu. This comprises nearly 200 000 people spread across 121 different villages. Targeting the 28 wards in this situation would be difficult because they have no infrastructure. So, given limited resources and the short duration of the intervention, it made sense to target the policing area. The station was located at Ga Kgapane (the centre and commercial zone), near the tar-road entrance of Bolobedu. It offered accessibility, infrastructure, information and proximity to other role-players (e.g. the hospital, education facilities, the victim support centre, Social Welfare).

Geography of crime. The audit was useful with regard to crime patterns on the ground. Dividing crimes into types and then finding their hotspots can really help focus a community. This also happened in the ISS intervention previously discussed and had merit there too (Chapter Four). In this case, the community and the forum were focused on more local patterns. They came to see the need for after-school care (as children were being raped and assaulted en route home) and to provide facilitated sporting activities where boys had good role-models and where such issues can be raised. The problems of shebeens were understood and directly targeted to stop under-age drinking, reduce assaults and incidents of rape. The traditional courts also became places for capacity-building and gender sensitivity training as this was likely to be the main source of criminal justice for some time to come given the inaccessible landscape. Village-to-village campaigns targeting domestic violence and the need to engage sector policing all emerged from a better understanding of the geography of crime including the difficulties of the landscape. Overall, the resulting crime plans (that of the police and the crime prevention plans of the community and CSOs) reflected clear targets because the audit showed where *particular* crimes were occurring.

DELIVERY STRATEGY OR PROCESS GUIDELINES

The delivery strategy was hardly more complicated than the programme theory. In fact, they are both simple and

FIGURE ELEVEN: THE BOLOBEDU POLICING AREA



relatively integrated except the degree of lobbying required was not fully anticipated. The following strategy was used:

- Conduct research to identify the problems and potential partners.
- Establish a core group than can target the potential partners and enrol their co-operation.
- Use lobbying and advocacy at community and government department levels to ensure participation and to overcome basic problems of service delivery.
- Set up a committee to design a sustainable crime prevention strategy.
- Facilitate a strategy based on both the audit and feedback from the group.
- Monitor and offer guidance where necessary but keep all community processes in community hands.
- Exit.

The first factor has already been discussed in order to validate the programme theory. The remaining factors will be detailed in terms of three sections below (Getting Started, Ensuring Relevant Outcomes, Impact and Exit Strategy). The significant point to identify here concerns the role that Idasa originally envisioned for itself: providing technical assistance. This reminds one of both the ISS and PDI interventions and from consistent testimony this approach appears to be good practice. However, the reality is that both the ISS and Idasa found themselves playing a strong role in getting the intervention *started*. Otherwise, the process would not have moved forward. The ISS hired a process facilitator and Idasa created a documented entrance strategy. Idasa then worked with the community to lobby all levels and tiers of governance and the community to get people on board.

GETTING STARTED

Getting started in Bolobedu was a process that took more than a year. It amounted to: (1) good baseline research; (2) facilitation that led to a documented entrance strategy; (3) lobbying and marketing the idea of an integrated approach to social crime prevention.

The intervention started with an audit and this had value as an entry strategy. As seen previously with the ISS intervention, it integrated external facilitators into the community and showed that the organisation offered value. This helps get the 'buy-in' that is necessary, particularly when a new structure is being envisioned. Knowing the crime problems also informs one about who to approach and what issues might interest that stakeholder. Without sufficient research background, one can appear naïve and easily lose the trust of key people.

The audit also provided a list of stakeholders to target. A core group would steer the effort (i.e. police representatives, a social worker, VEP volunteers). In Idasa-facilitated workshops, they developed a documented entrance strategy with clear targets, objectives, timetables and responsible parties. Surely, this is a good practice. Evidentially, it resulted in a committee with good representation and the effective development and management of crime prevention projects that each sector could undertake.

The crux of the strategy was lobbying and marketing the idea of social crime prevention as well as the need for integrated management to achieve it. There were two targets in this sense: (1) service delivery agencies of

government at local, provincial and national government and (2) the stakeholders in the community. This first group of targets included social workers, local government representatives, health workers, police, prosecutors, magistrates and Correctional Services officials. The second group included civic leadership, educators, traditional leaders, victims organisations, parents and members of the voluntary sector.

Similar to the CSF entry strategy, getting co-operation at formal government level required consultative meetings and presentations to various departments. Each had to understand the importance of crime prevention and the multi-agency approach that was required. The community-level entry was pitched differently as ‘community awareness seminars’ focusing more on the problems that had to be addressed. Much of the data for the presentations was drawn from Idasa’s audit and listening to community feedback.

The facilitators found that the three most critical points for developing buy-in at community level were: (1) traditional leaders, (2) traditional courts and (3) schools. Regarding the first, a facilitator repeated what we heard previously from NIM, ‘You do not get very far without buy-in from the traditional leaders.’ In this case there were not Amakhosi but two queens and a king. Bolobedu is a matrilineal society (despite violence against women). Tribal courts were significant because, as the audit showed, this represented the criminal justice system that affected most people. Schools are critical simply because youth commit most crimes and are the most common victims. That these three institutions were the ones that required critical attention at the entry stage is evidence again that South African communities are not so identical that the same entry strategies will work everywhere. One needs to identify the key entry points through research and then develop a strategy.

Trust-building can be difficult in any community but can be especially slow in a traditional setting. Percy Mathabathe, Idasa facilitator, said:

Politically volatile situations such as traditional areas that are not being respected by those from city centres can lead to suspicion. People fear being exploited. So disrespect leads to serious problems. Showing respect is probably the main attitude to have. Traditional institutions were a pillar in terms of access to services and we had to keep that in mind.²

He offered some other useful techniques for expediting entry into a rural area:

- ‘Be sociable. People trust friends.’
- ‘Don’t go in as an expert but as technical assistants.’
- ‘Tap into local talents and get local people to carry the ball.’
- ‘Respect all opinions. Formal and informal education are equal in many ways and one must value and respect the differences.’

‘Do your spade-work! Every community has its own special qualities that one needs to know about.’

‘Try to feel what the locals feel. They know you are a distant person from Pretoria. So, try to overcome that by making a real connection.’

‘You cannot have an intervention from a desk. You have to spend a lot of time there.’

ENSURING RELEVANT CRIME PREVENTION OUTCOMES

Three items emerge strongly in terms of ensuring relevant outcomes. Firstly, the audit emerges as a highly significant factor. Secondly, the role, experience, approach and guidance of the facilitator seemed to have had a major impact. Thirdly, lobbying and advocacy were used to break stalemates, and to get things done.

The audit was most significant for ensuring a relevant outcome because it mobilised the community. The audit explained crime in a way that had not previously been understood. For instance, many people were not aware that statutory rape and domestic violence were crimes. The links between patriarchy and abuse were clear from the audit. This was contextualised in terms of an accessible community report on crime. Such an item had never been seen before. It mobilised people and got the necessary departments to respond with the delivery of services. For instance, a women's group developed a constitution and raised funds based in large part on responding to the shocking findings of the audit. Social workers and the Department of Health responded to the described problems of teenage pregnancy with a registry and an improved system of referrals.

The proposal for the entire multi-agency structure and its subsequent activities were guided by the audit as were the community presentations. We saw a similar mobilising response in the Govan Mbeki Municipality. Therefore, audits must be recommended as good practice even though we may have to find ways to make them less expensive without reducing their level of rigour (see next chapter).

The audit not only mobilised people but broke a culture of silence. It gave groups, departments and individuals the permission they needed to investigate child abuse, rape and domestic violence. Work sessions held by the Bolobedu Multi-Agency Committee unearthed further findings such as the abuse and sexual victimisation taking place in churches and educational institutions. Ultimately, the audit spurred much-needed community activism and promoted co-operation on an integrated plan.

Experienced facilitation was also a factor. The reviewer observed the style of one of the Idasa facilitators at Bolobedu and found that this had merit for relevant outcomes. The facilitator:

- Kept the exit strategy as the primary focus. Most processes were therefore kept in community hands – from setting up meetings to taking minutes.
- Actively monitored the group, thoroughly checked their reports and kept individuals 'on their toes' because he was quick to spot gaps in delivery and asked tough questions.
- Checked with community members at random to make sure that they knew about the committee and its projects.
- Prodded the committee to take action in a humorous but direct way without taking over their role.

Both experience and sheer force of personality seemed to make a large impact. Yet this is something we seldom discuss in proposals as if facilitators were equal and just an input devoid of character. Just as good initial research (good researchers) can ensure a relevant outcome, so do experienced facilitators.

The primary method of facilitation was referred to as a 'problem-solving' approach. This is very important because it is distinguished from those interventions (e.g. UMAC, PDI) that emphasised mainly project management. The

committee was first designed to solve problems (not just manage conflicts). The problem-solving approach had five steps:

1. Establish a common problem or objective.
2. Establish what causes the problem.
3. Establish who is most competent to deal with the problem.
4. Establish what motivates the sector into activity and develop projects that deal with those specific aspects.
5. Establish a mechanism to coordinate implementation and improvements.

First note that this fits eloquently with the programme theory and the delivery strategy previously described. There was some methodological rigour in terms of practicing theory. This is important for research because it allows one to measure what has occurred. If the theory says one thing and the facilitator does another, evaluators have difficulty measuring the impact because all methodological rigour is lost. In those cases, there is no trail to follow from theory to exit; only a random group of actions.

Steps One and Two were informed by an audit but workshops were held that further analysed the problem and resulted in additional information and understanding. For instance, the 'disbanding of sound traditional ways of resolving conflict' was seen as a problem contributing to 'moral degeneration'. It was also found that the values that children were learning in Bolobedu were encouraging anti-social behaviour. Otherwise most of the analysis in the audit was accepted and the committee worked directly on each.

Step Three assumes that each problem will have a sector of people who will be most effective at making an impact. They were identified and put onto the appropriate committee with deliberation (not just voluntary groups). For instance, the alcohol intervention involved the Department of Health, SAPS, Economic Affairs and the Traffic Department. 'Moral Regeneration' involved traditional leaders, religious leaders, SABC Radio and the Department of Welfare (the lead).

Step Four is related to Step Three and very important in terms of the service providers: the line functions of the department were considered in the design of the projects. This factor creates the starting point for integrated governance as was argued in Chapter Two. The departments must be able to deliver on a project and if they cannot fit this within their existing roles, they resist participation. The same approach was taken to the targets of service delivery. For instance, children are motivated by imaginative and entertaining activities. Thus, the projects were also designed to suit them.

The final step is to establish a coordinating mechanism for monitoring and implementing the projects. This was achieved in terms of the Bolobedu Committee. The Victim Empowerment sector under the social worker monitored the committee along with the CPF. The group monitored each other and jointly reviewed progress reports from each of the implementing departments.

In all processes of facilitation, Idasa also provided information and guidance. The implementing agencies needed information regarding social crime prevention practices. Ideas like target hardening and opportunity reduction

were new to many participants on the Bolobedu Multi-Sectoral Committee. This was provided as 'guidance' as noted in the delivery strategy and often imparted through participatory information sessions.

Finally, advocacy was also a main pillar for ensuring relevant outcomes. There were breakdowns in terms of participation, and in terms of getting service delivery and access to services in place. This brings us back to the subject of functional service delivery. This has to be in place before departments can co-operate on integrated forms of governance. For instance, prosecutors were not working with the police to improve the quality of statements. Without such feedback, a cycle of poor delivery is perpetuated and the rate of re-offending is high. So, the magistrate and prosecutors were lobbied. In another example, more resources had to be located with the police including personnel (female staff members were especially needed) and vehicles. Idasa took this matter to provincial officials and got action. Social crime prevention also had to be put on the agenda of various departments and that involved mini-workshops with relevant service providers at provincial, local and district level.

Idasa participated strongly in the advocacy processes. So, similar to what happened with the ISS in the Govan Mbeki Municipality, it cannot be said that *all* processes were owned by the community. Yet it is hard to see how these advocacy problems would have been resolved quickly without organisational support. On this same matter, the ISS concluded that external intervention is a requirement. The reviewer concurs in terms of advocacy. CSOs need to play a more powerful role in resolving these issues for all communities. If advocacy worked at Bolobedu, how much more efficient would it be to tackle many of these problems at a policy level? This might require more of a healthy separation between civil society and the government than currently exists. Therefore the role of CSOs in South Africa must be identified and discussed.

MEASURING IMPACT

The major impacts in this case were quite identifiable thanks to the audit, which also offers a baseline. No final evaluation was done but the reviewer could observe some changes based on comparing the findings in the audit to the findings of the participant focus group involving most of the Bolobedu Multi-Agency Committee. This included:

- The multi-agency committee had been sustained for nearly a year without facilitation. It had 30 members covering an extensive range of government departments, traditional leaders and community-based organisations. They were engaged in five dynamic projects that targeted all the key problem areas identified in the audit: (1) moral regeneration (sexual victimisation); (2) alcohol abuse; (3) school safety; (4) victim empowerment; and (5) gendered crime. Each project was managed by an appropriate committee that could exercise some clout. All efforts were active. It should also be noted that two of these were underway before the intervention (victim support and safe schools) but were advanced by the greater levels of co-operation

One of the most advanced of the projects may have been the victim empowerment project that included police, social workers, medical doctors, psychiatric nurses, prosecutors, Correctional Services officers, clergy and volunteers in a multi-disciplinary effort. It was sustained through European Union and SAPS funding and was busy with debriefing, counselling, support and services to both victims of crime and HIV/Aids victims. This included secure facilities for victims living in fear.

The 'Safe and Beautiful Schools' intervention was also very advanced and won a provincial award in a beautiful

schools competition. It was repainting schools, creating 'adopt a cop' partnerships between police and schools, and developing Sports Against Crime programmes. Arts and drama were also being used to impart crime prevention information and promote a culture of learning. The police involvement in educating school children on social crime prevention grew directly out of the committee work.

- Consumption of alcohol by minors was down because of stringent new policies and this reflected in sales, which are down. Part of the checklist tasks for the police on the committee was to monitor and raid the illegal shebeens and this is also having strong impact.
- Two officers were assigned to a social crime prevention unit and involved in delivering on several aspects of the integrated plan. The police also addressed all the findings in the audit pertaining to policing in a service delivery plan of their own. This included much improved statement taking skills (detectives and prosecutors were having fewer problems with statements), training in new domestic violence legislation, initiating joint programmes with the CPFs, and introducing sector policing in the villages. Their service to victims of crime was improving but they still needed more training in VEP.
- On the basis of lobbying and advocacy at provincial level, more vehicles, personnel and resources had been delivered to the station. The all-male staff was scrubbed with a large increase in female staff members (up from 1 to 12). A new female commissioner was also posted to the station.
- More government sectors now interact with the police improving the level of integrated planning and communication between departments.
- In response to a crime prevention workshop that reported audit results, the Shotong Women's Forum was organised. They drafted a constitution and then embarked on a serious door-to-door campaign against domestic violence and child abuse. They remain vigilant members of the multi-sectoral committee. At the time of the review, the eleven members were conducting village-to-village gender education campaigns. They also show up in shebeens and teach people to use alcohol responsibly. A new bread-work project was making money and the communal work period is used to share problems, offer support and to develop advocacy campaigns. Based on testimony, this programme seems to have reduced crime in Shotong Village simply by breaking the culture of silence. One member said, 'Our counterpart males who used to harass us and rape our children and parents now know that if they tamper with us any longer, the police will arrest them. We are now free to say what we want.' The same women are also members of the CPF.
- The moral regeneration group was among the most dynamic. They hold weekly radio shows on SABC (Thobela Radio FM) covering themes relevant to social crime prevention such as 'sexual abuse' or 'indigenous knowledge and crime prevention'.

MAKING AN EXIT

Idasa was very careful not to create any dependency, which is critical in promoting new structures. The exit strategy was the foremost consideration in the facilitation of the intervention. Managing meetings and projects were kept in community hands although Idasa did play a major role initially in terms of research, facilitation and advocacy.

In the ISS initiative in the Govan Mbeki Municipality, there was a public safety department where the effort could be housed but in Bolobedu there was no such structure. The committee was offered police facilities and a small police budget but the project is not administered in a council line-budget as in Mpumalanga. At the time of the

review, the committee still needed to be formally institutionalised in a government department. Negotiations were underway with the Letaba Municipality (of which Bolobedu is a district) and there was interest and ongoing collaboration.

Unfortunately, the structure did seem to depend in part on the dynamic social worker, Jane Bambo, who had been the champion and chairperson of the committee. While the reviewer was in Bolobedu, there was discussion of transferring Ms Bambo to another area and focus group members voiced fear that this structure would not hold without her. One of the facilitators also voiced concern about this and felt that the committee needed to sit on a formal public safety committee. So, even though the structure was running projects based on a plan at the time of the reviewer's visit, it was fragile since it sat outside of formal channels of governance.

KEY LESSONS LEARNT [facilitators and participants]

- 'Be realistic in terms of what you can achieve. You may plan to reduce crime but many things need to be in place before that outcome – like access to services or getting crimes reported.'
- 'Discourage departmental information campaigns. They are not effective. They just come and go and there is no follow-up.'
- 'Always start with a baseline. This will send the intervention in the right direction.'
- 'Victim empowerment is limited without a perpetrator's programme. Victims and perpetrators are part of a cycle of violence and both have to be addressed at once.'
- 'On multi-sectoral bodies, make sure that you have consistent representation or you spend all your time updating new people.'
- 'Immediate seniors do not take an interest in the multi-sectoral committee. Make sure you workshop these folks.'
- 'Radio is a good medium for social crime prevention. It has a big impact and we get lots of calls.'

REVIEWER'S COMMENTS

The audit coupled with good facilitation on a problem-solving model led to some level of sustainability for an integrated approach to crime prevention. There is no doubt that an audit of political, social, economic and geographical factors in crime helped to: (1) capacitate and integrate the facilitators, and (2) inform the community so they can respond with more appropriate choices in crime prevention. Primary research prior to the design of an intervention is recommended as good practice.

Idasa also played a powerful role in 'getting started' including research support, facilitating an entrance strategy and helping to lobby role-players. They also worked at provincial and national level to get the police properly resourced and role-players co-operating. The professional facilitators also employed a sophisticated five-step problem-solving model that worked within government line functions. This is capacity born of professional experience and not just textbook skills that one passes out like apples. One ISS lesson was that skilled external research and facilitation are needed to really embed social crime prevention practices. The experience at Bolobedu

also seems to validate that. One could also point to UMAC and NIM, which likewise facilitated groups into action. The chief problem is: who will pay for this nationally?

The Bolobedu Multi-Sectoral Committee may still be fragile. The weakness is that that the committee sits outside of government. On initiatives like these, why not borrow from the PDI experience and use only existing institutions including the ward committees and development forums? One could also borrow from ISS and target the responsible municipal council. If we reflect on the previous chapter, it seems that the best lessons of PDI (good entrance and exit strategy) and Idasa's (research-based delivery) could be combined. The result might be a sustained intervention that ensures relevant outcomes and lowers the cost and time investment.

In this intervention, the audit preceded strategic planning. One of the critical planning tools offered by the Bolobedu audit was the identification of crime hot spots. There is a body of international evidence to show that crime clusters in certain places can be targeted to result in a reduction in crime.³ The audit discussed these crime clusters within the text. It is important, however, for safety audits to map these hot spots in order to furnish critical information for appropriate strategic planning.

References

- 1 Mathabathe, P. and Shabangu, T., *Bolobedu: towards an integrated strategy to prevent crime and violence in South Africa*, Pretoria: Idasa, 2001
- 2 Interview with Mathabathe, P., Bolobedu, 26 March 2002
- 3 Tilley, N. and Laycock, G., *Working out what to do: evidence-based crime reduction*, Crime Reduction Research Series Paper 11, London: Home Office, 2002



9

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

At the end of each chapter, the reviewer identified some key themes and issues. These were analysed to find the interconnections between them and then categorised into six discussion topics. Each of these topics was presented in a feedback discussion with the participants in the review who offered comment and critique. This helped to confirm and sometimes refine certain of the recommendations. Both conclusions and recommendations are detailed under six sub-headings that include:

1. The paradigms that guide us.
2. The role of civil society.
3. Targeting the right people in the right place.
4. Geography vs replicable social programmes.
5. The tragedy of research.
6. Proposal and delivery components.

1. The paradigms that guide us

The first four organisations described in the review, took the 1996 National Crime Prevention Strategy or the 1998 *White Paper on Safety and Security* as the departure point for their programme theories (UMAC, NIM, ISS, CSV). Idasa also took government policy as a departure point but in terms of making integrated sustainable rural development work by including crime prevention. PDI targeted government institutions for capacity-building and included crime prevention within the context of sustainable development too (United Nations Local Agenda 21). The ISHS-CPA was the only organisation that took the causes of crime (identified through epidemiological research) as the key departure point (the public health model).

Figure Twelve describes the organisations reviewed according to:

- The departure points discussed.
- The paradigm involved.
- Whether timing was an issue.
- Whether the aim was to implement policy.
- The source or motivation for the programme design (e.g. research).

FIGURE 12: SOME CHARACTERISTICS RELATING TO CSO ROLES IN CRIME PREVENTION

UMAC	NCPS, White Papers	Security, Development	Yes	Yes	Negotiations, consultation with province
NIM (rural)	NCPS, White Papers	Security, Development	Yes	Yes	National negotiations and rural needs assessments
ISS	NCPS, White Papers	Security, Development	Yes	Yes	Testing crime prevention manual
CSVR	NCPS, White Papers	Security, Development	Yes	Yes	Research and networking
CPA (Injury)	Epidemiological Studies	Social Health	No	No	Public health model of research
PDI	United Nations Local Agenda 21 Action Programme	Integrated sustainable development	No	Yes	Community needs assessments
Idasa	Launch of Presidential Project	Integrated sustainable development	No	Yes	Safety audit

Obviously there was a disproportionate focus on safety and security policy. Many programmes designed at the change of the millennium were based on the new policies then establishing our safety and security framework (the Constitution, the NCPS and the White Papers on safety and security and on local government). The four that took these as a departure point all suffered from problems in the timing of the interventions. This may be because the policy was inappropriate for the period of government transition. It had located responsibility with municipalities and metropolitan areas that were not fully established. Some tried to resolve that problem by providing the structures that would make them work (UMAC, NIM). Others tried to provide some coordinating role to effect policy (ISS, CSV). In every one of those organisations one or more facilitators interviewed told about the difficulties of being drawn into government agendas that were not part of their own.

The dominance of the security perspective can be seen in a historical light. South Africa's National Crime Prevention Strategy, developed in 1996, might have been better termed a National Crime Prevention *Vision*. It recognised the need for a broad cross-section of people and organisations and government departments to work together at local level on initiatives to prevent and reduce crime. This was reinforced by the 1998 *White Paper on Safety and Security* and the 1998 *White Paper on Local Government* that mandated that local government play a role in coordinating such an effort. These documents did not offer methods, structures, sufficient funding, timetables or action plans. In fact, many local government leaders saw the crime prevention component as an unfunded mandate and did not take it seriously. This created a gap that some CSOs tried to fill.

The department that took some of the lead in relation to the NCPS was Safety and Security, and this had some influence in creating so-called 'security' paradigms. This is not really a fair term as the document promotes an integrated strategy. Further, as indicated earlier, most organisations included economic and developmental issues in their approaches. The main issue is really about perspectives or departure points.

Some are now seeing problems with the 'security perspective' and turning to the government's development sector (e.g. IDPs, development forums). For instance, the CSFs in the Western Cape are now being seen as a possible structural component of integrated development planning (IDP). However, there may be a danger there too. Once we take this lead, our crime prevention plan ends up looking like a development plan or a poverty alleviation plan. Councillors in the Govan Mbeki Municipality looked at this and immediately integrated the two.

Are development and poverty alleviation the same as crime prevention or are we being led off track again? If crime prevention is a component of development, then we should have anticipated that. The IDP forums may be new but the IDP is not and was right there along with the *White Paper on Safety and Security* and the *White Paper on Local Government*. In hindsight, did we grab the wrong document? In an August 1998 publication, Mark Shaw wrote:

The *White Paper* (1998) directs local government to promote integrated spatial and socio-economic development that is socially just and equitable. This requires that crime prevention considerations should be integrated with other aspects of local development, including local economic development. The *White Paper* also encourages local government to enter into partnerships with community-based organisations and non-governmental organisations, especially where these agencies have expertise that is traditionally lacking within local government such as crime prevention.¹

While most agree that crime prevention considerations belong in the design of the built environment and in all our social programmes, we must be cautious about jumping onto a new 'bandwagon'. Poverty, unemployment and poor infrastructure do play a role in crime prevention but so do patriarchy, culture, reflectors, alcoholism, locked doors and low self-esteem. If we focus on participation in government development programmes, we might miss the boat again. Is there not a vehicle or a focus where crime prevention belongs in its own right? Some countries think so and have crime prevention centres (e.g. Canada, New Zealand) but that again locates it with government. Maybe crime prevention is not only a component of government delivery but something broader in scope.

It might be useful to drop our blinders, forget our textbooks and look at the problem afresh with regard to how these paradigms are generated. For the sake of some momentary clarity, let us consider the subject *a priori*. There might be three highly interrelated approaches to crime prevention: (1) through arresting and convicting the offenders; (2) deterring the offenders, and (3) preventing the occurrence of offenders.

The first approach we might call law enforcement. It falls within a security perspective. We also hope that a swift and efficient justice system will stop other criminals from tempting the same fate. We hope that by arresting and rehabilitating the offender we will prevent that identified criminal from repeating again. This reactive approach is an important component of crime reduction but it is not a complete strategy. It has problems that have to be balanced by other approaches. First, we cannot catch all the criminals. Even in very big operations that 'crack down' on crime, most criminals simply move operations from one area to the next. Second, even with efficient police, courts and correctional services, criminals also become more swift and efficient. An unhealthy society keeps producing new generations of cunning offenders leading to a cat and mouse game. Lastly, cracking down on criminals is not quite the job that civil society does best. Law enforcement rests most safely in the hands of a responsible government.

The second tactic is crime deterrence by opportunity reduction. This refers to efforts such as visible policing, barbed-wire fencing or locked vehicles with alarms. It is any system or design in the environment meant to deter the criminal. The potential offender may be deterred from breaking into your house because of the presence of a snarling dog. This approach can help too but it suffers from the same problems as the first – the social production of perpetrators is not addressed. It is unlike the law enforcement approach since it is something in which everyone can engage but to varying degrees. Wealthier people and businesses can get together and make their areas very secure. Wealthy people are moving into patrolled security villas, isolated behind big walls with streets that are monitored by closed circuit television. Businesses are now pooling resources to secure city centres with guards and closed circuit television. Poor people cannot afford this. So, this methodology helps produce a landscape of fortified villas surrounded by poverty and crime. Crime concentrates in the poor areas, along the corridors between the poor and rich areas and may eventually lead to an explosive, unmanageable situation. We see this and sometimes try to resolve it with 'development' alone.

Preventing the occurrence of offenders is a long-term approach more focused on what causes people to become perpetrators. Around the country, children grow up in destitute areas. They come from divided families. They are hungry. Their parents cannot pay their school fees or buy school uniforms. Some of these are boys expelled from schools only to join gangs. Soon they engage in crimes that terrorise community members. Next, schools cannot perform because the gang violence and related drug peddling enters the school grounds. Fewer

youths now have access to a good education and the number of gang members increase. This is a vicious cycle and there are many more like it.

Criminality prevention is the idea of identifying this risk and coming up with local initiatives to stop such boys from being expelled from school in the first place. A school-feeding programme and a fund for paying the school fees of poor children and a sewing group that empowers women while they make school uniforms might help prevent the problem described. Community mentors that can provide good role-models for these youths are also important. If those programmes were an integrated part of an even larger set of interventions ranging from improved parenting skills in the home to better managed schools to sustainable community development, we have the start to a winning formula.

This last approach might fall largely within a social health perspective that looks at risk and resilience factors for injury. It does not really exclude sustainable development and security concerns. So, there is great value to integrating the public health perspective so as to balance the disproportionate attention to security and development. This perspective recognises the role we all play (not just government) in the construction of our societies. It is our divided families, divided classes and divided societies that produce criminals. The answer might be co-operation that heals those divisions and brings people together to develop and implement the multitude of programmes that will reduce and prevent criminality.

■ **Recommendation:** *Criminality prevention is best understood in a social or public health perspective. The reviewer recommends that CSOs incorporate more of the social health perspective and more science without losing their own unique identities. This is to achieve a balanced perspective of security, health and development concerns.*

Incorporating the perspective on social health into all the work we do, does not stop anyone from working with the police (inefficient policing can be a risk factor) or working on development issues (a stronger economy is a resilience factor). We have seen in the review that there are particular areas where development should precede delivery on security and social health programmes because services and infrastructure are not adequate to sustain such interventions. We saw this at the informal settlement of Thembelihle and earlier in terms of rural areas that were simply not ready for CSFs. Sometimes, one must work to create an environment conducive to delivery. In Bolobedu, the Idasa audit showed that development and public health practices were warranted over law enforcement approaches but that may not be the case everywhere. In central business districts, maybe visible policing is what really works.

The need for integrating all of our paradigms supports the long-running argument in this review that we must first analyse the situation before targeting people and places. We have to know first what approach to adopt. That requires science and research. It just makes us more clear and precise about what we are doing. It adds rigour and changes our departure point from government policy to science. It is a shift in paradigm that may even free civil society to play its appropriate role including the analysis and advocacy of policy (see next section).

The public health model is a useful example of a scientific paradigm. First, it views the problem of crime as a problem of social health and this focuses us on the behavioural tendencies of individuals and groups owing to relationships (e.g. poor parenting), products (e.g. guns) and environments (e.g. poor and overcrowded). The risk

factors are identified and manipulated to prevent problems of intentional or unintentional violence. This must be evaluated and then the whole process is repeated until sustainable solutions are located in a community. This seems to be what the review has been trying to tell us case-by-case. It is necessary to start with a professional study (a safety audit or epidemiological study), identify and target the risk factors (and the development and security factors) and then facilitate *the community's* intervention strategy. This leads to methodological rigour in the design of our intervention strategies, and allows us to test and explain what works or what does not.

■ **Recommendation:** *The aspects of public health paradigm recommended for incorporation are mainly scientific approaches except for the element of advocacy (which distinguishes CSOs from research units). This includes:*

- 1 *Risk-factor identification: making the causal factors of crime the launching point for our programme theories.*
- 2 *Using research to design interventions.*
- 3 *Addressing the seven factors that help produce crime within our programme design.*
- 4 *Testing our interventions at a manageable scale.*
- 5 *Evaluating and improving on those interventions yearly.*
- 6 *Engaging and capacitating the target community in advocacy.*

This recommendation is not a new finding but refers us to what international studies have indicated for many long years. The 1992 textbook, *Crime Prevention: Approaches, Practices and Evaluations*, also put forward a crime prevention model of using the social health perspective.² It fits all of our approaches (including reaction, deterrence and pro-active crime prevention) into three instructive areas:

- 1 Primary crime prevention.
- 2 Secondary crime prevention.
- 3 Tertiary crime prevention.

The first deals with the physical and social environment that fosters deviance. This is the area of opportunity reduction, deterrence and developmental activities. Neighbourhood watches, environmental design, private security, police patrols, surveillance, jobs training are all included here. The Secondary area is identification and prediction of criminality prior to the commission of any illegal activity. It tends to identify high crime and crime producing areas and targets these with everything from early childhood education to diversion programmes. Finally, we get to reaction and the formal criminal justice system at the Tertiary level that deals with actual offenders. All three are valid in terms of social health and each treats criminality as a social disease that advances in various stages. We can try to stop it at the potential site, prevent it from occurring in the first place or treat the illness once it has been exposed.

■ **Recommendation:** *It is recommended that we be very explicit about this in our theories and proposals. Are we trying to: (1) set up our social and physical environment to deter crime; (2) trying to prevent criminality from occurring; or (3) react appropriately to the effects of criminality?*

2. The role of civil society

What is the appropriate relationship between government and civil society organisations? Should we be responsible for helping to carry out systems of governance that are flawed and not delivering? If so, should civil society organisations be coordinating government efforts or should government institutions be helping to coordinate civil society in its crime prevention role? If we take White Papers as our departure point, it might be the latter.

There must be alternative roles that empower civil society organisations. One might be an advocacy-based approach and another might be a research-based approach. As we consider each, the distinction seems to collapse.

The first alternative would suggest that those interested in crime prevention become watchdog advocates and promoters of crime prevention/reduction without taking responsibility for the government role. There are major advocacy issues to target that might have more impact than all our pilot projects combined. The confusing boundaries of our country have social workers in one zone, police in another, the court in one more and the municipality running in another direction. This raises havoc in trying to organise a multi-sectoral crime prevention response. The government is issuing the same vans to all police stations despite many different kinds of terrain. The police in Bolobedu take five hours to respond to a call because their vehicles cannot move along the muddy roads. All over the country, vans are literally bogged down in the mud because we do not pay sufficient attention to locality. These are only two of hundreds of advocacy issues in crime prevention and reduction that could have a big impact on crime prevention. A third critical example would be the task of ensuring that government institutionalises criminality prevention into all its work since it seems to be imbalanced in its approach (concentrating more on deterrence and law enforcement).

Advocacy does not alter our focus as much as it lays the foundation for a functioning civil society. It is a particularly important part of a young democracy because there are many unrepresented voices. In the review, it was plainly shown that good governance, democracy and human rights are fundamentals for creating any workable initiative. If we do not have a functional human-rights driven democracy, then our efforts in crime prevention are pointless. The policies of crime prevention today will be undermined by strict law enforcement tomorrow and up-end our entire investment of time and money. Democracy is constitutional, authoritarianism is whimsical.

To advocate requires a healthy separation between the state and civil society. It means *not* getting too caught up in government processes and being critical in a healthy, democratic way. If we want functional government, we might identify and explain how and why it is *not* working and how it could work. After that we advocate delivery, perhaps based on the unheard voices coming from our selected areas of work. If we see that the police are under-resourced and reactive about crime, we should address this basic issue of functionality by explaining, campaigning and advocating change.

We must criticise the government when they deliver poorly or offer unfunded mandates. Does it advance government or civil society to replace the government's role? How can civil society play its role in interest-group governance if it is trying to be the government's delivery agent? In the big picture, it may be more effective to build a strong civil society that holds it accountable. We can use the professional services of CSOs to solve crime problems or manage conflicts or write policies but our intent is to have a good government that can manage on its own. Otherwise who are the monitors of democracy, good governance and human rights?

Our allegiance changes in this alternative advocacy role. It is not to government but to the unrepresented masses that have no constituencies, no voice and hardly any role in development. One ISS researcher assisting in the review asked, 'Are the legitimate structures legitimate? What we have close to the ground is volunteerism and unpaid structures. What is close to the ground is disorganised!' Civil society organisations are not adequately addressing that gap. We work with systems that are flawed and offer no real representation but we ignore that and we try to make them work. There are no constituencies and local development committees and forums are highly political.

If the government is not functioning well, one appropriate NGO role might be to identify it, monitor it, show how to rectify it and then insist on some action. In the Govan Mbeki Municipality, a group of 15 people involved with the crime prevention plan met with the researcher. Most were government officials from the core departments of criminal justice. One person said, 'It would be ideal if we had job descriptions fitting crime prevention, but this is not the case.' The rest nodded their agreement. Should organisations concerned with crime prevention deal with this problem (or perception) at every local level or at a high level of advocacy (government, media) where many people can be reached at once?

Advocacy of any value is research-based. One cannot just demand change. The existing situation and the proposed changes have to be researched. In this sense, research and advocacy are inseparable. The scientific approach such as that taken by CPA using the public health model offers all organisations interested in crime prevention another possible role. It does not have to move us away from security or developmental concerns. It does not have to change our targets or partners. It just means that a *scientific* approach to a problem offers the *freedom* to be independent of government at the political level. At the same time it adds rigour and allows us to penetrate the causes of crime and respond to those.

It is neither necessary to adopt a public health model nor become a scientist to envision civil society organisations in a research-based role. The safety audit at Bolobedu or the one used in the Govan Mbeki Municipality were quite adequate to galvanise the community and ended in a sustained intervention. One of them was compiled by the facilitator and analysed in partnership with SAPS. Perhaps a visionary would see civil society organisations taking over a significant amount of global research since they can also deliver on their findings.

■ **Recommendation:** *However, this review only recommends that we question a really big assumption that the CSO role is to partner with government. It is being recommended instead that we limit ourselves to smaller assumptions (theories) that we can test. It might be something like this:*

- 1 *We need to work in places where people need help with crime.*
- 2 *Places differ so we had better do some research to understand and explain the problem better.*
- 3 *We will need to identify who we can and should partner because resources are in short supply.*
- 4 *We then consult with communities on possible steps they might take and help advocate a solution if invited.*

In that example, research and advocacy become one. The government can even be one partner in an intervention but that is not the *raison d'être* of a CSO. Instead, it is quite different: a stronger research-based advocacy role for

civil society organisations interested in crime prevention. Many do this now but it is role and perspective that counts in terms of departure points (research-based departure rather than government policy departure). This hardly means that policy is not examined. To the contrary, it must then be well examined but from a new role as a tier of interest-group governance. The constituency comprises unrepresented people and communities. To do this successfully requires an independent civil society role. We cannot be seeking government approval or substituting for its role and easily serve as an advocate of the people.

3. Targeting the right people in the right place

People targeting and geographical targeting appear to be major factors in ensuring a relevant outcome. If we target busy people, disinterested people, those with no clout or those with so much clout that they are too busy to help, it is a problem. Targeting volunteers can be a problem because they disappear when they get a job. Not targeting the local councillors is another problem we ran across and NGO involvement with party politics can also be tricky. Targeting only one local councillor can taint the intervention with a political party bias and create more diversions. So, we must take great care in who we target and target people in a constructive way that heals rather than creates divisions between them. We must also be cognisant of where the people and problems are too. There is geography to every problem and this is truer in South Africa than nearly any other place owing to a history of engineering the political, social and cultural geography. The solution is to do one's homework first before engaging in an intervention. We must understand both the problems and the potential partners in proper geographical context before engaging either.

Targeting the right people in the right places can only be arrived at through proper research and is not evident from the day one enters the community. The ISS identified the importance of appropriate change agents in the process of facilitating crime prevention programmes in two different provinces. After some difficulties in having chosen the incorrect change agents, through improved methodologies they quickly learnt how to target the right ones, and for that reason had a sustained intervention in the Govan Mbeki Municipality. This starts to tell us that the only appropriate place to start an intervention is with baseline studies that let us know: who to work with, how to work with them and what the geography of crime and service delivery is in an area. We also have to take account of the local political situation. Perhaps government is not functional at all or totally lacks a human rights culture, or is severely divided along political lines. Then civil society must turn to advocating for good governance first. Of course, there are many other factors to consider in working out an approach to effective crime prevention strategies such as specific risk factors, developmental factors or security factors. All this has to be collectively documented and analysed if we are to develop a workable intervention strategy. Spontaneous and whimsical ideas coupled with seemingly convenient partnerships lead to ad hoc strategies that are unlikely to have impact.

■ **Recommendation:** *All this tells us that implementing organisations must come to know a particular area in an appropriate way before the intervention starts. The best way uncovered in this review is through a scientifically done safety audit. The reviewer recommends that such safety audits be done before the design of the intervention and that these include some epidemiological data (risk factors). This recommendation is made because the audit has too many advantages to ignore. It can:*

- 1 *Reduce the high costs of being politically, socially, culturally and geographically ignorant about a target area*

(e.g. the settlement is about to be removed, a war is breaking out over a boundary issue, the local official you are negotiating with is corrupt).

- 2 *Integrate the facilitators into an area quickly and reduce entry time.*
- 3 *Allow us to choose an appropriate approach and appropriate partners according to the level of service delivery and the democratic and human rights functioning of the area.*
- 4 *Help us to target crime hot spots and the right people in the right places.*
- 5 *Help us to target the social, developmental, physical and policy causes of crime in an integrated way.*
- 6 *Mobilise people to respond to their crime problems.*
- 7 *Help ensure that communities make informed decisions about crime prevention.*
- 8 *Allow the community to see the value of a CSO intervention.*
- 9 *Sustain enthusiasm for crime prevention over a long period of time.*
- 10 *Offer the evaluator a baseline to carry out subsequent evaluations.*

All these benefits were discussed throughout the review but the best chapters to refer to would be Chapters Four, Six and Eight.

Community-initiated safety audits based only on local funds and local talent are not recommended. The reviewer was not impressed with any community-based audit reviewed. They tended toward being more encyclopaedic than analytical. They are usually short and not detailed, and mixed with too many assumptions. The results can be problematic as local representatives are not social scientists. Communities can get ahead of themselves too by trying to solve complex social problems beyond their reach. Community-based safety audits present another hazard: groups stop all their activities while they wait for the results. This delays delivery and sometimes demoralises participants owing to a perceived lack of action. Short-term deliverables preceding the audit may be needed to maintain the momentum of groups and sustain enthusiasm while the audit results are awaited.

The audit is too important not to be professionally done. So, we have to look at ways to reduce cost when this is a factor.

■ **Recommendation:** *Since professional audits are expensive, inexpensive alternatives are recommended for piloting. These are some recommendations on piloting less expensive audits:*

- 1 *Use unemployed community members to help gather the information. This should work for the victim survey. The CPA does this for its studies and empowers women volunteers in the process. The analysis remains with professionals.*
- 2 *A professional researcher could be utilised to facilitate research workshops where information can be gathered at about five meetings of the relevant community individuals. Perhaps this might target: (a) a group of relevant government departments or a CSF structure if available; (b) the CPF; (c) the IDP forum representatives; (d) local elected representatives; and (e) CSOs working at ground level. Departments of Public Safety might be good partners in arranging for this. Information could be gathered by workshops and through available documentation to construct a draft audit. This could then be further discussed with a reference group composed of representatives from the five groupings. This leaves out the expensive victim*

surveys, reduces transport costs and researcher days. It relies on local expertise but a good researcher informed on the development, security and social health factors in crime prevention may be able to solicit the required information.

- 3 *Use geography post-graduate students to help identify and map crime patterns on the ground. They are field researchers, cartographers (usually trained in GIS) and have the critical thinking skills that are ideal for this kind of work. Collaboration with geography departments on this issue might prove mutually beneficial.*
- 4 *Do the same as above using public health post-graduate students to take a public health model approach (epidemiology) and criminology students for a more sociological approach. Perhaps both these proposed pilots and the one above could be piloted simultaneously and the results compared.*
- 5 *Make sure that the evaluator for the project does the safety audit and the baseline at the same time. This reduces two processes to one and can save a significant amount of money.*
- 6 *Properly capacitated CPFs, CSFs, or NIM's rural structures (RCPCs) can routinely collect the data for a periodic audit. This would enable easy data collection by a professional analyst. For instance, NIM's area based steering committees already collect most of this kind of data. It might be useful to pilot a project with one of NIM's CSFs or RCPCs on organising the data collection for this purpose. See the structures discussed in Chapter Three under the heading 'Structures'.*

This brings us to a consideration of factors that might be included in a safety audit. The professional audits at Bolobedu and the Govan Mbeki Municipality were combined here (duplications eliminated) and some elements added based on good practices identified by the reviewer.

■ **Recommendation:** *The following are recommended as components of a good safety audit:*

- 1 *A mapping and analysis of the demographic patterns found in the proposed target area.*
- 2 *A victim survey to determine the scope and nature of crime in each area.*
- 3 *A mapping and analysis of SAPS crime statistics by area and its correlation to a place-based public survey of crime.*
- 4 *A mapping and analysis of particular crime 'hotspots' including a macro-level overview according to zones (urban, peri-urban, commercial, rural, informal settlements) and a discussion of pertinent micro-patterns of human activity and settlement (e.g., violence outside shebeens, rape between schools and homes).*
- 5 *Characteristics of victims and perpetrators (risk factors).*
- 6 *Crime-causing environmental factors.*
- 7 *Crime-causing products (targeting crime facilitators).*
- 8 *A mapping and analysis of the capacity in the local council (and traditional authority if rural), the local SAPS stations and the criminal justice, social, economic and health sectors for crime reduction in the target area.*
- 9 *Main obstacles to crime prevention initiatives including any problems of good governance, human rights or democratic functioning.*
- 10 *Potential partners.*
- 11 *Ideas for what the community can do to promote safety.*

12 Ideas for the CSO role in assisting the community including a consideration of distance from the target community, the scale on which it can have an impact and its organisational culture and background.

Numbers 1 to 7 are of paramount importance for identifying all appropriate places and targets for a crime prevention initiative. The following five bullets (8 to 12) tell us about capacity to address the problem. Note also that all the elements of programme design within the public health model have been included in some form (see the '7 Es' in Chapter Six). By including them here, they will become a strategic planning tool.

Many of the recommended items tell us about crime patterns on the ground and therefore should be mapped. One basic inadequacy in all the audits reviewed was a lack of maps. These are internationally-recognised tools of strategy for combating crime and should be developed and utilised.² Since one can target crime problems where they occur, this is a critical component of planning.

- **Recommendation:** *It is recommended that audits also furnish communities with strategic planning maps to help focus a crime reduction effort appropriately.*

The victim survey is critical. We saw how important the demographics and crime distribution was in towns at the scale of Govan Mbeki Municipality and at the micro-scale in Bolobedu (shebeens, homes, schools, public areas). The victim surveys help tell us about social fabric crime that may not be reported (Bolobedu).

- **Recommendation:** *It is recommended that all audits include a victim survey to ensure that the analysis does not rely only on official reports.*

More generally, the safety audits need to include more about crime on the ground (geographical targeting). We often just discover things by taking account of geography, a subject born of exploration. It is a striking fact that Durban's new metropolitan area is now 66% rural. Both PDI and NIM find that conditions inside the city in these areas are not the same and require different treatment. There is such tremendous diversity in this country that rural areas in metropolitan areas are not the same as rural districts in municipalities. The CSVR discovered that and launched a programme to examine rural areas on the urban fringe.

In geographical targeting, the implementing organisation must also reflect on its capacity to deliver. Therefore it must consider: (1) distance; (2) the scale at which it can respond; and (3) organisational background and culture.

Distance is a geographical factor that needs to be addressed in a better way in nearly every strategy under review. It is hard to build trust from a distance and every organisation found this out. The CPA in Johannesburg is 60km closer to its target than the one in Cape Town, and that eases delivery, trust-building and ensures a better outcome. The CSVR is in Johannesburg and developed close ties to city officials there quicker and easier than elsewhere. NIM is more effective in the areas in and around its offices. We found that the distance gap can be overcome through the audit process as described in the Govan Mbeki Municipality or through hiring process facilitators from the target location as suggested by some UMAC staff (e.g. the facilitator in Tygerberg is from that area).

Scale. There may not be a 'right' scale. Wards seem to offer the manageable scale in many cases (NIM, PDI, UMAC in the Eastern Cape). In Bolobedu this would not have worked (villages with no infrastructure). Neighbourhoods are at a human scale and reasonable for research but perhaps not in terms of having a major impact on a

community. A magisterial district did not work for UMAC but wards and policing areas seemed to. It does seem that wards and policing areas, if not contradicted by research, are good scales for impact. Anything larger or smaller may diminish impact by either substituting breadth for depth or may focus us more on research than wide-scale impact (also important).

Organisational culture and background. This refers to understanding the capacity of the organisation and what it can deliver. This must be weighed against what the community needs. For instance, it is a problem if the organisation trains in materials that it has developed while the community needs training in something else. Furthermore, the target might be Tswana speakers but the organisation consists only of English speakers. All this needs to be analysed in the audit if new project managers are required or if collaborative partnerships need to be formed.

4. Geography versus replicable social programmes

We can make expensive and dangerous presumptions when we want to carry out the same strategy in *every* kind of place. No military strategist worth his salt ever did that. Geography will not allow the general to succeed in urban warfare with battle plans devised for the open plains. Sometimes it seems as if we try to do that for the sake of policy. Professor Wilfried Scharf of UCT had an interesting insight in relation to the NCPS. He wrote:

It is worth a little more than a moment of reflection to question whether there is such a thing as a world formula for crime prevention irrespective of different culture, mentalities and state capacities. The UN document seems to think there is. Simply take the formula and apply it according to your country's capacity.³

The search for replicable structures leads us to target areas the size of whole earth, entire countries and entire segments of a country (e.g. the metropolitan areas of South Africa). When we think of the 'replicable' we seem to forget human and physical geography. The earth is not a uniform ball of wax ready for an imprint but is already imprinted with cultures, institutions, languages, systems, landscapes and a range of factors called human geography. If geography matters, how then can we suggest creating replicable social programmes?

International experience suggests that nationwide coordination of crime prevention is not desirable.⁴ National coordination has largely failed whereas a variety of efforts that take the local social, economic, political and cultural issues into account do succeed. This was the very reason why the NCPS and a variety of white papers identified this as a local government role. This means local government leads. It is counterproductive to try and replicate and roll out any pre-conceived idea as to how crime prevention should work. It undermines local initiative and stops us from investigating the geographical variation that is so important to identify and capture. This is why crime prevention work must advance incrementally on a place-by-place basis as indicated by Mark Shaw in one of the first articles describing the NCPS:

Experience elsewhere suggests that there is much to be gained from 'learning by doing' – an incremental approach to the implementation of crime prevention strategies rather than one which attempts to ensure a high level of coordination across the country.⁵

One CSO argued that its goal is a replicable structure aimed at resolving a nationwide need for local-level

implementation of the NCPS. Another organisation also looked for a replicable programme but in a more targeted kind of area (impoverished areas on the urban fringe). Arguably, these approaches contradict the need to allow a variety of experiences to blossom. When asked, UMAC argued that ‘replicable’ means that national policy is standardised around ‘the structure’ for engaging local communities in social crime prevention. The reviewer sees that as problematic since we do not know what structure is appropriate. It might be a development forum or a school depending on the area. In some rural places, the only service delivery and infrastructure available are schools and police. Can we know all the options available until crime prevention practice is fully adopted as a local community effort and then later evaluate and discuss good practices? Besides, what is replicated on the ground? If we are replicating role-players around a table who then may engage in different activities in different ways in different places, are we replicating anything at all? In practice, replicable refers to the form and same strategy that any local community (with facilitation?) can duplicate. In this regard, there is a test of this in that UMAC passed key information to NIM in KwaZulu-Natal to set up CSFs. The reviewer concluded that the same strategy leading to CSFs was not replicated nor the structures. Many practices relating to CSFs were incorporated into what seem to be new kinds of structures facilitated differently and practised at a different scale. They are similar but are evolving differently based on different geography and circumstances. This only calls into question what we call ‘replicable’ and not the effort to create a multi-agency ‘mechanisms’ locally, based on the NCPS.

One of the latest international reviews on the idea of replication stated:

The track record of replication is not good. Mixed findings from evaluation studies are the norm. This is the case for example for property marking, street lighting, patrol and for arrest for domestic violence... Too often it is expected that the same measure will automatically produce the same outcome. It won't. Both common sense and research findings agree on that.⁶

That particular 2002 review by Britain's Home Office was also looking more at forms of deterrence including alarms and street lighting. If these identical products cannot manage to produce a result that we can call replicable, how much less replicable is a social programme aimed at crime prevention? What has been found repeatedly in international studies is that one must identify the context in which a strategy or tactic is being utilised and then try to repeat it in a very similar context. This, of course, includes many elements of human geography such as culture, economics, distances and any of a large number of situational factors that have been referred to as geography in this review.

Have we forgotten about geography? It does seem that the multiplicity of human and physical factors that shape ‘place’ defies our attempts to create a crime prevention structure that is replicable. Our multi-agency models do not appear to function in the same way nor should they. Creating structures that are as replicable as a fast-food franchise is counterproductive because it works against finding the structures and organisational practices suited to a diversity of people and conditions. Locals should take the lead in strategic design, not the CSO. In general, NGOs should be the technical assistants informing choice and the community advocate if invited and willing.

If the search for the replicability is tilting at windmills, we must change our ideas about models, uniform strategies, and ‘rolling out’ programmes. Instead of getting a model we may see a proliferation of experiences according to human geography.

- **Recommendation:** *It is recommended that we reduce our presumptions about what is replicable and focus on capturing information about the context, timing and spatial characteristics of our target areas and consider variations in impact accordingly. Our aim should be to carry forward a set of potentially good practices from one type of area to the next. Therefore we should document good practices by types of area (e.g. informal settlements on the urban fringe) and attempt to generate process guidelines for these areas while being aware that strategy is always implemented at ground level.*

It is further recommended that a section on the targeted areas be included in our proposals so that we are aware of the cultural, spatial, social, economic and environmental context of the intervention.

It is specifically recommended that the 15 UMAC pilot projects be analysed without delay for learning and good practices according to a variety of target areas classified by type (rural, rural within an urban area, informal areas, urban areas, peri-urban areas, etc.).

It should not be forgotten that each organisational culture has an impact on the delivery strategy and outcome. For instance, CSFs implemented by NIM are simply not the same as CSFs implemented by UMAC. It is not at all surprising that the NIM's CSFs include monitors. It is not surprising that the CPA and CSVr are research-based in approach. Of course, the ISS will examine policy. These backgrounds must be considered in predicting the kind of outcome observed on the ground.

- **Recommendation:** *It is recommended that the organisational culture and background not be limited to a description (often copy and pasted into a proposal) but should be an area of analysis regarding the capacity to deliver. Furthermore, it is recommended that evaluators also consider organisational background and culture in evaluating outcomes.*

5. The tragedy of South African research

Acknowledging the woeful state of research accompanying our crime prevention efforts is not new. It has been covered *ad nauseum* in papers, conferences and discussion. The question is why is this not rectified? We have studies conducted without evaluations, assessments masquerading as evaluations (because there is no baseline study) and interventions proceeding apace without established indicators (or generic ones not specified by place). It is tragic because we are working so hard and having a few successes but a success not documented is not really a success.

The reviewer proposes a few ideas as to why research is so limited and suggests that a feedback workshop analyse this question (in particular because there are certain fears and concerns regarding research that need to be dispelled).

Many people fear that evaluations are really disguised staff appraisals and for this reason are not anxious to be available for them.

The evaluator wants to understand both what works and what does not but the targeted organisation fears that this will expose organisational weaknesses and cause funding problems.

Researchers are not consulted at the proposal stage so the research component and what it entails are not properly considered.

- Research is seen as an extra input into the intervention rather than integral to every aspect of it.
- Sadly, some see an evaluation as merely completing a funding objective: it is ticked off the list when completed without serious follow through on any recommendations.
- Evaluations are seen as a process that takes something away from the both organisation and the community, especially time, money and opportunities for other forms of delivery.
- Often evaluations are seen as a process *owned* by the evaluator despite all attempts to make the process as participatory as possible.

Ideally, the delivery process must be monitored in-house with process evaluations to allow for timely corrections in strategy. The outcomes should always be externally evaluated because this is the only internationally acceptable practice. Internal and external researchers should co-operate from the date funding is approved to make sure that the baseline data is in accordance with what the external evaluator will need at a later stage. In-house researchers offer these advantages:

- Researchers can be on board the *management* team and be part of all proposals and processes.
- Researchers are readily available to monitor and collect baseline data for every pilot area and project *prior* to the NGO's intervention to establish the indicators for properly measuring change.
- Researchers are available to participate in processes.
- Researchers are best able to conduct internal process evaluations that provide 'action research' leading to prompt modifications in delivery strategy.
- Researchers can participate in the dissemination of research findings through briefings, publications and conferences.
- Researchers are capable of linking up with other researchers internationally and participating in international research efforts.
- Researchers offer research-based advocacy.

Arguably this approach helps to ensure the success of the intervention. Interventions without research are ad hoc and cannot be measured. It is hard to imagine that NGOs without integrated research will survive long into the future as competition for funding intensifies and the demand for professional operations increases.

The downside of an in-house research department is that the researcher becomes part of the organisational culture and therefore has a bias. Sometime she or he is pressured into making research findings represent the organisation in a favourable way. This is why external evaluations are required periodically.

Contracted researchers with a civil society background are often best for evaluating outcomes since they have no affiliations and a more limited agenda. Many consulting firms with a business approach are not only exorbitantly expensive but have not cultivated the kind of ethos required to analyse social programmes appropriately.

- **Recommendation:** *Whatever our effort, it is recommended that we should use area-based research to inform the design our interventions and stick with monitoring and evaluating these for some years.*

Both Idasa and the ISS had interventions that showed their greatest success a year after they had departed. A slap and dash approach to research does not draw much international respect either. We have to measure what happened or it did not happen. Moreover, that takes repeated testing and time. Longitudinal research is the most respected kind of research when it comes to social crime prevention. We might engage in an early childhood development intervention but then we have to track that child into adulthood. Such approaches are expensive and that is why there is a bias in research publications toward strategies that work in developed countries.

If those are accepted as problems, then we must strive for solutions. At the organisational level this means integrating research into everyone's work while also acknowledging that it must be managed by trained professionals. Knowledge is a socially collaborative production, not data waiting to be collected on the next street corner. Philosophy including ethics informs what we choose to 'collect', analyse and produce. Therefore it should be participative and generated in a way that assists all who collaborate in its production including those at community level.

Another idea is to create national crime prevention centres. Nine developed countries have formulated different kinds of structures for this. It is most interesting that they are mainly organised around reviewing prevention practices including risk factors and cost-effective ways of targeting these factors.⁷ This places crime prevention firmly within government hands and therefore may be effective. However, civil society organisations might be wary of simply following the government line and not being in a role to critique its operations and strategies or to lobby and advocate for change.

■ **Recommendation:** *Centralising information and capacity on crime prevention are recommended but the reviewer is uncertain at this point of the government role and if this would compromise the research-based advocacy role for civil society, which is already quite limited.*

■ **Recommendation:** *This section would not be complete without some consideration for what standard to keep for the content of evaluations. The reviewer recommends the following nine components of an evaluation as consistent with the findings:*

- 1 **A problem statement:** Why was the project proposed and undertaken?
- 2 **Theory:** A cogent explanation of the programme theory to be tested including the programme objectives, any assumptions and how it fits into the international literature. The evaluator should also look for consistency between the programme theory and the actual delivery.
- 3 **Context:** A clear account of the social, geographical, political and economic conditions under which this strategy is supposed to work including an account of the organisation implementing it (organisational culture, capacity, background, mission and objectives).
- 4 **A methods statement:** What methodologies and indicators will the evaluator use? The methods should be both quantitative and qualitative. Indicators should be rigorous and according to (1) the aims, objectives and planned activities of the project; and (2) the expectations of the participants. Participatory methods should be used to identify the outcomes anticipated by the staff and target group at a pre-intervention stage. The only valid method is one that includes the research from the proposal stage so that there is a baseline and an early process to establish and test the indicators (otherwise there is no 'evaluation', just an assessment).
- 5 **Delivery:** An explanation of the mechanisms by which the theory was put into practice and a comparative consideration between theory and practice (did the project go as planned?).

- 6 **Measurements from a baseline:** Qualitative and quantitative measurements of impact (preferably several methods each) measured from a baseline study initiated prior to the intervention. Here it is important to include risks to the security of community members and then later measure a reduction in those risks.
- 7 **Analysis:** Interpret what worked and what did not (and by what methods and in what context (refer to 2, 3, and 4 above) and draft a report for feedback. The programme impacts must be clearly linked to programme aims, objectives and activities.
- 8 **Feedback:** Some reference group should be utilised because knowledge is a social production and a participatory process. Limiting it to one authority or one expert limits our understanding.
- 9 **Recommendations:** What can be done next time to improve practice?

6. Proposal and delivery

Our proposals should demonstrate two clear items: (1) our programme theory; and (2) how we are going to deliver a *relevant and measurable outcome* according to various programme components. It is internationally recognised that we need a programme theory that results in an outcome that can be measured and verified.⁸ If the theory does not inform practice, it is neither relevant nor measurable.

The proposal is also critical because it is pre-intervention data that *documents* the theory and gives the objectives. The evaluator compares theory, objectives, process and outcomes (based on measurements from a baseline) to make valid statements. Therefore, the tie between proposal, theory and delivery needs to be tight so that we can measure what we are doing. Otherwise we are saying one thing and doing another.

The reviewer could not easily access a clear theoretical statement from many organisations. In fact, it was very hard work to deliver on this part of each chapter because they were usually not given accurately or clearly in the proposal. In some cases, major changes in theory and practice were made after the proposal stage making it very difficult to assess what happened. The theory, objectives and outcomes should be evident from the proposals, progress reports and evaluations. The reviewer had to use field research methodologies to fully explain some difficult documents. Sometimes there was no programme theory at all; only a list of proposed activities. Most did manage some theoretical framework in their proposals although they certainly need more rigour. The most rigorous methodology for programme design of all those discussed in the review was outlined in Chapter Six (ISHS-CPA).

Most organisations in one way or another employed theories based on the NCPS-given components of crime prevention (law enforcement, environmental design and crime prevention). All those elements are included in the public health model, which offers a far more rigorous theoretical model for programme design.

- **Recommendation:** *It is highly recommended that all organisations integrate the seven components of programme design from the public health model as discussed in Chapter Six. Furthermore, the reviewer attempted an integration of good practices in a model and found that other organisations offered an equal number of good practice elements. This resulted in **Figure Fourteen** below, which includes some components recommended for our proposals and programme designs.*

FIGURE FOURTEEN: SOME KEY ELEMENTS OF PROPOSAL AND PROGRAMME DESIGN

<p>1 Establish a research-based programme theory.</p>	<p>Use international and national research (peer-reviewed articles, books, literature reviews, evaluations or possibly this review) to identify a theory. Limit your assumptions rather than increase them but fit your theory into an international framework. The best theory can be simply stated. Complex theories cannot be communicated.</p>
<p>2 Choose a site for testing the theory: consider timing, scale, distance, social and physical environment, relevant impact, and organisational culture.</p>	<p>The site should test the theory but the area must be socially, politically and environmentally stable enough to sustain the intervention. Consider the timing of the intervention. Calculate distance from the target to ensure that you can make an impact. Choose a manageable scale: go for depth of impact as much as possible. Wards and policing areas are a good target in many cases. Also consider your own organisational culture and background (e.g. Zulu speakers are good in Zulu areas) and the distance to the target site.</p>
<p>3 Conduct a safety audit or epidemiological study that can also serve as a baseline for a later evaluation.</p>	<p>This is a professional task. Find an appropriate person or team. Identify the distribution of the crime problem, its patterns, its causes, the risks factors and how to apply all this to a crime prevention programme (local capacity, partners). Bear in mind this data will be used for the evaluation. Note: the '7 E's' as discussed in Chapter Six must be included here. This discussion is not complete without referring to Section Three above for full details on the content of a safety audit.</p>
<p>4 Community consultations: feedback, decision-making, invitation, targeting.</p>	<p>Offer feedback on the study so that the community is informed and mobilised. Put all decision-making in their hands but offer technical assistance. If invited, establish a steering group for consultations on the CSO role. A good practice is to include local councillors who can report directly to the local council and traditional leaders in rural areas. Ensure that you will be targeting the right people in the right place to ensure a relevant and sustainable outcome (e.g. public safety committee). Consider change agents.</p>
<p>5 Consultative design stage: negotiate and contract the CSO role including entry and exit.</p>	<p>Discuss the CSO role in the community in relationship to the steering group. Make a contract that clearly designates areas of responsibility. Include a CSO entrance and exit strategy. Best practice is to make the targeted group the ones that sustain the intervention but be sure that these are the people with the right job descriptions (and avoid adding a new structure). Try to work out ways that you can make their jobs easier rather than harder while still locating all responsibility with the target group.</p>

LESSONS FROM LOCAL CRIME PREVENTION

6	Strategic planning and empowerment: capacity building, problem-solving, strategic planning, indicators, means of verification, timetable.	Target existing institutions for capacity building. Include life skills, problem-solving, strategic planning capacity and training and information about crime prevention. Develop a place-based strategy in a participatory and problem-solving way. Outcome: Action plan with indicators means of verification, timetables and areas of responsibility. Do not force partnerships but allow the community to develop at its own pace. Strive for accredited training.
7	Community-directed and negotiated CSO input.	Negotiate additional CSO input into the community's delivery strategy. Keep ownership in community hands.
8	CSO-negotiated advocacy and pro-activism.	Advocate for the community where needed. Help stop crime when good information is available. Be proactive about issues of national crime prevention importance including low levels of participation in government, and problems of good governance, human rights and democratic functioning.
9	Monitor and Evaluate.	Assess the impact and efficacy of the crime prevention initiative with both process evaluations and outcome evaluations over a long enough time to make valid statement (use an external evaluator for outcomes. Establish whether or not the intervention reduced risk.
10	Exit.	Leave after adding value. If the right group was targeted in the entrance strategy and no new structure was added, then one can add value to existing structures and leave a sustainable imprint behind.

The recommendations outlined in **Figure Fourteen** integrate key elements of approaches from the public health, developmental and security frameworks. It allows us some leeway with regard to epidemiology (a safety audit instead) and the use of CPTED. It also included the finding that we need to address democracy, human rights and governance as fundamentals of delivery. We also need to recognise the security, developmental and public health concerns are mixed and sometimes we must prioritise one over the other. Therefore there should be a gap between research and the design of the intervention as we consult with the community.

- **Recommendation:** *It is recommended that funding agencies make some limited funding available for professional audits and community consultations and then make additional longer-term funding available based on the strategy that develops. Short-term, one-year funding is usually inadequate and some mechanism is required to help with longer-term research and facilitation practices.*

Aside from the programme theory that was detailed above, the following are also recommended as subject headings that need to be addressed in every proposal:

Entrance strategy. *This is often missing and yet it can take half the time of the intervention or more (see 'Getting Started' in each chapter and Chapter Seven for good practice discussion).*

- **Process guidelines and the actual step-by-step delivery strategy.** *The initial delivery strategy does require discussion but it also needs to be listed or diagrammed somewhere. This must be documented and when changes do occur, this must be identified in progress reports in the same manner; otherwise it is difficult, if not impossible, to capture the intervention and therefore measure outcomes accurately (see 'Delivery Strategy', in each chapter and Chapters Six or Eight for good practice information).*
- **Geographical targeting.** *This would include the cultural, spatial, social, economic and environmental context of the target area and a discussion of the capacity of the organisation to deliver with consideration for distance, scale and organisational culture and background. A motivation for these particular targets must be made and must fit with the programme theory. The timing of the intervention in the area might also be considered in this section (see 'Organisational Background' and 'Geographical Targeting' in each of the chapters).*
- **An exit strategy:** *This is usually missing. It was well considered in at least two of the interventions with the result of a sustainable multi-agency structures working on crime prevention (see 'Making an Exit' in each chapter).*
- **Ensuring relevant outcomes.** *This section would discuss the techniques for ensuring relevant outcomes from hiring the right facilitator to the type of training. For instance, a perfectly planned intervention with the wrong staff can go awry (see all chapters under 'Ensuring Relevant Outcomes' and 'Lessons Learnt').*
- **Measuring impact.** *One must account for the methods of measuring impact. Preferably the research is available at the proposal stage and helps to draft it. Otherwise, a researcher should be used for this section. This must always be in a proposal and according to international standards of research. An intervention not evaluated might as well not have occurred because we cannot share the practice. It must be external; otherwise there is no faith in the evaluation results with the same effect that it cannot be shared. Other aspects of this were detailed in the section 'The Tragedy of Research' above.*

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